Separate but equal?
John F. Kennedy, Europe, and the Declaration of Interdependence

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The foreign policy legacy of John F. Kennedy has largely been limited to three of the defining battlegrounds of the Cold War – Berlin, Vietnam, and Cuba. To many, Kennedy’s European policy equals Kennedy’s Berlin policy. However, his relationship with a united Europe represented significant part of his Cold War strategy. On July 4 1962, President Kennedy spoke at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. After arguing that the Declaration of Independence continued to inspire struggles for freedom around the world, he claimed that “the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence” with a united Europe. Kennedy also encouraged his fellow citizens “to think intercontinentally”. Such statements can be argued to be both a departure from and a continuation of American foreign policy traditions. The purpose of this paper is to place John F. Kennedy’s policy towards Europe, particularly his 1962 Declaration of Interdependence, within the context of the historical traditions of isolationism and liberal internationalism.

The main focus will be on the economic aspect of the Atlantic partnership, rather than political or military cooperation. As the purpose of and background for the 1962 Declaration of Interdependence are explored, it becomes increasingly clear that Kennedy’s European policy was primarily concerned with trade. Also, Kennedy’s 1962 speech was not directed at European audience but was part of a campaign to convince Congress to pass the bill that would become the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. In fact, while Kennedy’s message of intercontinental interdependence served national interests rather than international ones. American willingness to participate in the Atlantic community and act through multilateral institutions suggest that American leaders had departed from the traditionally isolationist doctrine in America foreign policy. However, such new ideas were based on a shift in what was deemed necessary to protect national interest, in this case economic interests. Thus, American principles did not necessarily significantly change, but the global context in which American foreign policy was formulated did. Therefore, several frameworks can be examined to analyze Kennedy’s European policy: traditions of isolationism and internationalism in American history in general, the impact of the Cold War on these, and the beliefs and

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principles of the Kennedy administration. Through history, Americans have generally assumed an isolationist position on foreign policy – paradoxically combined with a belief in America as a superior nation and a potential world leader in democratic principles. President Woodrow Wilson’s proposal for liberal institutionalism after World War I was rejected by an isolationist Congress, but these internationalist principles returned with the Cold War. Also, foreign policy is considered the responsibility of the president while certain powers lie with Congress, such as the approval of treaties and the power to declare war. History has shown presidents to be more internationalist and progressive in matters of foreign policy, whereas Congress represents the more conservative and cautious home front. The relationship between the Executive and Congress are particularly interesting in the case of Kennedy and the Declaration of Interdependence, since the speech coincided with Congress’ treatment of the Trade Expansion Act.

The terms “Atlantic partnership” or “Atlantic community” will both be used to describe the American-European relationship in this paper. According to some political leaders at the time, “partnership” referred to the relationship between the US and Europe as a united, single actor (mostly for economic purposes) and “community” referred to the bilateral relationship between the US and the various European states (primarily on NATO matters). However, many current scholars do not make the distinction between the two, and the approach is continued here.

Isolationism, unilateralism, and the national interest

In 1796, George Washington decided to leave the presidency after two terms. His Farewell Address became a founding document in American politics in issues defining much of American foreign policy for most of the 19th century. This was an isolationist foreign policy defined by protection of the national interest. International engagements were seen as possible threats to the survival of the young American nation. Washington argued, “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world”, and that trade

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should be the only motivation for international relationships. Washington particularly presented Europe as a threat to American interests. He claimed that

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation [...] it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Thus, Europe in particular was identified as the symbol of the Old World which represented conflicts and alliances potential dangerous to American interests.

In 1901, Thomas Jefferson’s inaugural address continued in the same tradition as Washington’s address, yet with a significant contribution. Jefferson based his insistence on American isolationism on the exceptional nature and morally superiority of the American nation and warned that, if it became involved with “entangling alliances”, the morally and politically superior new nation would be drawn into the European power politics that it had recently escaped.4

The early tradition of isolationism was institutionalized in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Directed at European, particularly Spanish and French, interests and their potential intervention in South and Central America, the doctrine was part isolationist, part interventionist. It presented the idea of continental separation, securing the Americas from military and economic intervention while promising US non-intervention in Europe. A promise that was directed both Europeans and to appease isolationists at home. However, it also gave US the right to intervene when deeming necessary in the rest of the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine was not necessarily a result of anti-European sentiments in the new American nation; it was an acknowledgement of national interests in a global context.5 In fact, the formulation and success of the doctrine depended on an improving relationship with Britain and the belief in the global supremacy of its navy. Americans tend to remember the doctrine as a principled act establishing their distance from European affairs, but Walter Russell Mead argues that it was decided that the British interests in the area were more in sync with American ones, and thus America would rely on British control of the area. Another advantage of British supremacy in Latin America was that it prevented America from building

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an expensive navy at a time when internal development was more in the national interest.\textsuperscript{6} Only at the turn of the century did America acquire the military and naval power necessary to intervene unilaterally in Latin America, as seen in the addition of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904.

**Interventionism, multilateralism and liberal institutionalism**

Towards the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, American power had prospered economically and geographically to the degree that international engagements no longer seemed a threat to the national interest. In fact, American leaders used their supposed moral superiority to justify interventions in colonial struggles in Cuba and the Philippines, among others. For the first time, America possessed the strength and will to “defend” the Americas by themselves. However, it was the presidency of Woodrow Wilson that provided the significant shift in American foreign policy. In his “Fourteen Points speech”, Wilson had the recipe for a world safe for democracy and free trade. This represents the attitude that would provide the other tradition in American foreign policy, namely the tradition of interventionism and institutionalism. Especially Wilson’s proposal for the establishment of the League of Nations embodied new American support for the principle of collective security and liberal institutionalism. However, the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the Senate due to small, but efficient group of isolationists in the Senate led by Republican Henry Cabot Lodge.\textsuperscript{7} They feared that the League of Nations would threaten US sovereignty, and especially the power the British might assume over the League. Senator William Borah of Idaho opposed the treaty because “The League of Nations makes it necessary for America to give back to George V what it took away from George III.”\textsuperscript{8} Thomas Guinsberg has argued that the isolationist opposition to the Treaty of Versailles was not based on a wish not to participate in international relation, but simply the fear of “fighting other people’s battles in a strait-jacket”.\textsuperscript{9} This relates to Walter LaFeber’s argument that isolationism in America did not necessarily signify indifference to international issues or the wish for limited trade, but rather

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{6}] Mead pp. 199-203
\item[\textsuperscript{7}] Guinsberg p. 19
\item[\textsuperscript{8}] New York Times, March 20, 1919. Quoted in Guinsberg p. 30
\item[\textsuperscript{9}] Guinsberg p. 20
\end{itemize}
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a wish for “the freedom to act unilaterally”. The result of the debate concerning the League of Nations was a compromise on foreign policy which implied that America would promote its national interests, particularly free trade, in the global arena, but would not intervene in the matters of other nations. Thus, the groundwork for a new internationalist principle in American foreign policy had been laid, but the conditions for the American public and political leadership to support it were missing.

**The Cold War**

World War II significantly changed the international setting for American foreign policy. The outcome of the war provided an opportunity for the three traditions of foreign policy to come together: the national interest of national security and economic prosperity, the belief in America as a morally superior nation that would serve as a role model for other nations, and the Wilsonian principles of liberal institutionalism and collective security. American support for international institutions, such as the United Nations, and collective security, as exemplified in NATO, signified a renewed dedication to Wilsonian ideals. But all these were also in the national interest of the United States. Spreading democracy and free trade would open markets to American goods and decrease the risk of war – i.e. reduce American military spending.

The Cold War forced American leaders to rethink their isolationist tradition. As Pearl Harbor proved that the Atlantic no longer provided an automatic defense barrier against foreign aggression, Americans became aware of the importance of collective security. The threat from the Soviet Union required the defense of not just American borders, but the entire “free” world. Even for America, such task required international cooperation. However, two factors besides national security influenced Americans’ newfound willingness to participate in international institutions and assume a role of international leadership. First, World War II had left the US as an economic and military superpower and as the leader of the Western, capitalist system. The American sense of exceptionalism and moral superiority only strengthened the resolve to assume world leadership. The economic and materialistic strength

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of the US highlighted the importance of creating new markets abroad. Americans’ newfound economic supremacy proved a double advantage – they needed international trade and they could now pursue this without having to fear the control of other nations. Second, America’s reluctance to participate in international institutions and contribute to collective security had always been based on a fear of losing sovereignty and being forced into unruly situations by alliances. Due to America’s newfound status as the free world’s sole superpower, American leaders were probably aware that the very survival and success of those institutions now relied fully on American leadership, and thus it was highly unlikely that the US could be forced into conflicts against its own will. Thus, not only did the Cold War seem to be an immediate end to the isolationist sentiment that had defined US foreign policy through history, but the newfound role of superpower seemed to combine America’s wish for internationalist cooperation with a traditional wish to protect national security and economic prosperity. Thus, it was able to use its activist, collective tendencies while also maintaining nearly complete control of its own military, economic and political matters.

The stability of Western Europe had top priority after the war, as it was considered the first moral battleground between capitalism and communism. A democratic and capitalistic Western Europe was considered the foundation for containing communism, and its political, economic and cultural ties to the US made it particularly important to American interests. A weak and divided Europe happily accepted American support and leadership in return for relinquishing power to the Americans on many matters, especially military ones. However, by the time John F. Kennedy came into power in 1961, the balance of power between the US and Europe had shifted as the threat of nuclear war in Europe seemed smaller, and the Common Market developed into a serious competitor to American economic supremacy in the Western world. As any other activist, internationalist country, America was now facing the reality that there was a limit to its economic capabilities. In short, America at home could no longer afford to protect American interest abroad singlehandedly. In the words of Joseph Kraft in the book *The Grand Design*, “this country’s foreign commitments have outpaces its

12 LaFeber p. 37
domestic development.”14 As Europe was becoming stronger in the late 1950s, it could suitably take over some of the military and economic responsibilities of the US; however, this would require American leaders to relinquish power.

Separate but equal? The United States and Europe

The military, political and economic cooperation between the US and Europe was institutionalized with the establishment of the Marshall Plan in 1947 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. In the 1950s, American would quietly support further integration in Western Europe by supporting the establishment of the Steel and Coal Union and later, its successor, the European Economic Community in 1957.15 The concept of a united Europe was popular with the elites of American politics on both sides of the political aisle.16 The failure of a suggested European Defence Community (which would have been under American control and leadership) in 1954 created a growing split between economic and military aspects of Atlantic cooperation. By the time Kennedy came into office, the primary concern of the Americans was economic cooperation. In fact, American national security interests clashed with economic interests. In national security, US leaders wished for a strong, integrated Western Europe to contain Soviet power and, in particular, West Germany. Thus a potential rise in German militarism would be contained by other European powers while also preventing a reunification with East Germany that would almost surely result in a neutral state.17 However, a strong, integrated Europe could potentially pose an economic threat to American interests. Thus, American leaders had an ambivalent relationship with the European Economic Community as it strengthened European integration, but it could potentially lead to American isolation on Atlantic economic matters. Also, it was feared that a joint European tariff would limit trade with the Third World, thus creating social instability in areas which Americans considered crucial in the struggle against communism.18

For the US, the main issue was to have Great Britain accepted into the Common Market. Due to the

15 Schlesinger p. 718
16 Kraft p. 116
17 Costigliola 1989 p. 39
“special relationship”, it was believed that British entry would secure de facto American influence.  

The common phrase used by both Americans and pro-integration Europeans leader such as Jean Monnet to describe the Atlantic partnership was that the two pillars should be “separate but equal”.  

Considering that the phrase was usually employed in an American context to legitimize harassment and suppression of African American, its use was actually quite suitable for describing the Atlantic “partnership”. Americans wanted a strong and independent Western Europe as long as they could control it.

On military matters, Europe was still dependent on American support and leadership in NATO. This also contributed to America’s economic problems. One of the concerns of American leaders was the uneven balance-of-payments due to military spending in Europe. Military protection of Western Europe was a considerable part of American defense spending. As Europe prospered economically, it seemed unfair to Americans that they should continue to pay for European defense when the continent was no longer weak and divided. However, when some Europeans nations, especially France, suggested strengthening national rather than international defense, American objected.

**John F. Kennedy and The Grand Design**

In his 1962 State of the Union Address, Kennedy outlined the issues that would come to define the political year. The economy stands out as the major issue in the speech, and Kennedy referred to the need for a new trade expansion bill as absolutely crucial to America’s future success and stability. He also spoke favourably of the United Nations and mentioned “the united strength of the Atlantic community” as one of the “five basic sources of strength.” Kennedy argued that military concerns in Europe were being replaced by economic ones, particularly due to the growth of the Common Market. However, he argued that a new favourable trade act was the only way to secure a Common Market accessible to American

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19 Costigliola 1989 p. 26
20 Schlesinger p. 72. The phrase is also used in Joseph Kraft’s *The Grand Design*
31 Costigliola 1989 p. 26
goods. Thus, John F. Kennedy’s objectives for an Atlantic partnership/community was primary economic.

Kennedy’s under secretary of state for economic affairs, George Ball, noted, even before Kennedy’s inauguration, that “we shall be able to keep […] our hopes for a prosperous and secure Free World only if we swiftly move to develop a new set of economic policies in common with our allies”. Thus, Kennedy’s goal was to redefine the Atlantic partnership to counteract the shifting power balance between the US and Europe and to convince/force Europeans to pay their share of military expenses in the Cold War. In the 1961 Acheson Report, which defined the Kennedy administration’s goals on European policy, it was openly admitted that the goal of a new partnership was not to change American policy, but to increase control over Western Europe.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTA), which had defined American international trade since 1934, would expire in 1962. Due to rising isolationism in Congress, Kennedy decided to present its replacement, the Trade Expansion Act, immediately in 1962. The Dillon Round at the GATT conference from May 1961 to January 1962 had been particularly troublesome due to the few options for negotiations in the RTA – this only convinced Kennedy and his advisers that new legislation was necessary and that this should give the president far greater powers in negotiating trade barriers. Within the Kennedy administration, a conflict arose concerning which department should define the politics of the Great Design. George Ball and the internationalist State Department clashed with the isolationist Commerce Department. Eventually, the internationalist, pro-free trade George Ball was given control over much of European affairs, especially since Secretary of State Dean Rusk had very little interest in the

23 George W. Ball to Dean Rusk, 1 January 1961, Box 12, General Correspondence Folder, 48-164, 1 January to 3 March 1961, in John F. Kennedy Library. Quoted in DiLeo, David L. “George Ball and the Europeanists in the State Department”, in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds., John F. Kennedy and Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), p. 263
25 Kraft p. 35
26 Major p. 388
27 Kraft p. 25
topic despite being staunchly pro-European, as were the president and most of his advisors. Ball was instrumental in the formulation of the Trade Expansion Act, and it came to reflect his Wilsonian ideals of free trade and institutionalism.

Kennedy sent the Trade Expansion Act to Congress in January 1962, and soon the bill was fused in the minds of many with the concept of an Atlantic Partnership. When introducing the bill to Congress, President Kennedy emphasized the domestic importance of a new trade act considering that the country had faced three recessions in seven years. While he emphasized international institutionalism, he also reminded members of Congress that economic cooperation was in fact a matter of national security in the Cold War. He argued, “An integrated Western Europe, joined in trading partnership with the United States, will further shift the world balance of power to the side of freedom.” Kennedy did not only present the bill as an economic measure, but an important tool in the Cold War. Thus, American prosperity and European stability were central to the continued struggle against communism.

President Kennedy presented his Declaration of Interdependence speech on July 4, 1962. Ironically, for a speech on US-European relations, no European leaders were in the audience. Kennedy had a clear domestic agenda for his July 4 speech. It is no coincidence that Kennedy’s 1962 speech primarily mentioned economic cooperation and to a lesser degree political and military matters. He was appealing to a potentially isolationist Congress that an Atlantic partnership was in the interest of American economic interest. He stated that

We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.

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29 Costigliola 1989 p. 69
30 Kraft p. 36, 115
32 Kennedy, January 25 1962
33 Kennedy, July 4 1962, my emphasis
By focusing on Europe carrying part of the burden, President Kennedy addressed the concerns of Congress and interest groups due to European growth, thereby assuring them that a strong Europe would not be a rival but rather a partner to share the (economic) burden of leading the free world. Thus, the congressional vote on the bill would in fact be on Kennedy’s vision for a Grand Design. The increasing demand from various political groups and interest organizations that Europeans should share their part of the burden in the Cold War, was not necessarily based on a wish to lesser American engagement in international affairs.\textsuperscript{34}

In 1962, columnist Joseph Kraft released the book \textit{The Grand Design} which presented the specifics of renewed Atlantic partnerships and how such an arrangement would strengthen both Europe and America. Kraft claimed that the book was not the official program of the Kennedy administration, but he had consulted with several high ranking officials in the administration when writing the book.\textsuperscript{35} The Grand Design was intended as a redefinition of the Atlantic relationship – particularly designed to suit American needs. Indeed, Kraft suggested that the Grand Design would take its place next to NATO and the Marshall Plan as “another spectacular leap in this country’s remarkable transit from isolation to international commitment.”\textsuperscript{36} However, the Grand Design and the Kennedy administration faced a problem that the Truman administration and its internationalist projects had not: a strong, independent-minded Europe which had no intention of letting the US continue to set the agenda. Particularly French leader Charles de Gaulle was a proponent of this newfound independence. The primary objective of the Grand Design was economic prosperity with military and political cooperation; this suggests that Americans did indeed feel its economic supremacy threatened, but not its military or political control.

For Europeans, increased economic independence contributed to the wish for military control as well. The decreasing fear in Western Europe of a Soviet nuclear attack was weakening the Europeans’ sense of inferiority and subordination to American control. Generally, the post-war Atlantic relationship was defined by cooperation and consultation in principle, but American dominance in reality. Especially in military/NATO matters - an example was the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Kraft p. 21
\item \textsuperscript{35} Kraft p. 9
\item \textsuperscript{36} Kraft p. 15
\end{itemize}
Cuban Missile Crisis in which the European allies were kept in the dark - Americans considered European concerns to be secondary.\textsuperscript{37} Despite Kennedy’s wish for a Grand Design, his European allies generally felt that he ignored them in the decision-making process and was far less cooperative then Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{38} Kennedy’s military doctrine of flexible response made some European leaders worry whether Americans would actually deploy nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. In response, the French wished for their own nuclear capabilities. Americans instead suggested a Multilateral Force (the MLF) that would consists of a multilateral/NATO fleet of ships armed with nuclear missiles – under American control, obviously.\textsuperscript{39} 

The Trade Expansion Act was the major legislative event of 1962, yet it passed Congress convincingly, 78-8 in the Senate and 298-125 in the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{40} However, Kennedy’s hopes for an Atlantic community were sabotaged by Charles de Gaulle. In January 1963, de Gaulle gave a speech in which he efficiently put an end to American hopes for greater cooperation across the Atlantic. First, he vetoed the acceptance of Great Britain into the Common Market. Second, he denounced the MLF. Both issues were discredited due to it being, according to de Gaulle, another scheme for American domination of European affairs.\textsuperscript{41} Without French cooperation, Kennedy had little chance of fulfilling the dream of a Grand Design. After de Gaulle’s statements, Kennedy abandoned the idea of a redefinition of the Atlantic community and instead focused on specific initiatives, such as the MLF and the Kennedy Round at the GATT conference at which the Trade Expansion Act was used to reduce tariffs.\textsuperscript{42}

In 1963, Kennedy and several of his advisors abandoned the Eurocentric approach to foreign relations that had defined the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. During his time as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, JFK had shown greater interest in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia than Europe. With Cold

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{38} Costigliola 1995 p. 107 \\
\textsuperscript{39} Costigliola 1989 p. 51 \\
\textsuperscript{40} Schlesinger pp. 271-272 \\
\textsuperscript{41} Schlesinger p. 717 \\
\textsuperscript{42} Giauque p. 101.
\end{flushright}
War struggles in Laos and Vietnam calling for his attention, Kennedy’s interest in European affairs decreased in 1963.\textsuperscript{43}

President Kennedy’s 1962 Declaration of Interdependence and his request for an Atlantic partnership can seem rather distant from the isolationist rhetoric frequently heard through American history. However, Kennedy – and American leaders throughout the Cold War – was reluctant to relinquish power in an Atlantic partnership, and thus the rhetoric of community was in fact a tool of domestic politics for legislative purposes. Despite, the internationalist approach of Kennedy’s foreign policy, his primary concerns was still to protect American interests, particularly in the field of trade. Kennedy struggled with the paradox of being a superpower with strong national interests and the wish to be a member of the international community with its demands of compromise, cooperation and possible loss of sovereignty. He had to appeal to his domestic supporters in order to work with international allies. When faced with the choice between national interest and the international community, Kennedy chose national interest. Thus, in this case, Kennedy’s wish for an Atlantic community can be interpreted as a wish to consolidate American power rather than a legitimate wish for liberal institutionalism.

**List of sources**


\textsuperscript{43}Costigliola 1989 p. 52


