'I don't need your handkerchiefs': Holland's experience of crisis consultation in NATO

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The article looks at conflicts of interest between the United States and some of the smaller allies in NATO over the last 30 years, and examines three episodes of crisis—Cuba, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the downing of the Korean airliner—to see how alliance political consultation took shape, and whether it occurred at all. It traces the impetus behind moves to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance. It is based on declassified Dutch diplomatic archives for the period 1960–85.

Dutch Foreign Minister Luns meets US Admiral Rickover at a cocktail party in Washington, May 1969:

LUNS: I am pleased to meet you at last.

RICKOVER: So you are the man who has been weeping and crying for years about not getting an atomic submarine from us. I have brought a lot of handkerchiefs with me to wipe your tears, because you are not going to get any assistance from us.

LUNS: I don't need your handkerchiefs. Why do you refuse to give the Netherlands an atomic submarine?

RICKOVER: You are wholly dependent for your existence and survival on the United States. Right? Therefore we and not you will decide what type of warships you may possess and you should know that you are far too small and poor ever to be able to build or to run atomic submarines...I know all your arguments and I am sick and tired of them.[1]

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In 1966 the Atlantic Institute in Paris published *Crisis management: the new diplomacy* by Alastair Buchan. According to Buchan, the Atlantic alliance was

[1] This conversation actually took place; the text reproduced here is translated from Foreign Minister Luns's note of his conversation with Admiral Rickover. Memorandum by Luns, 1 June 1969, Secret Archives (hereafter SA followed by Code, File and Part Number), Code 912.1, File 1041, Part II, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the Dutch Prime Minister's Office and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in allowing them to quote from their Secret Archives for the period 1960–85. Further archival materials come from the holdings of the Dutch National Archives; the Canadian Department of External Affairs, Ottawa; and the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Translations are the authors'. A first draft of the article was presented at a conference on 'NATO after 40 years' at the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies, Kent State University, in 1989.

in considerable disarray. Old alliance mechanisms developed ten or 15 years before were out of date.[2] Buchan was not alone in thinking along these lines in the mid-1960s. With such ominous titles as *The troubled partnership*, *The end of alliance* and *NATO in quest of cohesion*, commentators like Henry Kissinger, Ronald Steel and Karl Cerny also pointed to fundamental weaknesses in the transatlantic partnership.[3]

Given the state of the alliance, Buchan considered 'considerable modification' essential if NATO was to survive. Seventeen years after its foundation, the organization still lacked a system of collective decision-making that would stand the test of a major or European crisis. To overcome the problems involved in crisis-management, he advocated a system of long-term contingency planning based in Washington, a North Atlantic Policy Planning Council, and a standby system for high-level crisis consultation.

His suggestions seemed aimed at the United States' main European allies—Britain, France and West Germany. As Buchan noted, 'Small allies...she [the United States] can probably retain indefinitely for they have little freedom of choice. But to retain the support of the major allies means finding a common objective with them.' Buchan was aware of possible difficulties with the smaller NATO allies, who would not be too happy with his prescriptions for centralized decision-making. If the alliance was to be effective, however, 'the reality of power' had to be confronted.[4]

Buchan expected the smaller allies to put up little resistance to inroads into their national autonomy. But for small allies there is a great deal at stake in the consultation process. Consultation and, with it, the ability to influence or restrain other allies is generally considered one of the principal incentives for joining an alliance, especially for smaller nations. It gives them the opportunity to influence other states, which is an asset in itself. And that influence can also be used to limit one of the principal risks of joining an alliance: entrapment, or the fear of being dragged by the major allies into a larger military conflict.[5] As Robert Russell has observed with regard to the Netherlands, political consultation within NATO has been the Dutch method of compensating for being small and lacking any automatic claim to a special relationship with the United States.[6]

Buchan's suggestions were not implemented. Nevertheless, the issues Buchan confronted are still with us today. NATO survived, and is still permanently plagued by recurring crises.[7] Crisis-management, political consultation and the

[2] Alastair Buchan, *Crisis management: the new diplomacy* (Boulogne-sur-Seine: Atlantic Institute, 1966).

[3] Henry Kissinger, *The troubled partnership: a reappraisal of the Atlantic alliance* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965); Ronald Steel, *The end of alliance: America and the future of Europe* (New York: Viking, 1964), and K. H. Cerny and H. W. Briefs, eds., *NATO in quest of cohesion* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

[4] Buchan, *Crisis management*, *passim*.

[5] Glenn H. Snyder, 'The security dilemma in alliance politics', *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4, July 1984, pp. 461–95.

[6] Robert W. Russell, 'The Atlantic alliance in Dutch foreign policy', in J. H. Leurdijk, ed., *The foreign policy of the Netherlands* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 175–8.

[7] Cf. William Park, *Defending the West: a history of NATO* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986), p. vii: 'Since its inception in 1949 the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been both punctuated and propelled by crises, so much so that the alliance has had to survive since birth against the background of an almost continuous death-knell.'

role of the smaller powers in that process continue to be some of the unresolved issues. The central questions addressed in this article are therefore: How much political consultation did take place in NATO at times when the alliance needed it most; and what effect did consultation, or the lack of it, have on the loyalty of the smaller allies, and hence on the cohesion of the alliance?

These questions are important for at least two reasons. First, from a historical perspective, the answers will clarify the role of the smaller allies within NATO. Is it still, as Johan Galtung once remarked, a feudal alliance, hierarchically ordered with rather limited horizontal interaction among its lower-ranking members? Second, from a policy perspective, they will provide us with some leads regarding NATO's future course. The crises examined are the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviet-orchestrated invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the downing of the Korean Airliner KAL 007 in 1983. These crises are very dissimilar. However, we explicitly decided to bring in this diversity in order to assess the process of consultation and crisis-management under different circumstances. Despite this diversity, the episodes have in common certain traits commonly associated with international crises—an explicit threat, limited reaction time, and the element of surprise.

Cuba was manifestly an East–West confrontation and provoked an infringement of the postwar bloc structure. Furthermore, it was on the edge of the territorial scope of the North Atlantic Treaty, but with threatening implications especially for the situation in Berlin. The assault on Czechoslovakia did not create an infringement of the European spheres of influence or bloc structures. Nonetheless, it had direct implications for the working of the alliance because it threatened to destabilize the complex military and political environment directly at the demarcation line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The downing of the Korean airliner was an out-of-area problem. Notwithstanding the fact that it was no direct threat to the security of any of the parties, it was dealt with in such a grave manner that it could have severely threatened international peace and security.

We are aware of the fact that in addressing this issue we are dealing with just one aspect of the central problem confronting the smaller NATO allies: the extent to which they are able to influence alliance policies in general. This aspect is, however, a cardinal one in an alliance. The ability to deal with crises is of paramount importance to NATO. The feeling among small allies that their interests are also taken into account in crisis-management is fundamental to the alliance. Without such confidence, allied loyalty and alliance cohesion are at stake. In our conclusions we will try to put our findings into the broader context of inter-allied relations, the problems and roles of smaller powers, and the future of the alliance.

Given the different regulations with regard to the declassification of federal records in the NATO member states and NATO itself, and the liberal situation in the Netherlands, our research has been based primarily on Dutch sources. Our findings should be evaluated as a first but necessary step towards a better understanding of political consultation and smaller allies during international crises.

Prelude: NATO's first ten years

NATO did not get off to a propitious start as regards political consultation with its smaller allies. Unknown to their future allies, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada settled the principal features of the North Atlantic Treaty in the ultra-secret Pentagon negotiations of March 1948. In ten days of frank and frantic discussions in the bowels of the Pentagon the Anglo-Saxon powers hammered out a list of treaty stipulations, a list of prospective treaty members and a general understanding to reach a definite agreement as soon as circumstances (for instance the presidential elections in the United States) would permit.[8] When France and the Benelux countries joined the negotiations in the summer of 1948, the three Anglo-Saxon conferees decided to keep their agreement secret. This, on a number of occasions, seriously hampered the Treaty negotiating process. After completing the Treaty text in the spring of 1949, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy were invited to become members of the North Atlantic Alliance on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The distribution of power within the alliance was aptly demonstrated in the discussions on Article 5, the core article of the treaty. While Article 5 sweepingly stipulates that an armed attack on one of the parties is considered an attack against them all, the action to be taken by each member state is the action it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. The US Senate was adamant in this respect. In the end, domestic considerations clearly were more important to the Truman administration than the wishes of its prospective partners.[9]

Political consultation was firmly engraved in the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 4 provides that 'The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.' The (secret) agreed interpretations left no room for doubt: Article 4 was applicable 'in the event of a threat in any part of the world, to the security of any of the Parties, including a threat to the security of their overseas territories.'[10] Thus the North Atlantic Treaty closely resembled the stipulations of the 1948 Treaty of Brussels in which, though the assistance clause was explicitly limited to the territory of the signatories in Europe, the consultation clause knew no geographical limits.[11]

These solemnly agreed provisions proved, however, to be idle words in the first years of NATO's existence. A North Atlantic Council was created, but the main business dealt with was the United States asking its European allies for

[8] Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, 'The Pentagon negotiations, March 1948: the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty'. *International Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 3, Summer 1983, pp. 351–63.

[9] After more than ten years, the best study on the origins of the alliance is still Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947–1949* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

[10] *Foreign relations of the United States*, 1949, Vol. IV, Western Europe (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 222–3.

[11] Cf. Articles 4 and 7 of the Treaty of Brussels, and Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For a legally oriented assessment of the obligation to consult under the provisions of the North Atlantic treaty: Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., 'NATO consultations as a component of national decisionmaking', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 73, No. 3, July 1979, pp. 372–406.

increased defence spending and the Europeans pleading for more aid. That political consultation hardly existed was exemplified by the Western reaction to the outbreak of the Korean War. The Truman administration, without consulting even its closest ally, Britain, decided to intervene in Korea on behalf of the free world; most of its NATO allies ultimately followed suit by sending military contingents to the Korean battlefields.

As early as 1951 a committee was instructed to recommend ways and means to enlarge the scope of political consultation. While acknowledging the fact that each government was entitled to full freedom of action, the NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community advocated increased consultation in order to strengthen the alliance, adding: 'While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community.'[12] The implication was clear: to foster alliance cohesion political consultation was imperative, and the smaller allies were entitled to generous treatment from the larger ones.

Despite this recommendation, the situation did not improve much over the next five years. Consultation occurred only on an *ad hoc* basis.[13] When the North Atlantic Council assessed progress in the field during its meeting of May 1956, the allies decided to set up a Committee on Non-Military Cooperation which, again, was to make recommendations in order to improve and extend cooperation in the non-military field. The need for such cooperation was amply demonstrated by the Suez crisis of November 1956, and the lack of consultation between the principal allies during that crisis reverberated in the report of the 'three wise men', Halvard Lange, Gaetano Martino and Lester Pearson:

> It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political—or economic—consultation in NATO. It is difficult and has in fact been shown to be impossible, if the proper conviction is lacking, to convert the profession into practice. ... There is a pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of national policy. Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy.[14]

The fundamental dilemma—how to reconcile the inherent right of each government to act unilaterally with the need for allied consultation and common policies—was papered over in the recommendations of the three wise men. The 'essential thing' for each ally was to keep in mind always the interests of the alliance, and not to adopt firm policies before 'adequate advance consultation' had taken place unless 'circumstances' made this impossible. The three added that the interests of the alliance members were 'not confined to the area covered by the Treaty'.[15]

[12] Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: the transatlantic bargain* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 14–15.

[13] For a general survey of political consultation in this period: Francis A. Beer, *Integration and disintegration in NATO: processes of alliance cohesion and prospects for Atlantic community* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 12–28; and Roger Hill, *Political consultation in NATO* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1978), pp. 15–17.

[14] Report of the Committee of Three on Non Military Cooperation in NATO (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1956), pp. 12–13.

[15] Report of the Committee of Three, pp. 14, 9.

Five years later, on the eve of the Cuban missile crisis, the dilemma was still not resolved. In May 1962 the North Atlantic Council debated in Athens the plans of the US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, for a changed nuclear strategy—'flexible response'. This concept of a controlled nuclear war was embraced only lukewarmly by the European allies. Britain and the United States promised to consult all allies before taking recourse to nuclear weapons, but the guidelines left (according to Cleveland)[16] a loophole almost as wide as the commitment: 'time and circumstances permitting,' as Cleveland put it. Five months later, NATO's political consultation mechanisms were put to the test.

The Cuban missile crisis

Cuba, according to Dean Rusk, was the 'most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen', the only time when both superpowers came 'eyeball to eyeball'. An American diplomat told his Dutch colleague that the United States 'looked through a barrel of a gun'. Lawrence Kaplan judges that it could have been a *casus belli*. Only because Khrushchev backed away from the brink was a major war between the Soviet Union and the United States, and thus NATO, averted.[17] In a strict sense the Cuban missile crisis was not a crisis directly threatening NATO. Cuba is situated in an area just south of the Tropic of Cancer, which is outside the territorial scope of the alliance. But the grave repercussions involved clearly made it a crisis threatening not just the United States but also its European allies, and thus clearly necessitating political consultation under Article 4.

Furthermore, the crisis erupted at a critical moment in NATO's development. Allied unity was under strain from centrifugal forces caused by the Berlin crisis of 1961, de Gaulle's challenges to American leadership and the problems of nuclear sharing. The building of the Berlin Wall and the United States' feeble reaction to it had been bitterly resented by the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and the French President, Charles de Gaulle, shared Adenauer's resentment. Deploring European subservience to the United States, de Gaulle had tried to reconstruct Western Europe under French leadership. These centrifugal tendencies were counteracted to an extent by plans to make NATO the fourth nuclear power—in December 1960 the North Atlantic Council put under study a plan to create a multilateral nuclear force jointly owned by the European allies—but the reactions of the allies boded ill for the realization of the scheme. Given this tense situation in inter-allied relations it was clear that the Cuban crisis could have grave repercussions for the alliance.

But the Cuban crisis demonstrated that the American administration attached little importance to meaningful consultation with its NATO allies. When

[16] Cleveland, *NATO*, p. 16.

[17] Rusk as quoted in J. G. Blight, J. S. Nye, Jr., and D. A. Welch, 'The Cuban missile crisis revisited', in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 1, Fall 1987, p. 170. Further: D. Dijksman and J. Hoedeman, 'De Grote Knal', in *De Haagse Post*, 10 Oct. 1987, p. 25; also Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: the enduring alliance* (Boston, Mass.: Twayne, 1988), p. 85.

President John F. Kennedy announced the blockade of Cuba in his speech of 22 October 1962, the allies were informed only 45 minutes beforehand about the important developments which led to this drastic decision. They had been told nothing about the discoveries by American U-2 planes of the Soviet rocket-launchers on Cuban soil. The Dutch embassy in Washington reported before the broadcast of Kennedy's speech that there was frenzied political activity in Washington. Embassy officials had quickly consulted the British and French ambassadors, who said they too were being kept in the dark. Only just before the speech were the NATO ambassadors brought up to date by Under-Secretary of State George Ball. At the same time the North Atlantic Council in Paris was briefed by Dean Acheson, who had been sent on a special mission by Kennedy.[18]

This form of consultation (dubbed by Cleveland 'consent-building notification after the fact')[19] created almost universal resentment among the allies. In London the Dutch ambassador, Bentinck, learned from the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Harold Caccia, that Macmillan had been only partly informed by US ambassador Bruce about Kennedy's speech. The Foreign Office was particularly worried about the possible consequences for Berlin. Bentinck's straightforward impression after this talk was that the British Cabinet had been unpleasantly affected by the American measures.[20]

The Adenauer government was likewise very disturbed about the lack of consultation and information before Kennedy gave his speech. There was widespread fear in Bonn that US action would provoke the Soviet Union into major action over Berlin, a 'beleaguered' city which Khrushchev termed 'the testicles of the West'. Roving ambassador Acheson had to calm Adenauer down. De Gaulle, for his part, also feared that the US administration might compromise with Moscow at Europe's expense. As Acheson began to brief him just before Kennedy's speech, de Gaulle asked a preliminary question, as if to get the record straight. '"May we be clear before you start," he said. "Are you consulting or informing me?" Acheson confessed that he was there to inform, not consult.'[21] Nonetheless, de Gaulle gave his support as an independent but loyal ally.

Other, smaller, allies gave similar reactions. For instance, the Italian Prime

[18] Schiff (Washington) to Luns, 22 Oct. 1962, and Schurmann (Paris) to Luns, 22 Oct. 1962, SA 921.340, 2149, Cuba. According to André de Staercke, then dean of the NATO ambassadorial corps, Acheson asked the allies whether they had any objections. They had not, and Kirgis concludes 'and undoubtedly [they] would not have done so under the circumstances even if they had disagreed with the American plan'. Cf. Kirgis, 'NATO consultations as a component of national decisionmaking', p. 400.

[19] Cleveland, *NATO*, pp. 22–3.

[20] Bentinck (London) to Luns, 23 Oct. 1962, SA 921.340, 2149, Cuba.

[21] Cf. Van Ittersum (Bonn) to Luns, 24 Oct. 1962, and Van Roijen (Washington) to Luns, 1 Nov. 1962, SA 921.340, 2149, Cuba. For Khrushchev's remark on Berlin: Notes on emergency meeting of the National Security Council, 20 Aug. 1968, National Security File, Tom Johnson's notes of NSC Meetings, Box 2, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJ Library). Also: Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959–1963* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1968), pp. 199–200; Frank Costigliola, 'The failed design: Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the struggle for Europe', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 1984, p. 214; Charles de Gaulle, *Lettres, notes et carnets: janvier 1961–décembre 1963* (Paris: Plon, 1986), pp. 270–2, and Elie Abel, *The missiles of October: the story of the Cuban missile crisis 1962* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1966), pp. 102–7.

Minister Fanfani strongly castigated Kennedy's behaviour and was critical about the lack of consultation. He was joined by his Canadian colleague, John Diefenbaker, and the Belgian Foreign Secretary and former Secretary-General of NATO, Paul-Henri Spaak ('Franchement je n'y comprends pas grande chose'). Diefenbaker was so fearful of 'entrapment' that he barred US Strategic Air Command bombers from using Canadian airfields during the crisis and initially refused to put Canadian air defence forces on full alert. For Ottawa it was an especially uneasy experience because the North American Air Defence (NORAD) agreement stipulated direct and immediate consultation. Ottawa, like the other allies, was informed of the Cuban blockade one hour prior to Kennedy's speech. The Turkish government was outraged and extremely worried, for they feared that Kennedy would be wheeling and dealing with the Jupiter missiles stationed on Turkish territory.[22]

Did the Dutch enrol in this chorus of criticism? The day after Kennedy's speech the Dutch NATO representative was already instructed not to pledge 'absolute solidarity' with the Americans, but only to show his 'understanding and support'. Foreign Secretary Joseph Luns told Prime Minister de Quay that he disagreed with American policy. De Quay was unable to comment on Kennedy's speech in parliament because he did not have a copy of the speech. On 25 October there was a special meeting of the Cabinet. Luns did not attend, for he refused to break off his holiday—an attitude in stark contrast to the urgency and panic experienced in other Western capitals. The Dutch Cabinet did not fear a major escalation and decided to support Kennedy's policy as a loyal ally, though disapproval was voiced with respect to his speech. Several members were puzzled why the President had not mentioned NATO. There were complaints that the North Atlantic Council had not been briefed in advance. The Cabinet recognized that Cuba was outside NATO's strict territorial scope, but the crisis might have severe repercussions in Berlin. De Quay stated that the same strong criticism had been voiced during a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 24 October, and the US representative had promised to keep the allies up to date as regarded future developments.[23] From the notes the Secretary of the Dutch Cabinet made during these meetings, one can infer that the ministers debated and perhaps even seriously considered the idea of not supporting Kennedy at all. Luns later observed, however, that if the other allies had dissociated themselves the Soviet Union would have gained a major psychological victory.[24]

[22] Van Vredenburch (Rome) to Luns, 24 and 25 Oct. 1962; Teixeira (Brussels) to Luns, 25 Oct. 1962; Hagenaar (Ankara) to Luns, 26 Oct. 1962 and Lovink (Ottawa) to Luns, 26 Oct. 1962, SA 921.340, 2149, Cuba; and Embassy, Ottawa to Luns, 26 Oct. 1962, Code 921.340, Dept. Archives, Box 842, Cuba crisis Part I, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter NMFA). US ambassador Reinhardt described Fanfani's attitude as 'flabby'.

[23] Cabinet meeting No. 3098, 25 Oct. 1962, Cabinet Minutes, 2.02.05, File 676, Fiche 177, Dutch National Archives, The Hague, and Memorandum by DNW (No. 183), 29 Oct. 1962, SA 911.31, 1152, Cuba.

[24] Memorandum by Luns for Cabinet, 29 Oct. 1962, SA 921.340, 2149, Cuba, and letter Dr R. K. Visser (Prime Minister's Office) to the authors, 30 Nov. 1988. Criticism was also cagily voiced in the Dutch foreign ministry yearbook. See: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *Jaarboek van het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1962/1963* ('s-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1963), pp. 52–3.

One is led to conclude that no advance consultation nor major flows of information to the allies took place. The United States ran this show, and the allies, great or small, had to look on from the sidelines and hope for the best. It is not surprising, therefore, that the American suggestion that NATO should go on a high level of alert did not meet with a favourable response. All NATO members took the same view, and consequently there was no mobilization of NATO forces.[25]

The lack of consultation also applied to the crucial, secret decision to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in the wake of the crisis. This decision was a political rather than a military one. The missiles lacked military utility and were obsolete—they were based on old liquid-fuel systems—and nobody could even be sure if they were operable. But the missiles were an integral part of the US NATO commitment and, as George Ball has correctly noted, Washington 'could not trade off equipment committed by NATO to serve interests of its own without undercutting the confidence of our Western allies'—all the more so as the turnover of the Jupiters to the Turkish army had actually taken place on 22 October, the day of Kennedy's speech announcing the Cuban blockade.[26]

The Dutch ambassador in Washington had been told unequivocally that Kennedy would never tear down the obsolete base near Soviet territory. But the American administration proceeded to follow exactly this course. Kennedy gave a hedged promise to the Soviets to withdraw the Jupiters at a future date and, again, no advance consultation took place with the other allies. Even the Turks were not consulted, though Washington feared that withdrawal of the missiles could lead to the fall of the Turkish government.[27]

Accordingly several scenarios circulated whereby, without notifying NATO in advance, a secret American–Soviet agreement about the Jupiters would take place, although Washington knew that a formal swap would frighten the German, British, Turkish and Dutch governments, confirm de Gaulle's earlier evaluation, and undermine NATO's political morale. Nevertheless, it was decided in the White House not to consult NATO; and ambassador Thomas Finletter was instructed unreservedly not to 'hint of any [US] readiness to meet [the] Soviet Jupiter proposal'.[28]

In its final analysis of the Cuba crisis the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed that the US government had been successful in its efforts to keep Cuba

[25] Cf. Harold Macmillan, *At the end of the day* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 219–20. Macmillan's observation that the other allies 'had no real grievance about non-consultation' is clearly at variance with our information. Cf. Macmillan, *At the end of the day*, pp. 189–90.

[26] George W. Ball, *The past has another pattern: memoirs* (New York/London: Norton, 1982), pp. 305–6, and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban missile crisis* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1987), p. 43. Also: Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Volume XV, 88th Congress, First Session (Washington: GPO, 1987), pp. 103–7.

[27] Van Roijen (Washington) to Luns, 24 Oct. 1962, and Hagenaar (Ankara) to Luns, 28–29 Oct. 1962, SA 921.340, 2149, Cuba. For the Jupiters: Barton J. Bernstein, 'The Cuban missile crisis: trading the Jupiters in Turkey?', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, No. 1, Spring 1980, pp. 97–125.

[28] Bernstein, 'The Cuban missile crisis', pp. 112–21, and Bernd Greiner, *Kuba–Krise, 13 Tage im Oktober: Analysen, Dokumente, Zeitungen* (Nördlingen: Greno, 1988), pp. 126–7, 350–65. As regards the Jupiters: a swap would probably have pleased Canada, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Denmark and Norway. For the secret Jupiter deal and a possible role for Fanfani: Gregg Herken, *Councils of war* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), p. 364.

from being dealt with in NATO. The other allies were not adequately informed or consulted about Kennedy's speech, the removal of the Jupiters or the contents of the secret Kennedy–Khrushchev correspondence, which contained at least eight letters.[29] The Dutch—and clearly they were not the only ones—unequivocally deplored the American attitude; in their opinion a major crisis in East–West relations had to be dealt with in the framework of NATO. But, as Costigliola has concluded, 'the President saw no need for such consultation'.[30]

Though the ministry acknowledged that consultations might have produced obstacles, it also noted that many voices in NATO capitals were saying that consultations had to be broadened. This met with warm approval, for the Dutch were enthusiastic supporters of political consultation. Despite the sobering experience of the preceding weeks, consultation was still considered a means to check the largest NATO ally and thus to reduce the danger of entrapment.

In retrospect, political consultation during the Cuban missile crisis has been evaluated in dramatically different ways. Manlio Brosio, NATO Secretary-General from 1964 to 1971, considers the Cuban episode 'a brilliant example of timely sharing of information by the United States', whereas James Nathan concludes that 'in spite of European gestures of support, the alliance received a shock from which it did not recover'.[31]

The least that one can conclude is that in 1962 the relations between the small allies and the largest alliance power were primarily hierarchically structured. Even the British reached this conclusion. The major imbalance in power terms between the United States on the one hand and its 14 allies on the other exercised a major limitation on the influence smaller allies could exert in the beginning of the 1960s. In his Annual Review for 1962, the British ambassador in The Hague, Andrew Noble, aptly summarized the state of the alliance: 'The Dutch realise even more clearly than we do that in 1963 the lesser Powers, to which we now both [*sic*] belong, have little influence on the policies and actions of the nuclear giants. Cuba made that very clear.'[32]

This state of affairs, however, was not yet to lead to closer inter-allied consultations between the smaller powers and thus to a more independent posture. There was no room for such an independent posture yet, except

[29] For some regrets: McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and survival: choices about the bomb in the first fifty years* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 436–9.

[30] Memorandum by DNW, 29 Oct. 1962, SA 911.31, 1152, Cuba. Costigliola, 'The failed design', p. 243. Buchan rightly concludes, however, that 'If the Soviet Union had not started a diplomatic retreat...then the lack of any standby arrangements in Washington for high level consultation among the NATO allies would have been seen as a clear and dangerous weakness.' Buchan, *Crisis management*, p. 34.

[31] Cf. Manlio Brosio, 'Consultation and the Atlantic alliance', *Survival*, Vol. 16, No. 3, May/June 1974, p. 116, and James A. Nathan, 'The missile crisis: his finest hour now', *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2, Jan. 1975, p. 279. Hill comments that 'Allied consultations in this crisis were as intensive as circumstances would permit', but also notes correctly in relation to Brosio's evaluation that 'a major power may have a great deal to gain from giving the *impression* of engaging in consultations'. Cf. Hill, *Political consultation in NATO*, pp. 19, 106.

[32] Andrew Noble to Lord Home, Netherlands: Foreign Office Annual Review for 1962 (CN 1011/1), 4 Jan. 1963, File 50147–40, Vol. 3, Dept of External Affairs, Ottawa.

possibly in France, where Kennedy's policies undoubtedly reinforced de Gaulle's conviction that France had to be more independent; preferably with its West European neighbours, but, if necessary, alone.

Paradoxically, de Gaulle's independent posture created the opposite of the result he wanted. Dutch fear of de Gaulle's intentions prevented the creation of a continental grouping; the Dutch clearly preferred American dominance to French. There was also rather limited room for manoeuvre in foreign policy, for small allies. For instance, shortly after the crisis two Norwegian ships sailed for Cuba with grain and oil. The US ambassador in Oslo, Wharton, made it all too clear that these ships should alter their course or else. 'Or else?' asked the Norwegian foreign minister. Wharton told him flatly that Washington would cut off deliveries of weapons.[33]

To sum up: Political consultation hardly took place during the Cuban missile crisis. The United States acted unilaterally, only notifying its smaller allies if and when the administration considered notification politically expedient. Regarding the Jupiters not even notification was considered essential.

The cohesion of the alliance did not suffer immediately, however. The US action was resented, but it had to be accepted given the distribution of power and the fact that the crisis had erupted in its own 'backyard'. The crisis accentuated dramatically the dependence of the smaller allies on the United States, though this situation did not yet lead to closer cooperation between them. On the contrary, France's independent stance forced some of the smaller allies even more firmly into American arms.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia

By the time the crisis in Czechoslovakia erupted in August 1968, the international political setting had changed fundamentally from that of 1962. Kennedy's 'Atlantic partnership' (a partnership of the United States and a unified Western Europe on the basis of equality) had failed to materialize; inter-allied relations were more strained than ever. France had left the military structure of NATO in 1966, forcing the relocation of NATO's military and political infrastructure to Belgium and the Netherlands. The Multilateral Force had failed to materialize, and in order to give the smaller allies some influence on NATO's nuclear policy the North Atlantic Council had decided in December 1966 to create the Nuclear Planning Group.

US policy in Vietnam had caused much resentment in West European nations. Governments did not like the unilateralist intervention by the United States in south-east Asian affairs, and among the population in Western Europe the unprecedented bombings provoked a 'US go home' mood. On the other hand, criticism of Europe's share in the defence burden led to Senator Mike Mansfield's call in 1967 for American troop withdrawals from Europe. Nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union gave rise to new

[33] De Smit (Oslo) to Luns, 13 Dec. 1962, SA 921.340, 2149, Cuba.

political concepts. In December 1967 NATO adopted the Harmel Report, calling for defence as well as detente. The Report, entitled 'The future tasks of the alliance', advocated the deepening and improvement of frank and timely consultation in order to strengthen the alliance as a factor for durable peace. Bilateral contacts with the Warsaw Pact countries were intensified.

The Soviet-orchestrated invasion of Czechoslovakia on the night of 20–21 August 1968 caught NATO off guard, though for some months reports had been coming in on troop movements near the Czech border. At the beginning of August the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, asked the NATO Council for political guidance with respect to possible measures, but the Council decided not to go on higher alert. Afterwards political experts concluded that 'Political–strategic warning notwithstanding, NATO had practically no tactical warning of the move'.[34] However, Dutch military sources indicate that NATO forces in West Germany were withdrawn from the Czech border some hours before the invasion to prevent any misadventures.[35]

The invasion, happening on the threshold of NATO's eastern flank, produced conflicting responses in the alliance. The three nuclear powers reacted in rather a low key. President Lyndon B. Johnson condemned the events, but recognized Czechoslovakia to be within the Soviet sphere of influence and refused to endanger the prevailing detente. He merely postponed—briefly—his scheduled meeting with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin on limiting strategic arms.[36] The British considered the invasion 'an offensive defensive operation' aimed at the reconstruction of Warsaw Pact cohesion, constituting 'no additional threat to NATO'. Prime Minister Harold Wilson expounded his worry in an emergency session in Parliament, but no extra measures were contemplated. The French, the third in the nuclear club, blamed the whole episode on Yalta, and Foreign Secretary Michel Debré's comment was pregnant: the invasion was no more than a 'traffic accident'.[37]

The Germans reacted in the strongest way. President Lübke considered Prague to be the prologue to the Third World War. Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and Foreign Secretary Willy Brandt repeatedly asked the US government for additional military measures, primarily as a political gesture, and the negative answer of the Americans left Bonn feeling abandoned. But

[34] *NATO after Czechoslovakia* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1969), p. 46. For Lemnitzer: Cabinet meeting (no. 4492), 8 Aug. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, Archives of the Prime Minister's Office, The Hague (hereafter cited as APMO).

[35] Private information from Dutch military sources. Kissinger describes it as 'the West had bent over backward *not* to involve itself in Czechoslovakia'. See: Henry Kissinger, *The White House years* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson/Michael Joseph, 1979), p. 116.

[36] Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The vantage point: perspectives on the presidency 1963–1969* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), pp. 488–9, and Ball, *The past has another pattern*, pp. 440–3.

[37] Van Lynden (London) to Luns, 28 Aug. 1968, and De Hoop Scheffer (Paris) to Luns, 29 Aug. 1968, SA 913.10, 1394, Vol. 47, and Harold Wilson, *The Labour government 1964–1970: a personal record* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson/Michael Joseph, 1971), pp. 551–4. Debré's German colleague Brandt later commented that this was an 'absurd presentation' of the real facts. Cf. Willy Brandt, *Begegnungen und Einsichten: die Jahre 1960–1975* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976), pp. 282–3. For a somewhat identical American analysis: Summary Notes of the 590th NSC Meeting, 4 Sept. 1968, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Box 2, LBJ Library.

President Johnson made his views very clear during a meeting of the National Security Council in Washington: 'We should not reassure the Germans until they take action on some of the things we want them to do'. German worries only lessened when Washington announced publicly on 17 September that an incursion into Germany would result in a direct response by NATO. For the time being, Bonn decided not to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[38]

The reactions of most of the smaller allies were guarded. The Norwegians and Danes expressed deep concern at Soviet troop and ship movements in the Baltic and on the Kola Peninsula. Visiting Norway, the Dutch Minister of Defence, Den Toom, talked to the King and his Norwegian colleague, O. G. Tidemand. Both expressed their anxiety about Kola and pointed to a possible rapid Soviet operation in the north of Norway. The Italian Foreign Secretary, De Medici, voiced disappointment at NATO's silence. Thwarted Prime Minister Saragat later sent a personal message to Johnson complaining that the President seemed to be more anxious about Israel than Berlin or Western Europe.[39] But despite the fact that the invasion seemed directly to threaten NATO's Central Front the alliance as a whole reacted carefully.

The North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee convened immediately after the first reports of the invasion reached Western capitals. Consultation between the allies was seriously hampered by 'the tendency of governments which get crisis information to hatch it themselves for a while before telling their allies'. The American delegate received authorization to tell his colleagues what the US government knew only minutes before the Council sessions began. His British colleague was instructed only to disclose information if the Americans would do likewise, though the French did not even get that much leeway from Paris.[40] The allies decided, however, not to go on high alert. Even the proclamation of 'military vigilance' was not considered necessary. General Lemnitzer therefore 'immediately and covertly' placed allied military installations and forces on emergency alert. The NATO Council dissuaded the member states from making bilateral contact with Warsaw Pact countries and decided not to withdraw any troops from Europe in the near future. But it contemplated no steps outside its territory, even if Romania came under attack.[41]

The possibility of an assault on Romania troubled all the allies, but the Council acknowledged that any formal NATO statement on Romania could provoke a Soviet onslaught. If Moscow were to make that move, the alliance would be forced to take steps. Dutch Foreign Secretary Luns, for instance,

[38] For Johnson's remark: Summary Notes of the 590th NSC Meeting, 4 Sept. 1968, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Box 2, LBJ Library. Further: Cabinet meetings (No. 4512, 4513 and 4525), 5, 9 and 20 Sept. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, APMO. The Netherlands had signed the NPT one day before the invasion! Italy decided also not to sign.

[39] Cabinet meeting (No. 4522), 13 Sept. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, APMO; Van Vredenburch (Rome) to Luns, 23 Aug. 1968; De Hoop Scheffer (Paris) to Luns, 29 Aug. 1968, and Van Vredenburch (Rome) to Luns, 30 Sept. 1968, SA 913.10, 1394, Vol. 47.

[40] See: Cleveland, *NATO*, pp. 118–19.

[41] Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 123. Brandt, in contrast, recalls in his memoirs that NATO feared 'for a short time that the invasion could have further, incalculable military consequences.' See Brandt, *Begegnungen und Einsichten*, p. 285.

rejected any plans of assistance to Romania. The possibility of a Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia created similar problems for the allies. The Yugoslav ambassador approached Luns and queried how The Hague and NATO would respond to an attack. Luns replied that if Yugoslav forces could defend the country for some time, help would not be inconceivable. The American chargé accosted Luns with the same question, on explicit instruction from President Johnson. Luns later declared unreservedly in a Cabinet meeting that the US administration was not prepared to drop Yugoslavia.[42]

Besides the consultations in Brussels, the smaller allies tried to arrange political consultation at a higher level. After an abortive German attempt to convene a special meeting of the foreign secretaries of NATO—torpedoed by the argument that such a meeting could only produce a meaningless political statement—the smaller allies took the lead. Tidemand, supported by the Dutch, asked for an emergency meeting of the defence ministers, only to be rebuffed by the larger powers. Den Toom tried to organize a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group, with even less success. The only result was the promise of a special meeting of the foreign secretaries in New York during the UN General Assembly. The meeting was scheduled for 7 October: more than six weeks after the invasion.[43]

The lack of high-level political consultation and doubt about the American reaction to Soviet attack had unexpected consequences. The West Europeans tried to organize their own consultation. Two days after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brandt and De Medici proposed an emergency session of the Consultative Council of the Western European Union (WEU). Luns supported them, but the proposal came to naught through French resistance. The French, in turn, tried to arrange expanded consultation in the framework of the European Economic Community, but they came up against traditional Dutch resistance to such proposals. Belgian Foreign Secretary Pierre Harmel thereupon tried to work out a special provision for political consultations in the WEU, but without France.[44]

In the middle of September the Dutch Prime Minister, Piet de Jong, went to Bonn with Luns for talks with Kiesinger and Brandt. During their meetings the Dutch encouraged their hosts to behave like a big power and to loosen ties with Paris on grounds that de Gaulle was endangering their mutual security. Bonn should take the lead *vis-à-vis* Paris. This suggestion did not fall upon deaf ears. Only a week later Brandt told the British ambassador in Bonn that he was interested in the formation of a European caucus within NATO, even if the

[42] Cabinet meetings (No. 4512, 4513 and 4525), 5, 9 and 20 Sept. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, APMO, and Report on a briefing for NATO ambassadors in Washington, 31 Aug. 1968, SA 911.31, 898, VI.

[43] Cabinet meetings (No. 4522, 4525 and 4527), 13, 20 and 27 Sept. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, APMO. Also: Cleveland, *NATO*, pp. 122–3. From the meeting on 27 Sept. one can learn that Lemnitzer had again asked for a higher state of alert, but this was rejected.

[44] Cf. Van Lynden (London) to Luns, 28 Aug. 1968; Van Vredenburch (Rome) to Luns, 29 Aug. 1968; De Hoop Scheffer (Paris) to Luns, 9 Sept. 1968, and De Beus (Bonn) to Luns, 11 Sept. 1968, SA 913.10, 1394, 47.

French would not take part. It was not exactly what the Dutch had meant, but to them it was a clear step ahead.[45]

But the Germans were quick to edge back from this position. On 28 and 29 September de Gaulle visited Bonn, and ranks were closed. De Gaulle reiterated his belief that the US administration would never use nuclear arms in support of Europe. To be sure, he could not give Kiesinger the guarantee that France would do so, but he promised the Chancellor, in the event of aggression, 'que nous serions ensemble'. Kiesinger was indebted to the French for this pledge. It signified the resumption of close relations between Paris and Bonn, to the dismay of the Dutch government.[46]

The French–German agreement doomed the Harmel initiative with respect to the WEU. Harmel kept pushing for political consultation without France, which of course infuriated de Gaulle. Despite fierce French resistance there were several gatherings, but neither Bonn nor London wanted to risk de Gaulle's wrath with respect to Britain's entry into the EEC. Harold Wilson, for instance, experienced de Gaulle's displeasure about Harmel's initiatives in January 1969. At that point the entire enterprise finally silently died.[47]

When the NATO foreign ministers finally met on 7 October at the UN General Assembly meeting in New York, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated unequivocally that a Soviet attack on Austria or Yugoslavia would be unacceptable to his government. Luns supported him, declaring that the strategic importance of the West was more important than legal obligations, clearly implying that the scope of Article 5 of the Treaty was too narrow at that moment. The foreign secretaries decided to hold their annual NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels one month ahead on 15–16 November.[48] During this meeting Rusk repeated that Austria and Yugoslavia clearly belonged to the alliance's military sphere of interest; at his explicit request, however, this pledge was not mentioned in the final communiqué. On Romania the Council agreed that an incursion into this nation would not have direct consequences for NATO. The allies warned the Soviet Union off any other military adventures, but at the same time declared that the process of detente must continue. Tranquillity returned to most European capitals, and a few months later these same nations were urging Washington to resume talks with the Soviet Union.[49]

The handling of the Czech crisis did not differ fundamentally from the

[45] Luns to NMFA, 21 Sept. 1968, and Van Lynden (London) to Luns, 1 Oct. 1968, SA 913.10, 1394, Vol. 47.

[46] Bentinck (Paris) to Luns, 2 Oct. 1968, and De Beus (Bonn) to Luns, 2 Oct. 1968, SA 913.10, 1394, Vol. 47, and Cabinet meeting No. 4529, Cabinet Minutes, APMO.

[47] Boon (NATO, Brussels) to Luns, 15 Nov. 1968; Memorandum, de Ranitz, 27 Nov. 1968, and De Beus (London) to Luns, 29 Nov. 1968, SA 913.10, 1395, Vol. 48, and Wilson, *The Labour government*, pp. 617–18. In the course of 1969 the French even repeated their policy of 'the empty chair', now within WEU, because they considered WEU not suited for discussions on out-of-area issues.

[48] Cabinet meeting (No. 4534), 11 Oct. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, APMO, and Middelburg (New York) to NMFA, 14 Oct. 1968, and Van Lynden (London) to Luns, 16 Oct. 1968, SA 913.10, 1394, Vol. 47.

[49] *Keesing's contemporary archives*, 7–14 December 1968, p. 23071. Also: Cabinet meetings (No. 4558 and 4563), 18 and 22 Nov. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, APMO, and William G. Hyland, *Mortal rivals: understanding the pattern of Soviet–American relations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 15–16.

Cuban one with regard to political consultations and the role of the smaller allies. The consultation mechanisms within the framework of Article 4 did not perform adequately. Requests by the smaller powers for high-level consultation were rebuffed by the larger powers. When the foreign secretaries finally convened in New York, six weeks after the invasion commenced, the crisis was in fact over. In the meantime the US administration had decided, unilaterally and without consulting its allies, to send two destroyers into the Black Sea. According to the Americans this was a routine visit planned in advance and therefore not necessitating consultation, which had never taken place in the past with regard to such deployments. Not all the allies accepted this explanation without criticism.[50]

The alliance did not function properly politically; and neither did its intelligence apparatus. We have already pointed to the surprise the Czech invasion caused in Western capitals. It took more than three weeks before NATO's Military Committee started its analysis of the crisis and the consequences for the alliance. The delay was caused by differences of opinion and sheer rivalry between the political and military experts. General Lemnitzer secured no political guidance from the NATO Council and—as he later recalled—this silence was 'one of the most serious breakdowns in the political–military mechanisms of the Alliance that occurred during my tenure as SACEUR'.[51]

According to Lawrence Kaplan, General Lemnitzer's exasperation was not wholly justified, for NATO was sobered by the severity of the Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia. This is open to dispute, however: the alliance certainly could have been expected to perform appropriately at the height of a severe military crisis occurring right on its borders—especially in view of the recognized need for political consultation acknowledged in Article 4. Although Cleveland maintains that 'NATO was readier for round-the-clock crisis-management than it had ever been before', our findings point to the fact that there was hardly any 'crisis-management' which could be depicted 'as the whole range of co-ordinated diplomatic, economic, military and other efforts aimed at solving an international crisis or at least preventing it from escalating into an armed conflict'. Crisis-management was one of the refinements of the strategy of flexible response which had been officially adopted in 1967. As such, as a Dutch expert accurately notes, it was supposed to apply to situations short of war, such as Czechoslovakia.[52]

Faced with this situation the smaller European allies made an early start on discussions about the emergence of some form of European 'pillar' within

[50] Cf. Cleveland, *NATO*, pp. 20–1, and Kirgis, 'NATO consultations as a component of national decisionmaking', p. 396.

[51] Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 123, and Cabinet meetings (No. 4497, 4498, 4504 and 4525), 21, 23 and 30 Aug. and 20 Sept. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, APMO.

[52] Guido Vigeveno, *The bomb and European security* (London: Hurst, 1983), p. 21, and Harlan Cleveland, 'NATO after the invasion', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, Jan. 1969, p. 257. Significantly, neither Brosio nor Hill mentions the Czech crisis in their survey of allied consultations in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s! Cf. Brosio, 'Consultation and the Atlantic alliance', pp. 115–17, and Hill, *Political consultation in NATO*, pp. 19–22.

NATO. These talks faltered, however, primarily because of French resistance and the problems arising from Britain's bid to enter the EEC. These feeble attempts to organize a European caucus within the alliance foreshadowed the problems which were to plague the attempts of the 1970s and 1980s to do this. In the first place, membership of both WEU and the EEC was limited to the central European powers; in neither organization were the southern or northern ones represented. Secondly, the European NATO members were—as they still are—dependent for their political and military intelligence on American sources. Thirdly, every attempt to 'Europeanize' NATO was a possible justification for Washington to cut down on its military presence in Europe. Nevertheless, the creation of the Eurogroup in 1968 within NATO—consisting of the defence ministers of all the European allies except for France—was not entirely a coincidence after the developments of the preceding years; its purpose, however, did not extend into the political realm.

The discussions on increased defence spending after the Czech invasion show clearly that accommodation to the wishes of the United States was still paramount. Although the final NATO analysis of the invasion concluded that it was a defensive Soviet action not aimed at the alliance, that the Warsaw Pact had been weakened by the invasion and the ensuing internal dissent, and that detente should still be the top alliance priority, all the European allies promised to increase their defence budgets in line with the wishes of the US government. The problems of burden-sharing and European criticism of the American intervention in Vietnam had already created resentment in Washington. As Rusk told Luns with regard to French criticism of Johnson's policy in Vietnam: 'One cannot be whore in Vietnam and at the same time virgin in Europe.'[53] As long as the United States was 'virgin' in Europe, the other allies had to be content with both the advantages and disadvantages of the alliance.

But doubts about the American security pledge slithered into NATO. Mounting European disenchantment over the war in Indochina displayed the first evidence of fragmentation. More and more key elements of alliance policy were being questioned, and criticisms of American leadership multiplied. West European mistrust of American intentions grew to such an extent that President Richard Nixon had to send a message to other alliance leaders in January 1972 about his visit to Moscow in May. Nixon reassured them that the American administration had 'no intention of dealing over the heads of its friends and allies in any matter where their security interests might be affected'[54]—a message that would have been almost unthinkable under the Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson administrations.

[53] Cabinet meeting (No. 4550), 8 Nov. 1968, Cabinet Minutes, APMO. For Rusk: De Beus (New York) to NMFA, 27 Sept. 1968, SA 912.1, 1041, II.

[54] Memorandum DWH, 11 Jan. 1972, SA 912.1, 1041, II.

The Korean airliner

The period 1968–83 gave further proof of strains in the alliance. The Vietnam war, the brutal Portuguese repression of the population in the African colonies of Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, the military dictatorship in Greece and fierce repression of democracy, the US role in the overthrow of Allende in Chile and the Greek–Turkish conflict over Cyprus caused one internal crisis after another. Alliance members no longer hesitated to castigate each other in public. The NATO security consensus eroded further and further. Nonetheless, membership itself was not a matter of controversy in the societies of the smaller powers. What did cause tension was 'the position taken by the Alliance on specific issues and sometimes the Alliance's strategic guidelines'.[55]

The end of 1973 was a low ebb in consultation between the allies, but the period since 1977, with President Carter's announcement of plans to deploy the neutron bomb in Europe and the 1979 decision to modernize NATO's medium-range nuclear weapons, has been one of the most critical in NATO's existence. Such dangerous diseases as Hollanditis (being the 'extreme form' of nuclear pacifism) and Denmarkization (being the underpayment of one's share of the collective defence burden in NATO) became widespread. Under this gloomy constellation NATO entered the Reagan era, the era of the 'evil empire'.

In the early morning hours of 1 September 1983 a Soviet fighter shot down a Korean Air Lines jumbo jet over the Sea of Japan near the Soviet island Sakhalin. The Korean plane—KAL 007—was on its way from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, Korea. It had flown off course for several hours over one of the most sensitive military areas of the Soviet Union and had not responded to repeated Soviet warnings. About a minute before KAL 007 would have passed into the safety of international airspace it was hit by a heat-seeking missile and exploded. The 269 crew and passengers aboard were killed.

The shooting down of KAL 007 was revealed to the world by Secretary of State George Shultz during a press conference on the same day. In the immediate hours after the downing international press agencies spread the news that KAL 007 had been forced to land on Soviet territory, but Shultz's press conference ended this rumour.[56] Shultz stated, among other things, that at least eight Soviet fighters had been in the vicinity of KAL 007 at one time or another, and that the fighter that finally shot down the Korean airliner was 'close enough for visual inspection'. He maintained that there was no evidence that the Soviets had tried to warn the Korean plane, though it had been tracked by

[55] Johán Jorgen Holst, 'Lilliputs and Gulliver: small states in a great-power alliance', in Gregory Flynn, ed., *NATO's northern allies: the national security policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 259.

[56] The source of the forced landing rumour has never been cleared. See for this and the role of the CIA, Seymour Hersh, *'The target is destroyed': what really happened to Flight 007 and what America knew about it* (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 71, 142–4, and R. W. Johnson, *Shootdown: Flight 007 and the American connection* (New York: Viking, 1986), pp. 76–80.

Soviet radar for some two and a half hours. He concluded that there was 'no excuse for this appalling act'.

Until Shultz's press conference, the allies had been in the dark as to the real fate of KAL 007. The Dutch embassy in Tokyo faithfully confirmed the messages from the international press agencies that the Boeing had been forced to land on Soviet territory.[57] This dependence upon American information continued for several days afterwards. Assistant Under-Secretary of State Richard Burt briefed the Western allies on 2 September. He told them that the United States had recorded the conversations between Soviet ground control and the pilot over a period of 25 minutes before the shootdown—information which was officially denied—and that the possibility could not be ruled out that the Soviets had confused KAL 007 with an American intelligence-gathering plane, a modified Boeing 707 dubbed RC-135. Two days later a different picture was presented: an official announcement was made by the Americans that an RC-135 had been on assignment off the coast of Kamchatka at the time KAL 007 was picked up by Soviet radar, and the plane had flown in the vicinity of the civilian airliner. The allies were told by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, that RC-135 aircraft do not enter Soviet airspace, despite the well-known fact that RC-135s do sometimes penetrate Soviet airspace in order to record Soviet radar responses.[58]

The US government had been forced to make this claim by the propaganda offensive of the Kremlin. After remaining silent for a few days, the Soviet Union decided to present its picture with full force. The RC-135 was a godsend. The fact that the Soviet pilot had probably failed to identify the Korean Boeing had been established by the US Air Force Intelligence (USAFI), but USAFI's important conclusion that there was no 'specific evidence showing that the Soviets had knowingly shot down an airliner' was never passed on to the allies; the information provided by USAFI was 'squelched' by the other intelligence agencies and the White House Special Group.[59] The latter, a group including Vice-President George Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey and Shultz, decided to take a harsh rhetorical stance towards the Soviets, brushing aside information which did not fit in with the official position—not, however, to such an extent as to endanger current talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva on arms limitations and Madrid in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Weinberger especially advocated harsher measures, but President Reagan sided with Shultz.

So far the American administration had tried to make the KAL 007 affair an exclusively US–Soviet problem, but now there was a change. On the morning

[57] See Dutch Embassy (Tokyo) to NMFA, 1 Sept. 1983, Code 5, File Soviet-Russia/KAL 007, NMFA.

[58] For Burt's briefing: Dutch Embassy (Washington) to NMFA, 2 Sept. 1983, Code 5, File Soviet-Russia/KAL 007, NMFA. For Eagleburger: NMFA to Dutch Permanent Mission (New York), 6 Sept. 1983, Code 9, File VN/VR–Korea/KAL 007, NMFA. See also the account by two former RC-135 intelligence experts: *International Herald Tribune*, 16 Sept. 1983, and Martin Streetly, 'US airborne ELINT systems: part 3: the Boeing RC-135 family', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 Mar. 1985, pp. 14–24.

[59] Cf. Hersh, '*The target is destroyed*', pp. 82–7, 103–11.

of 3 September Burt again briefed the Western allies. This time he stressed that the downing of KAL 007 was a problem for the whole international community. Therefore the State Department wanted close consultation and cooperation with the allies in order to prevent this kind of drama in the future. Cooperation should take shape, in the first place, in the UN Security Council. Burt thus announced the submission of a UN resolution condemning the Soviet act and asking for a fact-finding mission, as well as for an investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization.[60]

The first discussions in the Security Council had already taken place on 2 September. The Soviet action was condemned by most of the delegates. It was 'A wanton, calculated, deliberate murder'; 'incredible and atrocious brutality'; a 'flagrant and serious attack on the safety of international civil aviation'. No action, however, had yet been taken. These accusations were still based on raw and disputed intelligence data which were withheld from the allies.[61]

A new meeting was scheduled for 6 September. In preparation for that meeting Burt again briefed the US allies on 5 September, acting on the basis of a National Security Decision Directive approved by Reagan that same day.[62] The directive outlined the measures to be taken worldwide against the Soviet Union. The basic American goal was to show the world once and forever the contrast between Soviet words and deeds. The Soviet Union had to be made to admit responsibility for the disaster, had to be isolated in the area of civil aviation, and preferably had to be condemned by an impartial investigation. Burt stressed that 'the critical element is that we act in concert to demonstrate visibly and firmly the unanimity of revulsion in the civilized world to the Soviet action and conduct'.[63]

The meeting of the Security Council on 6 September was dominated by US ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. The delegates to the Council listened to recordings of the Soviet fighter intercepts. According to these tapes the Soviets had fired no warning shots and had not tried to warn the Korean crew in any other way. The performance was impressive, and clearly influenced the proceedings. Five days later the State Department issued corrections and additions to the released tapes which clearly supported the Soviet version of events, but the damage had already been done.[64] Following the debate in the Security Council representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Canada (all NATO members), Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand started work on a draft resolution.

The strongly worded draft condemned the Soviet Union for the shootdown,

[60] Dutch Embassy (Washington) to NMFA, 4 Sept. 1983, Code 5, File Soviet-Russia/KAL 007, NMFA.
[61] Dutch Permanent Mission (New York) to NMFA, 2 Sept. 1983, Code 9 DIO-archives, File VN/VR-Korea/KAL 007, NMFA, and Dept of State Bulletin 83, No. 2079 (Oct. 1983), pp. 3–5.
[62] See Hersh, '*The target is destroyed*', p. 161, and Alexander Dallin, *Black Box: KAL 007 and the superpowers* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p. 94.
[63] Dutch Embassy (Washington) to NMFA, 5 Sept. 1983, Code 5, File Soviet-Russia/KAL 007, NMFA.
[64] Cf. Johnson, *Shootdown*, pp. 118–20. Kirkpatrick's performance closely resembled that of her predecessor Adlai Stevenson, during the missile crisis. The UN was also used in 1962 as a platform where the Soviet case could be dealt a final blow before world opinion. Cf. Nathan, 'The missile crisis', pp. 277–8.

demanded appropriate compensation and called for two independent investigations, one by the International Civil Aviation Organization and one by the UN Secretary-General. The US delegate insisted upon sponsorship of the resolution by all nine countries, as the United States was unwilling to take the lead on its own. To obtain another propaganda victory the United States had to ensure that at least nine members of the Security Council supported the resolution; this would force the Soviet Union to use its veto. Support on as broad a scale as possible was therefore necessary.

The US delegation in New York mobilized all its allies (inside and outside NATO) to obtain the nine votes. Those of the Non-Aligned states would tip the balance one way or the other. Before the ninth vote could be counted on, the draft resolution had to be watered down considerably. For a few days a major Western embarrassment seemed to be in the offing as diplomats in New York lobbied for support. Finally Malta decided to support the resolution as the ninth country, and the Soviet Union had to veto the resolution. As Seymour Hersh correctly noted, 'The United States had won its worldwide propaganda victory over the Soviet Union'.[65]

Three months later the US government 'triumphed' again as the ICAO presented its report on the downing of the airliner. The report answered as many questions as it failed to answer. Major issues, such as the question why the Boeing was in Soviet airspace, were left in the dark, but the ICAO was unequivocal in its condemnation of the shooting down. This was to be the last statement of conviction, as the Western nations decided not to present their case again in the General Assembly. Attention had petered out, to re-emerge temporarily in the wake of the downing of an Iranian Boeing over the Persian Gulf in July 1988.

American policy with regard to the KAL disaster was based on a worst-case scenario that left no room for giving the Soviet Union the benefit of any doubt. The US government launched a vigorous anti-Soviet campaign using unbalanced and conflicting data. 'The concern seemed to be one of scoring points, exposing the adversary, being proven right, using the crisis for political gains' concludes Alexander Dallin.[66] But the rhetorical condemnation was not followed by harsh measures. On the one hand, Washington did not want an all-out confrontation with Moscow, and on the other Shultz tried to bolster his own position within the administration by taking a hard line.

Washington used the allies to support its position. In the first few days of the crisis they were merely informed, but as it became clearer and clearer that the Soviets might not have known that KAL 007 was a civilian airliner, and that US intelligence agencies had probably monitored its flight, the government tried to rally the allies to bolster its position and to prevent major embarrassments. Even at that point, however, the information given to the

[65] Hersh, '*The target is destroyed*', p. 174. Extensive documentation in: Code 9 DIO-archives, File VN/VR-Korea/KAL 007, NMFA. For some chilling observations on the consequences of this propaganda victory: Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The storm birds: Soviet post-war defectors* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), pp. 265–72.

[66] Dallin, *Black box*, p. 95.

allies was never as extensive as it could have been; they were not told about the differences of opinion between the different intelligence-gathering agencies in Washington, and information supporting the Soviet point of view was withheld for as long as possible. All the US allies were mobilized to force the Soviet Union to use its veto in the Security Council.

The allies complied; but doubts were voiced. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, for instance, believed the shootdown to be 'a tragic accident', and according to Trudeau the US government 'didn't have a leg to stand on' with regard to its version of the events. Margaret Thatcher, rarely afraid to support the United States through thick and thin, remained silent for 17 days before commenting on the tragic events. Probably these two nations discovered through their links with the American intelligence community that the Americans had used misinterpreted data.[67]

The smaller allies were more dependent on American information, but they also started to doubt the American accusations after a few days. The Dutch, for instance, clearly supported the American position, but doubts rose in The Hague after the information about the RC-135 was made public. The American administration's policy change from a unilateralist stance to a multilateral Western one was noticed. The Dutch, like the other Western allies, moved away from their original harsh condemnation and, later on, left room for the Soviet point of view.

Conclusions

Invariably analyses dealing with the future of NATO predict that, despite all the internal crises, NATO will survive. Likewise, analyses of the role and the problems of smaller countries in the alliance end predictably with the conclusion that these countries will remain faithful, perhaps a little bit critical, but nevertheless loyal members of NATO in the future.[68] This should come as no surprise for as long as the central rationale for NATO's existence—the Soviet Union's aggressive intentions towards Western Europe—is not challenged fundamentally by the governments of the member states. Given that basic principle, small allies are still prepared to give (a little) and take (a lot), as is documented here.

Essentially NATO's way of dealing with crises has not changed dramatically. When the going gets tough, the United States acts unilaterally; preferably supported by its allies, but if need be alone. The alliance is still apparently not equipped to deal with real, acute crises. The successes in alliance consultation that former Secretary-General Brosio could list in 1974 concerned long-term preparations for common positions in negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. This has not changed fundamentally since 1974. In times of crisis, consultation has

[67] Cf. Hersh, '*The target is destroyed*', pp. 244–5, and Johnson, *Shootdown*, p. 129.

[68] To give just one example: Sharon Squassoni, 'The smaller allies face major problems too: the Benelux members of the alliance', in Walter Goldstein, ed., *Fighting allies: tensions within the Atlantic alliance* (London: Brassey's, 1986), p. 167.

proved almost impossible. Consequently, no report or commentary on the alliance can reach its conclusions without recommending 'improved consultations'.[69]

During the Cuban crisis America's allies, greater or smaller, were brought up to date only at the very last moment, the more powerful allies receiving separate treatment through special emissaries. They were expected to support the US government and, indeed, despite serious misgivings, they did support President Kennedy. Five years later, in 1968, neither the Americans nor the Europeans could give NATO the direction it needed in one of the most serious crises it has had to face. The smaller allies tried to organize their own caucus, but their efforts soon faltered. The United States still preferred to act unilaterally, for instance by sending the destroyers to the Black Sea. During the crisis over the Korean airliner the United States at first also acted without consulting, but as its position began to deteriorate it tried to rally its allies to its cause. Because it needed their support the United States' position changed but, as the smaller allies were still dependent upon American intelligence, their influence was not as sobering as it might have been.

Dependence upon the United States, disunity and lack of mutual understanding, inability to make a joint stand—these are some of the problems of the smaller allies usually brought forward. However, in the last decade a noticeable shift in emphasis has taken place in the evaluation of the role of the smaller allies. Unreserved loyalty has given way to qualified loyalty, and slowly, despite many setbacks, the European allies, great and smaller, have been bolstering their position within the alliance.[70] Their influence grows, albeit slowly. They no longer accept American policies and proclamations uncritically.

Future analyses of the role of smaller allies in NATO will not indefinitely end with the observation that they will remain loyal members of the alliance. Internal cohesion has considerably lessened. NATO's policies have become hotly debated issues in a number of states. NATO's central rationale is under pressure from the Gorbachev initiative. Western electorates will not put up for ever with bland 'Yes – but...' responses to Soviet proposals. Gorbachev appears to have taken away NATO's mortal enemy; and this requires a new 'flexible response' in the next decade of the alliance.

[69] Cf. '"The habit of consultation", strongly advocated by the three wise men [in 1956], became an important part of alliance rhetoric, almost approaching theological heights ... Virtually no report or commentary on the alliance can reach its conclusion without recommending "improved consultations"': Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's future: towards a new transatlantic bargain* (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 45.

[70] For instance: Nikolaj Petersen, *Denmark and NATO 1949–1987* (Oslo: Forsvarshistorisk Forskningssenter, 1987, Forsvarsstudier 2/1987), pp. 43–5.

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THE ALL-VOLUNTEER MILITARY AS A "SOCIOPOLITICAL" PROBLEM

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The shift from a system of conscription to an all-volunteer military is a manifestation of the long-term decline in the mass armed force in Western parliamentary system. The end of conscription is no short-term measure but likely to persist so that the emergence of an expanded all-volunteer armed forces raises a series of sociopolitical issues for a political democracy. First, the hypothesis is examined that the military in the United States is displaying an increased emphasis on its organization boundaries and distinctive values. Thereby, its linkages with civilian society become attenuated and tied to special segments of the social structure. Second, it is possible to examine the changing social recruitment and, thereby, probe the hypothesis that the military—both the officer corps and the enlisted personnel—each in its own fashion is becoming less and less socially representative. These trends in social recruitment, especially of army officers, can create an "ideological cast" in the military and serve as another source of political cleavage. The implication is drawn that "institution building" is required in order to insure civilian control and to articulate the military with the larger society.

With the termination of conscription on June 30, 1973, the United States has been committed to maintaining an "expanded" military force based on volunteer manpower. Because the expanded force is comprised of over two million men and women, in contrast to the very small volunteer force which the nation had in previous peacetime periods, it represents a unique development in U.S. history.

There has been a prolonged public debate about the feasibility, morality, and sociopolitical impact of the all-volunteer system. The end of conscription came not only because of the opposition to the war in Vietnam but also because of a series of long-term trends in military technology, social structure, and international relations described below. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that for a short term at least, i.e., for the next ten years, the all-volunteer system is most likely to endure, even if it requires a reduction in force levels and a lowering of standards in recruiting and retaining personnel. My purpose here is, therefore, to analyze the emerging sociopolitical consequences of contemporary trends in military organization and in the social recruitment of the armed forces that are linked to the end of conscription.

The impact of the all-volunteer system on civil-military relations and on domestic social structure is hardly predetermined. It will be strongly influenced by the political and administrative policies used to manage the all-volunteer force. In particular, two sets of hypotheses are offered which, in the absence of

effective institution building, are seen as potential focal points of strain in civil-military relations and of difficulties in effective civilian control of the armed forces.

The end of conscription signals the shift from a military establishment based on the mobilization of civilians in time of war to a "force in being" employing trained personnel for immediate military tasks, especially that of deterrence. The first hypothesis is that the organizational format and the normative structure of the "new military," in contrast to the conscript force, displays an increased emphasis on its organizational boundaries and distinctive values. Thereby, its linkages with civilian society become attenuated and tied to special segments of the social structure. The normative conception of the "citizen-soldier," which was an essential element of conscription and civilian control, undergoes modification.

Second, compared with the system of conscription, the all-volunteer military is and will become less and less socially representative, in an alternate fashion for officers and for enlisted men. For enlisted personnel, the all-volunteer system recruits more and more heavily from submerged groups in civilian society, with special emphasis on black personnel. At the officer level, the career cadres reflect specialized recruitment, with a higher degree of self-recruitment from within the military, increased geographical concentration from the South and Southwest, and a stronger emphasis on academy graduates. These factors, when joined with the socialization and promotion systems which select out those with divergent orientations, will serve to develop a stronger conservative or right-wing politico-military orientation among professional officers.

A variety of indicators are available for exploring these hypotheses through comparison of trends during the period of Selective Service with those during the transitional phase from 1968 to 1973 and during the first year of the all-volunteer system. Obviously, the available data serve only to demonstrate the plausibility of the argument and to supply a bench mark for continuing scrutiny of this fundamental transformation in U.S. social structure.

The decline in reliance on Selective Service has been in effect since 1968 with the winding down of the war in Vietnam. Table 1 presents the trends in military manpower for the Vietnam and post-Vietnam periods. The shift in reliance on conscription can be seen from a high point of 343,000 draftees in 1968 to 50,000 in 1973, the last year of Selective Service. Under an all-volunteer system, the military face difficult problems in recruiting

TABLE 1
U.S. FORCE LEVELS AND DRAFT CALLS

Year	Active Duty Military (In Millions) June 30	Annual Draft Calls
1965	2.65	102,600
1966	3.09	334,530
1967	3.38	288,900
1968	3.58	343,300
1969	3.46	299,000
1970	3.07	289,900
1971	2.71	98,000
1972	2.33	50,000
1973	2.17	—

adequate numbers and quality of personnel. Civilian leaders seek to meet manpower needs mainly by raising financial incentives. But there are limits to resources and to the ability of wages to attract personnel. Moreover, those who can be "attracted" to avoid oppressive poverty are limited in number because of the extension of the alternative benefits of the welfare state.

The all-volunteer force emerges as a smaller establishment, but still huge by past standards. At the height of the Vietnam War the armed forces of the United States reached a manpower total of 3.6 million. In 1970 the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (1970) estimated that a force of 2.5 million would be feasible. By 1974 the Department of Defense reported that the total force level had dropped to approximately 2.1 million. Projections for the second half of the 1970's range from two million down to 1.75 million as a result of both fiscal constraint and the difficulties of recruiting qualified personnel.

THE DECLINE OF THE MASS ARMED FORCE

The onset in the decline of the mass armed force based on conscription in the United States can be fixed at the end of World War II, although the Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam had the effect of prolonging this military system. It is, however, essential to recall, albeit briefly, the sociopolitical context—and, in fact, the ideological setting—in which conscription as a form of universal military service was instituted in the United States. To assert that the U.S. military has traditionally been "all-volunteer" is to fail to capture the realities of civil-military relations in the United States. Universal military service—and the notions of the "citizen-soldier"—were constructions of the American and French revolutions. The extension to the mass of the population of the right and the obligation to bear arms in the American and French revolutions was truly a "revolutionary" step and one linked directly to the growth of parliamentary institutions. As Friedrich Engels asserted: "Contrary to appearance, compulsory military service surpasses general franchise as a democratic agency."

In actuality, the United States, unlike France, did not institute conscription during peacetime, in good measure because of its geographic isolation. In peacetime, the U.S. military was organized on the basis of a very small professional cadre, augmented in wartime by large numbers of civilians who served as officers and enlisted personnel and whose essentially civilian loyalties would prevent the emergence of a military establishment at odds with civilian political leadership. Only during major hostilities—the Civil War, World War I, and World War II—was universal military service instituted. Until the outbreak of World War II, civilian control over the U.S. military was strengthened because the federal government supported a very small land force in peacetime. After hostilities had ceased, the military was cut back to a vestigial institution.

The American and French revolutions emphasized that every citizen had the right to bear arms and that membership in the officer corps was not limited to socially privileged

groups, but open to all. These were ideological claims and goals which were hardly achieved in reality and practice. However, the ideological appeals of the American Revolution and the French Revolution contributed directly both to the citizen-soldier concept and to the emergence of the modern mass military formation. In those conflicts, the insurgent political leaders armed extensive sections of the civil population and broke decisively with traditional patterns. Under feudal and postfeudal monarchial arrangements, military formations had been staffed by mercenaries, men impressed into service, and small delimited groups of volunteers.

The political democracies which these revolutionary movements sought to establish rested on their having armed their citizens, who in turn demonstrated their loyalty through military service. Military service operated to assist the development of parliamentary institutions to the extent that mass armies defined their recruits in terms of the political idea of citizenship. Military service emerged as a hallmark of citizenship and citizenship as the hallmark of a political democracy. Political rights were to be achieved by mass participation in the nation-state; and nationalism was required to achieve social and economic progress of the citizenry at large.

After 1945 the United States developed, for the first time in its history, a long-term expanded military establishment based on conscription to confront the international environment of the Cold War and for the purposes of military intervention in Korea and Vietnam. The sheer size of the expanded military establishment and the power inherent in a military continuously engaged in worldwide operations altered the traditional definition of civil-military relations. The research literature of political sociology has analyzed the increased internal power position of the military establishment and its impact on foreign affairs (Mills, 1956; Janowitz, 1960, 1971). However, at the same time, three factors became operative that undermined the legitimacy and rationale of universal military service: nuclear weapons technology; the altered international environment; and internal sociopolitical changes in the "affluent nations" (Janowitz, 1960, 1971).

First, the deployment of nuclear weapons marked the technological transformation of the military of the advanced nations. Nuclear weapons weaken but do not eliminate the strategic concept of the inevitability of war—the essential logic of traditional military forces. The concept of strategic deterrence substitutes for the conventional idea of "victory." The advent of nuclear weapons changed the strategic role of the military and raised fundamental issues about the validity of the mass armed force and of the citizen-soldier concept. However, technological determinism is not adequate for explaining the transformation of modern military institutions. Technological innovations must be placed in the broader context of sociopolitical change in international relations.

Second, neither small professional forces nor large conscript armies are able to maintain a Western type of hegemony over the developing nations. The strength of nationalism in these nations is too

powerful; the assistance available to them from the Soviet bloc and China is too extensive; and in industrialized nations domestic rejection of old-style imperialism is too powerful. The military's role is thereby also altered.

Third, the decline of the mass armed force and the rise of the all-volunteer force are an expression of underlying processes of societal change under advanced industrialism. Higher levels of education and a more ample standard of mass consumption have produced, in wide segments of the population, a diffuse but persistent reluctance to serve in the military. Important sections of the population have come to believe that service to the nation and the solution of pressing economic and social issues require skills and outlooks other than those associated with military life and organization. Internally, nationalism, the very basis of the military establishment in the nineteenth century and a rationale for universal military service, has suffered erosion.

In Western industrialized societies, the goals and style of military institutions have been subjected to massive criticism. As a result, belief in the moral worth of military service has been shaken. In part, hedonism and the importance of self-expression supply a new basis for resistance to military authority. The sheer destructive power of weapons systems and the apparent feeling that political leaders are unable to control the nuclear arms race are also essential ingredients of the hostility toward military institutions. In the United States, moral revulsion against the Vietnam War has produced added dimensions. But reluctance to serve in the military is widespread throughout Western nations. Thus, even Germany, with no political involvement in Vietnam, has revealed the same pattern.

These technological and sociopolitical trends have resulted in a decline of the mass armed force and the move toward an all-volunteer force. It has taken 25 years for these trends to become fully evident in the United States. In Western Europe, in 1962, Great Britain was the first NATO nation to implement the all-volunteer concept, in part because of economic pressure. In the smaller nations of NATO, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark, the conscript service term has been shortened and contingency plans for all-volunteer forces are being formulated. West Germany is heavily committed to some form of conscription because of its strategic and political requirements. But the Germans are exploring alternative systems, including an all-volunteer professional core, augmented by short-term conscripts, organized as a modern territorial militia. Even in France, with its historical commitment to conscription, including the parties of the left, conscript service has been shortened, and the debate about an all-volunteer force is being pursued intensively.

Thus, from a sociological point of view, the implication of the shift to an all-volunteer force for civil-military relations can be analyzed in terms of changed patterns of military organization and trends in social recruitment.

CHANGING MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The first hypothesis centers on the changing organizational format of the military and asserts that,

under the all-volunteer system, the military becomes a more self-contained institution with more selective linkages to civilian society. Of course, the expanded military establishment, with its complex technological base, cannot return to the social isolation and pervasive institutional differentiation of the period between the two world wars. However, data on personnel turnover, recruitment patterns, skill structure, and organizational environment indicate significant emerging trends which imply a strengthening of the boundaries between the military and civilian sectors of society.

Conscription operated as a positive element in civil control because it resulted in the massive inflow and outflow of civilians through the armed services. Citizen-soldiers as enlisted personnel helped maintain linkages between civilian sectors and the military and were part of the long-term efforts to "civilianize" the military. Although recruitment through Selective Service was employed mainly by the ground forces, its impact—draft motivation, as it was called by the military—was essential for recruiting manpower into the naval and air forces. Conscription supplied the majority of the enlisted personnel during the Cold War. These enlisted personnel served between two and five years and returned to civilian life. Only a very tiny cadre of noncommissioned officers made the military a way of life and served twenty years or longer, while a much smaller number served between eight and 12 years.

Under the all-volunteer force structure, personnel turnover begins to slow, although this is far more important in civil-military relations at the officer level. Since 1968, military policies, including pay rates, have been instituted to reduce personnel turnover among enlisted personnel because it is assumed that lower rates of turnover will reduce personnel and training costs. The all-volunteer system has also been designed to articulate with contemporary military technology which requires longer periods of training. In particular, the skill structure of the services, especially of the Air Force and the Navy, requires a larger enlisted personnel with higher rank, who are, therefore, eligible for longer careers in the military service. As a result, the average term of initial tours has been lengthened. For example, in the ground forces combat units, the effective length of service has increased for initial tours from 26 months to 36 months (Secretary of Defense, 1974: 185.). There is every reason to project that the average length of service in enlisted ranks in all services will continue to rise during the next decade. Nevertheless, to staff an all-volunteer force of two million, some 300,000 new recruits must be obtained annually.

At the officer level, personnel turnover was strikingly high during the 1950's and 1960's. The bulk of the ROTC graduates, who constituted under conscription over 90 percent of the annual additions, served two years; only a limited number served for more than four years. Large numbers of reservists were on duty from 1945 to 1970 for relatively short periods of time. With the end of conscription, selected categories of ROTC officers are obliged to serve for longer periods; and the military establishment has altered its person-

nel policies in an effort to retain more ROTC officers for longer periods of active duty. In part this is the result of the continued decline in ROTC enrollments. Although changes have been made in the ROTC curriculum and two year courses have been introduced, the number of students has dropped sharply: 264,000 in 1966; 156,000 in 1970; 75,000 in 1973. Moreover, the military services believe that long periods of military service are required for organizational effectiveness.

But the most pronounced trend in personnel that reinforces a more self-contained military institution is comprised of both the reliance on a larger percentage of academy graduates in the active-duty force and a return to the practice of the dominance of leadership by academy graduates. (This trend articulates with the stronger emphasis on self-recruitment of military sons into the military academies and the powerful impact of professional socialization.)

In an effort to maintain organization boundaries and prerogatives, all three services have increased the number and proportion of officers trained at the service academies and have retained a strong emphasis on academy training as a criterion for elite positions. Before the Air Force Academy was established in 1955, enrollment at the two service academies numbered fewer than 6,200. By 1970 there were approximately 13,000 military cadets in the academies because of the establishment of the Air Force Academy and the expansion of West Point and Annapolis.

Although there is considerable attrition of cadets during the undergraduate years and although between 20 and 25 percent of the academy graduates leave the service after the obligated tour of duty, service academy graduates do rise to dominate the general and flag officer ranks. While the concentration of nonacademy graduates increased in the top ranks during the 1960's, the expansion of cadet graduates and the contraction of the military establishment again strengthen the continued dominance of academy trained officers.

Another precise indicator of the interpretation of military institutions and civilian society has been the long-term increase in the transferability of skills from the military to the civilian. This increase has been growing continuously since the Civil War. For example, military types of occupations for enlisted men accounted for 93.2 percent of the personnel in the Civil War, but after the Spanish-American War civilian types of occupations began to predominate. By 1954 only 28.8 percent of the army enlisted personnel were engaged in purely military occupations. The same pattern obtains for officers and, to an even greater extent, for both the navy and the air force (Report on Conditions of Military Service, 1955). However, during 1960-70 the limits of this trend were reached. For example, the proportion of army enlisted personnel whose primary specialty was ground combat fell from 39.3 percent in 1945 to 28.1 percent in 1960, although in 1963 the figure was 28.8 percent (Wool, 1968).

Thus, while the overwhelming bulk of military personnel have occupational specialties equivalent to those in civilian life, a core persists

which has only military specialties. It is particularly important that persons with military skills have the highest prestige in the military. The present skill structure in the military is likely to persist under the all-volunteer army, and, in fact, some purely civilian operations and specialties will be eliminated. The results are to limit civilianization and to maintain the basis of differentiating military organization from the larger society.

In addition to personnel practices and skill structure, the organizational boundaries of the military clearly reflect its authority structure and the professional definition of its goals. Since the turn of the century, there has been a continuous trend toward increased organizational convergence between military and civilian institutions (for a summary see Janowitz, 1965). This trend has been linked to a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment, namely, a shift from authoritative domination to a greater reliance on explanation, expertise, and consensus. This shift has reflected the civilianization of the military as a result both of new weapons, which required complex coordination, and of the continuing impact of conscription, which brought a vast number of civilians into the military establishment. The advent of the all-volunteer force has at least slowed or ended this trend and even introduced some countertrends toward more traditional forms of authority.

However, the countertrend reflects more than the decline of the citizen-soldier concept. It also reflects the conscious effort of the military leaders to "reestablish military authority," which important segments of the military profession believe had been weakened by excessive civilianization.

In the aftermath of the agonies of Vietnam these military leaders have emphasized "combat readiness" and the imagery of the "fighting man" as the basis of recruitment and morale. In fact, an overwhelming incentive for joining the volunteer force, in addition to the pay scale, has been the training and educational benefits associated with military service (Johnston and Bachman, 1972). This renewed emphasis on the military function and on a combat-ready organization serves to highlight the distinctive features of the military. Thus, professional ideology and military realities are creating self-conceptions which serve as a powerful counterforce to civilianization. In effect, the activities subsumed under the term "military" are numerous and, in terms of numbers of personnel, are mainly logistical and administrative. Moreover, the armed forces have incorporated many functions which could be performed by civilian agencies. But the core of combat-oriented professional officers set the dominant tone for the military establishment and reinforce the combat mentality under the all-volunteer system.

However, the boundaries of the military as a social organization are more than the mental definition its members create. Changing military technology and emerging military strategy have served gradually since 1945 (and more decisively since 1970) to limit the trend toward civilianization. A strategy of deterrence that relies on nuclear weapons has produced a military force with increasingly distinct boundaries that is more sharply differentiated from

civilian society. In order to staff nuclear weapons, the military becomes more and more a self-contained force on ready alert. There is a contraction of the idea of mobilizing the citizen reserve force. Likewise, even the conventional force, especially the ground force, emerges progressively more in the mold of a force in being and less as a cadre to be mobilized in time of "war."

These dimensions of personnel turnover, skill, authority, and professional ideology are augmented by elements of social ecology. When, after World War II, the military remained an enlarged organization, large numbers of its personnel were forced to live outside of military bases. Gradually the armed forces have been increasing their housing resources; and with the decline in the size of the active duty force, the trend is toward increased residence on military installations.

SOCIAL RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS

The second hypothesis deals with shifts in the pattern of officer recruitment as core indicators of change in the military; and these measures are especially relevant with the advent of the all-volunteer force. There are, of course, many intervening variables between the social origin of a professional group and its sociopolitical perspective and operating behavior. As Karl Mannheim (1940) emphasized, because the division of labor in modern society has become more and more complex, the processes of socialization, including professional socialization, have an increasing effect, compared with social origins, in accounting for sociopolitical behavior. But this is not to discount the continuing significance of the social background of the officers in the military profession, since we are dealing not only with those factors which condition attitudes but also with sources of legitimacy of the military. In the United States, the legitimacy of the military requires that it avoid undue self-recruitment and that it have a broadly representative social composition.

The second hypothesis, as it relates to officer recruitment, needs to be seen in conjunction with the procedures of officer socialization. The military profession in Western Europe and the United States, both by its social recruitment and by its organizational ethos, has tended to display a strong conservative sociopolitical outlook. The hypothesis can be offered that both the emerging pattern of recruitment under the all-volunteer system, with its stronger emphasis on self-recruitment from a less representative social base, plus the impact of professional socialization, will strengthen this traditional sociopolitical perspective.

Before 1940, the military profession in the United States, because of congressional appointments to the service academies and the role of the ROTC land-grant colleges, was less selective in its recruitment than the military in other Western nations. However, it did have a definite selectivity. Its social composition was reinforced by the regional concentration of the military installations in the South and by the resulting patterns of marriage and kinship that developed. The members of the U.S. military profession, especially its elite, were recruited largely from white Protestant estab-

lished families affiliated with the South from 1900 to 1940. A strong concentration came from the upper-middle class with small-town and rural backgrounds. But the long-term development of the mass army has produced a transformation in recruiting patterns. "The military elite has been undergoing a basic social transformation since the turn of the century; these elites have been shifting their recruitment from a narrow, relatively high social status to a broader base, more representative of the population as a whole" (Janowitz, 1960; 1971: 9). This broadening of the recruitment base has reflected the growth of the military establishment and the demand for larger numbers of trained specialists, as well as the political trend toward the "democratization of recruitment" especially to include previously excluded minorities. Perhaps the most dramatic measure of this is reflected in the fact that, among the top officers of the U.S. army in 1935, two percent came from working-class backgrounds, while the figure had reached 19 percent for the cadet class of 1960 at West Point (Janowitz, 1960; 1971: 91).

The trend toward a broader social base and the impact of large-scale mobilization of civilians directly into the career officer corps during World War II meant that, during the postwar period, the sociopolitical outlook for the professional military had a conservative emphasis but hardly a pronounced bias of political extremism. Questionnaire data collected in 1954 from high-ranking officers on duty in the Pentagon showed that only 21.6 percent identified themselves as conservative, 45.3 percent as a little on the conservative side, and 23.1 percent as a little on the liberal side.

The trend toward a less representative officer corps began to manifest itself even before the end of conscription and is likely to continue. First, officer recruitment has come to be based more and more on self-recruitment. All professions have a component of self-recruitment; about 25 percent of the recruits to the medical profession are sons of doctors. It is doubtful that the military officer cadres could be filled without at least a comparable input from sons of military personnel. The ROTC system and congressional selection of candidates were designed to prevent an over-concentration of offspring of military personnel in the service academies. However, the self-recruitment of the military officer has increased in all three services since 1945. In the 1960s more than 25 percent of cadets entering the ground force and naval academies came from career military families. Their fathers were either on full-time career duty or had completed 20 years of service. (There appears to be much less self-recruitment in the Air Force Academy.) If uncles and close relatives who were career military men had been included, the percentage would, of course, have greatly increased. Although precise data are not available, there has been a marked increase in the number of sons of noncommissioned officers at the service academies. Among military offspring, linkages with civilian society tend to be attenuated, and a sense of social isolation is often present.

Then, too, the regional representativeness of the officer corps is de-

clining, especially in the ground forces. As a result of student protest and other political factors, ROTC units in the Northeast and the Midwest have been closed down and moved to the South and Southwest. With the end of the pressure of conscription, the South and now the Southwest are more likely to produce persons interested in a military career.

Also, in recent years, social recruitment into the military, especially into the service academies, has emphasized selection from "modest" social backgrounds. The service academies continue to offer important opportunities to recruits from working-class families. Thus, 17.6 percent of the class of 1971 at the U.S. Military Academy were from the working class; at the U.S. Naval Academy, 20.1 percent of the cadets in the class of 1971 described their background as blue collar (Lebby, 1970). While the military seeks to describe its typical cadet as a person whose "father had some college education and is a business or professional person" (Office of Research, U.S. Military Academy, 1969:1), in effect, there has actually been a decline in sons with an upper-middle-class business and professional background and a strong emphasis on recruiting from selected lower-middle-class sources. New recruits come from families with more limited educational backgrounds and with less cosmopolitan perspectives. There is no reason to assume that broadening the basis of recruitment—that is, "democratization" of the sources of recruitment—produces new cadres with stronger commitments to civilian control and a rational and pragmatic approach to military policy. On the contrary, both in the military academies and among ROTC cadets, new recruits come from more provincial, less educated backgrounds and are likely to produce more traditionalistic, conventional and conservative perspectives.

And, while minority groups have been underrepresented in the officer corps and while this deficit will continue, there is no reason to expect that the officer corps will be completely devoid of minority-group members, especially of blacks. In fact, the ability of the officer corps to attract and retain minority-group members may well be one unanticipated trend; there had been an expectation that the officer corps would become all-white.

During World War II and immediately thereafter, blacks were particularly attracted to the officer ranks of the ground forces. Many served as enlisted personnel and, on the basis of ability and initiative, were able to rise to the officer ranks. Their total concentration was limited, but the expanding trend was significant. The overall percent of black officers in 1962 was 1.7; for the army, the figure stood at 3.3 percent (Table 2). In the 1960's, the civil rights movement gave college-educated blacks increased opportunities for career advancement in civilian society. The attractiveness of the military declined. The increase in black officers was very limited. By 1970, the overall figure for black officers was 2.2 percent. However, active recruiting into the service academies has produced, in the early 1970's, a marked increase in cadets with minority-group backgrounds. At West Point,

TABLE 2

BLACK PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMED FORCES, 1962-1970

Military Service	As of December 1970			As of 31 December 1962		
	Total	Black	%	Total	Black	%
Army						
Total	1,229,707	149,318	12.1	950,132	106,962	11.3
Officer	160,291	5,392	3.4	107,685	3,509	3.3
Enlisted	1,069,416	143,926	13.5	842,447	103,453	12.3
Navy						
Total	644,577	30,937	4.8	651,659	30,602	4.7
Officer	77,679	512	0.7	70,689	194	0.3
Enlisted	566,898	30,425	5.4	580,970	30,408	5.2
Marine Corps						
Total	231,601	23,590	10.2	190,417	13,392	7.03
Officer	23,034	296	1.3	16,804	41	0.2
Enlisted	208,567	23,294	11.2	173,613	13,351	7.7
Air Force						
Total	755,162	75,429	10.0	613,741	47,892	7.8
Officer	128,340	2,202	1.7	106,692	1,328	1.2
Enlisted	626,822	73,227	11.7	507,049	46,564	9.2
All Services						
Total	2,861,047	279,274	9.8	2,405,949	198,848	8.3
Officer	389,344	8,402	2.2	301,870	5,072	1.7
Enlisted	2,471,703	270,872	11.0	2,104,079	193,776	9.2

Source: Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity).

minority-group officers (blacks, Spanish-surname, etc.) rose from three percent in the school year 1970-71 to 7.8 percent in the school year 1973-74—a figure the military considers far short of its desired goals. Moreover, the ability of the ROTC to attract black recruits has also grown, during a period when the interest of white students has declined. Thus, in ROTC units, the concentration of minority-group members rose from 10.7 percent for the school year 1970-71 to 22.3 percent in the school year 1973-74. Blacks entering the officer corps are, of course, race conscious, but they are hardly militants.

The social recruitment of the officer corps, as measured by trends in self-recruitment, geographical affiliation and, to a lesser extent, in social composition reflects an extension of the conservative emphasis in the military profession. But it is the system of socialization which supplies the crucial intervening variable. Two penetrating studies of socialization at the service academies in the United States highlight the unanticipated conclusion that the military academies have only a very limited impact in fashioning professional perspectives (Lovell, 1964; Lebby, 1970). On the contrary, the socialization process

operates mainly by negative selection—not by changing attitudes but by eliminating those young cadets who do not fit into the ideal or desired mold. The same process of negative selection continues to operate at each level in the hierarchy of the military establishment; those who do not fit in are not promoted or select themselves out. This process has been documented in some detail for the Swedish military profession (Abrahamson, 1972). The process of negative self-selection implies that the social background of those who are recruited has a continuing sociological relevance; the characteristics and values of the persons who are recruited set the limits on this negative selection. As a result, given the shift in recruitment patterns plus the socialization process, the officer corps contains the elements for more extensive tough-minded politico-military perspective and a strong conservative or right-wing political ideology.

SOCIAL RECRUITMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

What are the trends in the recruitment of enlisted personnel? Obviously, the enlisted ranks of an all-volunteer army will have a concentration of men from the lower strata of society (Moskos, 1970). But how marked is the imbalance? The civil-military problem is less that of the political orientation of the enlisted ranks than of the political legitimacy of a military recruited exclusively from the lowest strata and overwhelmingly staffed by blacks and members of other minority groups. Such a force would pose a fundamental issue of political legitimacy for a society with parliamentary institutions. In terms of trends, the assertion that requires analysis is that the social unrepresentativeness of the enlisted ranks, especially in the ground forces, increases with the advent and reality of an all-volunteer force.

The military under Selective Service served as a channel of social mobility for limited segments of civilian society; the all-volunteer force will continue to perform this function. However, during the Vietnam War, the issue of the representative character of the enlisted ranks and the social class incidence of casualties became a matter of intense public debate. The available data and analysis are hardly definitive, but the degree of distortion may well have been overemphasized. According to an NORC survey conducted in 1964, the Selective Service System, with its medical and mental screening, underselected the very poorest, while educational deferments exempted a segment of middle-class youths. When these data are standardized for age, the difference by social group tends to contrast notably with the exception of the limited segment with extensive post-A.B. education (Duncan, Unpublished document). The changes in Selective Service introduced during the height of the Vietnam War led to the ending of college exemptions and produced a more representative enlisted body. However, during the Vietnam War, blacks, once inducted, tended to be concentrated in the ground forces, especially in the combat units. Official statistics released during the Vietnam period reported an overconcentration of casualties among blacks. It is, of course, necessary to determine the

extent to which the pattern of casualties was a racial or a social class phenomenon. However, full statistical analyses based on final casualty records and standardized for age have not been completed; preliminary analysis indicates that the differences, if they exist, were limited (Willis, undated).

With the advent of the volunteer force, there has been an immediate shift in the pattern of social recruitment. The enlisted ranks have been filled more and more from the less educated and from the lower social strata, and especially by blacks (Moskos, 1973). Any extensive impact of casualties under the all-volunteer force would present a more strongly unrepresentative pattern.

Socioeconomic background must be inferred from measures of education, academic achievement, and minority-group status. Taken together, these supply essential information about the trend under the all-volunteer force. Official sources have sought to deemphasize the trend, e.g., the Secretary of the Army's report, *The Volunteer Army—One Year Later,* issued on February 11, 1974. However, the short-term trend, starting with the reduction in the number of conscripted personnel in 1968 and continuing after the end of the Selective Service, has been toward a heavier and heavier reliance on the lowest social stratum. It is interesting that volunteer recruitment into the forces, again particularly into the ground forces, is more concentrated in the South and Southwest. The cultural dimensions which motivate young men to enter the officer corps also operate for enlisted personnel—but, with enlisted personnel, we are dealing with young whites and blacks who have not completed high school, since these groups continue to carry the "military" orientation of the South.

The most direct indicator of the shift in enlisted recruitment has been the elimination of personnel who enter those ranks with some college background. Under conscription, the percentage was limited but clearly served to produce an important element of social representativeness. In the army in 1961, 18 percent had had some college education. During the first six months of calendar 1973, the army had 22,257 new enlistments, of whom only 538, or less than three percent, had some college education (Secretary of the Army, 1974, II-7). They enlisted because intensive efforts were made to recruit students with some junior college training, attracting them by means of lateral entry, i.e., they entered with some grade in rank because of their occupational specialty or skill.

Educational level is not only an indicator of social representativeness, but is also a measure of minimum standards of quality and performance. Congressional legislation in 1974 required that 70 percent of new enlistments be high-school graduates. For the ground forces, the figures showed a decline from 69 percent high-school graduates for the first half of calendar 1973 to 54 percent for the second half of that calendar year. This educational requirement plus other factors resulted in the inability of the ground forces to meet their goals for fiscal 1974 by a shortage of approximately 30,000. Moreover, the concentration of high-school graduates would have been lower if

there had not been an increase in the enlistment of women with higher educational levels.

One's number of years of education is an approximate measure of one's position in the social structure. A more sensitive indicator of the trends in social recruitment and of the reliance in the enlisted ranks on the excluded and marginal groups in society can be derived from examining mental test scores (essentially achievement tests). Since tests and definitions vary over time, long-range comparisons are not possible. However, the short-range trend indicates the extent to which the ground forces rely on those who are the products of deprived slum and rural educational systems. The military classification system is based on five categories: Category One is the highest mental category, and Category Five is the lowest. On the basis of a survey conducted in Fall, 1974, no more than 19 percent of the enlisted personnel could be in Category Four if the force were to have the "minimum essential quality required by the Army in order to assure skill trainability." Sixty-one percent had to be in Categories One through Three. However, for calendar 1973, the ground forces failed to meet this standard. Only 55 percent of the new personnel were in these higher mental categories. In 1959, the army had 83.4 percent in comparable mental categories. No doubt an important segment could be retrained and given suitable compensatory education. But as a measure of socioeconomic background, these indicators reveal the direct impact of the end of the draft.

The issue of social representativeness has come to focus on the concentration of blacks in the enlisted ranks. The long-term increasing concentration of blacks is presented in Table 2. In 1970 the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force predicted a maximum of 15 percent, while civilian specialists doubted this estimate. Subsequently, the official sources revised the predicted point of leveling-off the concentration of blacks upward to 18 percent, but there has been little justification for these predictions. In 1962 the overall concentration of blacks in the armed services at the enlisted level stood at 9.2 percent. The navy had only 5.2 percent; the Air Force, 9.2 percent; and the army, 12.3 percent. Since that period, the figures have gone consistently upward. By 1970 the figure had reached 11 percent for the services as a whole. The concentration in the army was 13.4 percent in that year.

Table 3 presents the year-by-year increase in black enlisted personnel during transition to the all-volunteer force. By 1972 the figure for enlisted blacks in the ground forces was 17 percent; by 1974 it was 19.9 percent. In fact, in Fall, 1973, initial black enlistments into the army jumped to one-third; this figure temporarily declined to about 25 percent in Spring, 1974, but reached 30 percent during July and August of that year. In short, the advent of the all-volunteer force has produced an overconcentration of blacks in the ground forces and a continually rising percentage in the other services.

The crucial element is not only the increasing rates at which blacks enter the military but also the higher rates of reenlistment of

TABLE 3
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES, 1971-1974
BLACK PERSONNEL AS PERCENT OF TOTAL ENLISTED STRENGTH

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD
Fiscal Yr. 1971	14.3	5.4	11.4	12.3	11.4
Fiscal Yr. 1972	17.0	6.4	13.7	12.6	12.6
Fiscal Yr. 1973	18.6	7.7	16.9	13.4	14.1
First Half FY 74	19.9	8.1	17.7	13.8	14.9

Source: Secretary of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report, FY, 1975, p. 186.

blacks compared with whites. In estimating the future, the Department of Defense has emphasized that the pool of qualified blacks is finite; this fact will place an upper limit on the percentage of blacks in the service. However, it is difficult to make a precise or even generalized estimate of the point at which equilibrium will be reached, except to anticipate a continued increase in the concentration of blacks. Official sources indicate that 30 percent would be the "equilibrium" point. A figure of approximately 50 percent may be a more accurate estimate of an equilibrium point. However, no one can say when the tipping point would be reached—the point at which whites stop enlisting in a particular military service or unit because of the overconcentration of blacks there.

A reduction in the size of the armed forces would operate as another control, since a smaller armed force would have higher educational standards and, therefore, fewer blacks. A quota system would be unconstitutional. However, it may well happen that the all-volunteer military will have the unanticipated consequence of increasing the emphasis in the military on the technical and vocational training of its underprivileged recruits and on preparing them to leave for appropriate civilian jobs. The armed forces already have programs of this type and encourage employers to recruit from their ranks. Black social welfare agencies have become active in such programs.

When the manpower trends under an all-volunteer system are described, the increase in women in the service—in both the officer and enlisted ranks—is most striking. Women constitute an excluded minority group to be mobilized to meet manpower shortages. In the search for manpower, the military authorities have extended their recruitment of women. Until the end of the 1960's women were limited to two percent of the active duty force and confined to certain occupational specialties. By 1974 the services had increased their utilization of women and set goals of as high as six to eight percent for women. Goldman (1973) has traced the broadening of occupation opportunities for women in the military. It is notable that these goals are easily met—and from personnel with higher achievement test scores than men. However, since women appear to be excluded from combat units, it is hardly likely that their concentration will rise above ten percent. The implications of increased numbers of women for the organizational format and values of

the military remain an important research topic.

CONCLUSIONS

On balance, the advent of the all-volunteer force weakens the social representativeness of the military, especially through increased self-selection, and is accompanied by internal changes which increase the differentiation of the military establishment from the civilian society. Thus, the tasks of civilian control are made more complicated.

These trends do not imply an increase in the potential for a traditional military coup d'etat. Rather, they raise the likelihood that the military will continue to operate as a powerful pressure group with a distinctive and relatively unified outlook and ideology. Issues concerning the size of the military budget and the role of the military in foreign and domestic affairs are certain to persist as sources of intense political debate and controversy. A military establishment with selective linkages to civilian society, with a strong element of social unrepresentativeness, and with a presumed "ideological" cast, is likely to be the source of political conflict and dissensus with segments of civilian society.

The policies and locus for countermeasures in a democratic society focus on the system of military education and on career management of the military profession in order to build new institutional controls to strengthen civilian management of the military. Increased emphasis on civilian education for military officers would appear essential, but the pressure to lower the military budget has already resulted in Congressional reductions of such expenditures. The restructuring of the idea of the military career into a modern citizen-soldier concept would be another approach. Professional military service would include periods of assignment to civilian employment and, after a specified term of military service, officers would be shifted into the civilian civil service. Entrance into the military would, thereby, not be perceived as selecting a highly specialized and differentiated career but as taking one step in a career in public service. Movement in this direction appears remote because many civilian occupational groups strongly resist incorporating into their ranks men who have served in the professional military.

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