

Duccio Basosi
The Idea of Europe in US Foreign Policy, 1961-73

Links to useful documents:

John Kennedy, "Inuagural address", 20 January 1961
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8032&st=&st1=#axzz1SA6fEbUL>

John Kennedy, "The declaration of interdependence", 4 July 1962
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8756&st=interdependence&st1=#axzz1SA6fEbUL>

Lyndon Johnson, "Remarks on 15th anniversary of the signing of the Atlantic Treaty", 3 April 1964
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26137&st=france&st1=nato#axzz1SA6fEbUL>

Lyndon Johnson, "Inaugural address", 20 January 1965
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26985&st=&st1=#axzz1SA6fEbUL>

Henry Kissinger, "Year of Europe Speech", 23 April 1973
http://www.ena.lu/address_given_henry_kissinger_new_york_23_april_1973-020003978.html

G. Lundestad, "The US & Western Europe since 1945",
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 168-69, 179-183

6

Conflict and Cooperation: American–Western
European Relations (not) Redefined,
1969–1977

Redefinitions and Cooperation

In the late 1960s the wider framework for and the basic structure of the North Atlantic alliance was being challenged on virtually all fronts at the same time, causing the need for a reappraisal of relationships. In the Cold War with the Soviet Union and its allies, the confrontation continued, but now it was being combined with détente, i.e. cooperation on important military, political, and economic issues. In the American–European relationship, it was obvious that Europe was striking out more on its own. Not only France, but even loyal West Germany was developing its own policy, particularly toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the form of its *Ostpolitik*. Western Europe had also come to count for more than it had in the early years of NATO. With British membership in the European Community, the EC was beginning to rival the United States in importance, at least economically. In Southern Europe a democratic revolution was taking place.

On the other side of the Atlantic, even the Nixon administration was talking about the decline of the US and how it would now have to cooperate with the other economic centers of the world. Such self-doubts were greatly stimulated by the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the Communist takeover of South Vietnam. Also outside of Europe, the combination of the rise of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the volatility of the Middle East highlighted a growing energy problem that was to prove quite troublesome in Atlantic relations. The rise of Japan and the Pacific rim was also beginning to redefine the role and importance of Western Europe in the world. In 1979 trade across the Pacific was to be greater than across the Atlantic.

With all these redefinitions taking place at the same time, one can easily imagine the strain they imposed on American–European relations; and, indeed, many were the quarrels and debates, on relations with the Soviet

Union, on alliance questions, the Middle East, Vietnam, energy matters. Yet, this was nothing new, for there had always been quarrels and debates among the NATO members; but these were more structural now than they had been earlier, in the sense that they touched basic relationships not only single issues, however important. What was amazing, though, was how well even these more structural debates were contained within the alliance framework.

In a period when the United States felt it was in decline, it needed its crucial allies in Western Europe even more than before. For their part, the Europeans, while wanting to strike out more on their own, resisted anything that might reduce the role of the United States in Europe, and thus continued to issue their invitations to the United States to stay in Europe; in these years the emphasis was particularly on the need for the American troops to remain. Europe's dependence on America, especially militarily, endured. In fact, Western Europe did not really expect to be the equal of the United States; it did not even want to be. In this basic sense the American-Western European relationship was *not* redefined.

American foreign policy had so far been formulated primarily by the State Department. The economic departments, primarily Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, naturally paid much more attention to domestic economic interests than did State. But Presidents, normally backed by their National Security Advisers, still tended to support State, particularly since the economic departments often were divided. If all these economic interests, inside the administration and in Congress, were to come together, they would represent a most powerful coalition. All of them were clearly more skeptical to the EEC than was the State Department; Agriculture and Commerce for the harm done to their respective business clients, Treasury for the break with multilateralism which regional economic integration represented.

This coming together of the economic interests was to take place under Nixon, whose Republican administration was considerably more protectionist in its basic attitude than previous Democratic ones. For a decade de Gaulle had represented the main challenge to the American policy on European integration. With de Gaulle's resignation in 1969, with the EC relatively unified on tariff matters, and with the American economic situation increasingly strained, this was now changing.

The President's foreign policy report for 1970 stated, in tune with traditional US policy, that "We consider that the possible economic price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the West as a whole." The three economic departments expressed disagreement with this statement. Instead they wanted to emphasize the problems created by the EC, problems that would only become greater with membership for Britain and other EFTA countries supplemented by the association of the former British colonies. More and more Congress was weighing in on the side of the economic departments. In November 1970 Nixon sent Kissinger a note which expressed the new mood: "K—It seems to me that we 'protest' and continue to get the short end of the stick in our dealings with the Community." Agriculture was the prime example. "The Congress is simply not going to tolerate this too passive attitude on the part of our representatives in the negotiations."

Such pressure from the economic departments and from Congress had to be reflected in Nixon's foreign policy report for 1971. Compared with the 1970 report, in 1971 there was a noticeable shift toward underlining the many problems the EC would create for the United States, whereas for years it had been uncritically believed that a unified Western Europe would automatically lift burdens from the shoulders of the United States: "The truth is not so simple. European unity will also pose problems for American policy, which it would be idle to ignore." Agriculture and preferential trading arrangements with countries outside the EC were especially mentioned.

The United States was beginning to experience serious economic problems. It had long been running a balance of payments deficit, but from 1960

the federal budget had also been in the red. Normally this would have caused a devaluation, yet, due to the dollar's international position, Washington could continue its spending ways. More than three-quarters of trade among non-Communist countries and of central banks' reserves was in dollars. In the course of 1967–8, the most important currencies—the dollar, the pound, the franc, and the mark—all experienced crises, demonstrating that the foreign exchange market was effectively out of control. The introduction in 1968 of a system of special drawing rights (SDR) to stabilize the market and to reduce dependence on the dollar was only partly successful.

With low economic growth and inflation producing the new phenomenon of stagflation, America was in trouble. In 1971 the United States was for the first time since 1893 running a deficit not only in its balance of payments but also in its balance of trade. Secretary of the Treasury John Connally was telling the President that "The simple fact is that in many areas other nations are out-producing us, out-thinking us and out-trading us." As so often, Nixon's response was graphic: "We'll fix those bastards."²⁵ The fix came in the form of the Nixon–Connally economic measures of August 1971, whereby the convertibility of the dollar into gold was suspended (the equivalent of a dollar devaluation), a 10 per cent surtax was added on imported goods, and domestically a wage and price freeze was imposed. These measures signaled that finally the United States had decided to clean up its international financial act, and in doing so was paying far more attention to its more narrowly defined economic interests than it had done previously.

The 1972 foreign policy report attempted to strike some sort of balance, probably partly in response to much of the outside world's, certainly including Western Europe's, strong criticism of the August measures. On the one hand, the report reiterated Washington's strong support for the geographical enlargement of the Community represented by the possible membership of Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. On the other hand, the problems posed to the United States by the enlarged EC were certainly also mentioned, and, as we shall shortly see, these problems were not only economic.

In the analysis of Nixon–Kissinger, Atlantic cooperation worked well in the security field, but not in the economic one. On several occasions this discrepancy led the President to ask whether "Atlantic unity in defense and security [can] be reconciled with the European Community's increasingly regional economic policies?" He gave the answer himself—Europeans could not have it both ways: "They cannot have the United States participation and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political front." The conclusion was obvious: in return for the security provided by the United States, the Europeans ought really to become more conciliatory on the economic front; alternatively, the United States would do less on the security front.²⁶ Yet, there were

clear limits to the kind of pressure the US should exert. Although in the economic arena Nixon was convinced the “European leaders want to ‘screw’ us and we want to ‘screw’ them,” the overriding point was still that “We should not allow the umbilical cord between the US and Europe to be cut and Europe to be nibbled away by the Soviets.”²⁷

3. In promoting an integrated Europe, Washington could actually be pushing its best friends in Europe away from itself. An integrated Europe might come to be dominated by Gaullist ideas, clearly an undesirable outcome for the Nixon administration too. Somewhat less dramatic, but more likely than a Gaullist scenario, several countries in Europe followed the American lead quite closely, but if their policies were to be submerged in a European community the result could easily be greater distance toward the United States. In Kissinger’s words, “A confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain influence at many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake everything on affecting the views of a single, supranational body.”

In line with this argument, Nixon again started referring to the “special relationship” with Britain, a term generally frowned upon by earlier administrations in Washington. For Nixon–Kissinger there was no point in ending the “special relationship.” Quite on the contrary, the objective should be to bring as many countries as possible into special relationships with Washington. The Nixon administration, too, definitely wanted to get Britain into the EC, but a close relationship with the UK could still be maintained in a confederal structure, while this would be impossible in a federal one. The British were also skeptical toward supranationalism, an additional reason for Washington to be the same.

The paradox was that now, when the United States finally took a strong interest in the “special relationship,” Britain was not really interested. Prime Minister Edward Heath was more strongly committed to British membership in the EC than any of his predecessors and was ready to accept the EC pretty much as it stood. His strategy to accomplish membership for Britain included putting some distance between the US and the UK, and, largely for this reason, the Nixon–Heath relationship remained somewhat distant.

Heath did succeed, however, in bringing Britain into the EC. Not only was he himself very pro-European, but British industrialists were also becoming ever more so. Even more important were the changes on the other side of the English Channel, where Georges Pompidou held a more flexible position on British membership in the EC than had de Gaulle. This reflected the new President’s more pragmatic personality, but also, as we have already seen, his uneasiness over West Germany’s growing independence. The Six became the Nine.

4. Finally, the new American policy was undoubtedly also influenced by the complex attitude Nixon and Kissinger had toward France in general and toward de Gaulle in particular. They were both actually great admirers of the French President, especially of his personal qualities, though they were less enamoured of his attitude to the United States. As we have seen, the Johnson administration had pursued a relatively calm policy in the face of de Gaulle's challenge to American leadership, but Nixon–Kissinger wanted to take this policy one step further.

A lower American profile on European integration could help improve relations with de Gaulle and with his successor President Pompidou. (De Gaulle retired only three months after Nixon had taken office.) Pushing for a supranational Europe clearly disturbed relations with de Gaulle/Pompidou since they were against it and wanted a loose confederal structure. Nixon's initiation of secret American assistance to the French nuclear weapons project certainly also helped improve relations.

The Kennedy and particularly the Johnson administrations had expected that the problems between the United States and Western Europe would largely disappear when de Gaulle left the scene. The Nixon administration also assumed that its new policy would help improve relations, and in some respects relations did improve. Certainly the difficult issue of British membership of the EC was solved. Serious problems remained, however, as was most clearly seen in connection with the so-called Year of Europe (1973).

The Year of Europe was Nixon–Kissinger's most ambitious attempt to redefine and strengthen relations with Europe within the crucial Atlantic framework. After heavy emphasis on the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam, Europe was again to be at the center of Washington's attention. In the speech launching the scheme Kissinger stated that "The alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all postwar foreign policy." In the agenda for the future, the National Security Adviser affirmed that the United States would continue to support the unification of Europe. "We have no intention of destroying what we worked so hard to build." For the United States, "European unity is what it has always been: not an end in itself but a means to the strengthening of the West." Washington would "continue to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership." The Atlantic framework was essential, of course, but Kissinger's emphasis on European unity was really a bit strong in view of the administration's reevaluation on this point.

Kissinger thought Pompidou had encouraged him to undertake the reappraisal implied in the Year of Europe speech. If this was indeed so, he was soon disabused of the notion.²⁸ The new Atlantic Charter that Kissinger proposed irked the Europeans, and not only the French, by pointing out that while the United States had global responsibilities, the Europeans only had

more regional ones and by emphasizing the “linkage” between the maintenance of the American security guarantee and a European *quid pro quo* in the economic sphere and with regard to military burden-sharing. In response, the EC’s draft agreement stressed the political equality of the EC and the US and also refused to recognize any linkage between security and political and economic problems. It was in this context that Nixon presented his warning that “the Europeans could not have it both ways.”

The Year of Europe produced much heat, but little light. French–American differences were substantial, even after de Gaulle. At the time of Pompidou’s death in April 1974, even Kissinger felt that US–French relations were at an all-time low. He, who had so strongly accused earlier administrations of useless bickering with the French, ended up in the very same position.²⁹ As we saw in Chapter 5, Washington and most European capitals disagreed on the right policy toward the Middle East, a critical issue in 1973, the Year of Europe. Even the British were skeptical about the scheme since they wanted to prove themselves good Europeans, and in any case American leverage was rapidly being reduced under the growing scandal of Watergate. There were endless procedural wrangles. Should Washington negotiate with the three main European capitals individually, with the Nine in the form of the Commission, or with the country holding the EC presidency? The correct answer seemed to be all of the above.

The debate more or less ended with the Declaration on Atlantic Relations approved by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19 June 1974. This document was consensus-oriented, but still largely based on American ideas. The American security guarantee to Europe was tied to the Europeans assuming a fair share of the defense burden. The linkage so urgently requested by the United States was also vaguely recognized by an expression of intent that the American–European security relationship “be strengthened through harmonious relations in the political and economic fields.” Washington’s fear that the Europeans would “gang up” on the Americans was to be avoided by the Europeans consulting the Americans *before* they reached decisions on important matters of common interest.

At the same time, the United States made significant concessions to the Europeans. For the first time Washington explicitly recognized that the British and French nuclear forces were “capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance.”³⁰ For Washington this meant formally giving up its long-held policy of getting the two countries to give up their independent deterrents. In this context it helped that Washington, London, and Paris had a common desire to keep the European weapons out of the upcoming SALT II talks. In fact, the Nixon administration was now willing to provide the French with crucial nuclear information, mostly in the form of “negative guidance,” letting

French scientists present what they were doing, and then telling them whether they were on the right track or not.³¹

After Nixon's resignation in August 1974, President Ford had more pressing matters to deal with than American–European relations. In his very few statements on Europe he tended to emphasize the role of NATO, not the EC. The EC, on its side, was preoccupied with the adaptation of its three new members. Still, US–European relations improved a great deal under Ford, for although Kissinger continued as Secretary of State, Ford was prepared to listen more to the Europeans than Nixon had been. That was natural in view of his more limited foreign policy experience, but his personality was also friendlier than Nixon's had been. The changes in government in Europe in the very same year also worked in a favorable direction in that the new men were all more pro-Atlantic than their predecessors had been. In Britain Wilson came back as Prime Minister after Heath; when Wilson resigned in 1976 new Prime Minister James Callaghan was even more Atlantic in orientation; in France the more centrist Giscard d'Éstaing succeeded Pompidou as President; in West Germany Helmut Schmidt became the new Chancellor after Brandt had to resign because of the Guillaume spy scandal.

France and NATO agreed on further military cooperation both in peacetime deployment of forces and wartime coordination in case of a Soviet attack. Even the French nuclear weapons were now seen in a wider European perspective than simply as a French *force de frappe*. A regular system of consultation was set up between Washington and the capital of the country holding the EC presidency. In 1975 regular meetings of the heads of government in the five leading industrialized countries began (the US, the UK, France, West Germany, and Japan).³²

The energy issue was to become really important and bothersome in allied relations in the 1970s. The Arab embargo during the 1973 war stimulated entirely different reactions in the West. France and the United Kingdom tried to get around the embargo by making bilateral deals directly with the Arab oil producers. West Germany, Italy, and most other EC members favored a coordinated European response. The United States and Holland pressed for cooperation among all Western oil-consuming countries. The various positions clearly reflected the different extent to which they had been hit by the embargo and the respective optimism with which they thought they could deal with the Arabs. The United States also felt the obligation to assert its leadership on this issue, though the effect of the Arab embargo on the US was softened by the fact that it was much less dependent on imports than were the Western European countries; much of what it imported also came from non-Arab countries: Venezuela, Nigeria, and Iran. Despite these differences, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was formed in September 1974. France chose not to join.

Washington wanted the oil consumers to organize themselves before they started any dialogue with the oil producers. The Western countries ought first to agree on measures such as energy conservation, reserve stocks of oil, and a financial facility to strengthen the consumer nations. Ford–Kissinger were even willing to hint at the use of military action to soften the oil producers, particularly Western-oriented Iran and Saudi Arabia. France, at the other extreme, wanted to call an energy conference without any degree of advance coordination among the consumers, except that it wanted the EC represented as one unit. Gradually, however, the Germans and the British came to support the Americans. France then modified its position. A producer–consumer dialogue was to be started, but on the basis of Western agreement in the areas mentioned.

In the ensuing negotiations the United States managed to isolate OPEC from other Third World raw material producers who, on the one hand, were badly hit by the rise in oil prices, but, on the other, saw the possibility of similar cartels with regard to their own raw materials. OPEC solidarity was also beginning to crack. The price of oil held relatively steady. Then, however, the fall of the Shah in 1978–9 and the rapid cut-back in Iranian oil production strengthened OPEC once more. In 1973 the price of oil had quadrupled; in 1978–9 it doubled again. The IEA was never to be the instrument that the United States had hoped for, although it did limit the scramble for bilateral deals somewhat.³³

M. Smith

"The US & the EU" [pp. 239-242]

in M. Cox, D. Stokes (eds.) "US Foreign Policy,"
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 236-256

By the mid-1950s, therefore, it could be argued that the Americans had achieved all of their key goals in respect of European integration. They had fostered European cooperation in key industries, and had managed to get the West Germans integrated into the NATO command and political structure. Led by the State Department, US foreign policy elites saw European integration as an unquestioned and positive contribution to western security, and also to the development of a liberalized 'western' world economy centred on the Atlantic area. The Eisenhower administration wanted this to go further, through the entry into European institutions of Britain and other key NATO allies. Thus, when the original six member states of the ECSC set out in 1955 to create a European Economic Community, US policy makers saw this as positive, despite the fears of some that it might constitute a protectionist economic bloc which would damage American agricultural and industrial interests (Winand 1993).

It is important to note, though, that this position was not aligned with some of the emerging realities of life in the 'new Europe'. The British proved strangely reluctant to immerse themselves in what they saw as a second-rank organization, partly because of their perceived 'special relationship' with the USA itself. At the same time, the French saw US enthusiasm for British membership as a sign of a malign hegemony, which led them ever more strongly to emphasize the EEC's role as a point of resistance to US policies. President Charles de Gaulle, who held power in France from 1958 to 1969, was especially sensitive to the American threat, and made constant efforts to turn the West Germans and others away from their Atlanticist orientation. As a result, when in 1962 John F. Kennedy made a major speech calling for the development of a true 'Atlantic partnership' between the United States and a uniting Europe, this became a major point of friction rather than a rallying point. Throughout the remainder of the 1960s, the discourse among US policy makers about 'Atlantic partnership'

or 'Atlantic community' was countered by calls from Paris for resistance to US domination and for the use of the EEC as a means of fighting back (Calleo 1970; Cleveland 1966). Ironically, this was accompanied by a substantial flow of US foreign direct investment into the EEC—a factor that was to contribute greatly to integration at the transatlantic level, and to become a significant influence on US foreign economic policy (Krause 1968).

The late 1960s, therefore, saw contradictory trends in US policies towards European integration. On the one side, there was the continuing rhetoric of 'Atlantic partnership' as part of the broader Cold War system—a rhetoric which defined the EEC as part of the 'western system' and as the economic equivalent of NATO. This rhetoric was strongly dedicated to the leading role of NATO in western security, and incidentally as a major source of US leverage over the countries of western Europe. On the other side, there was the rhetoric of 'adversarial partnership', focusing on the challenge posed by the French and on the danger of a developing 'third way' which might turn into a European form of neutralism or non-alignment. This second rhetoric was given added force by the economic turbulence of the late 1960s, by the loss of dynamism in the US economy, and by the feeling that the Europeans had profited from US financial and military support without playing their full part in return.

In this context, the Nixon–Kissinger foreign policy conducted between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s played a crucial catalytic role. In economic terms, Nixon and Kissinger subscribed to the view that the USA was an 'ordinary country' which needed to defend its national economic interests and to protect itself against those who took advantage of the liberal international economy (Rosecrance 1976). In security terms, the 'Nixon Doctrine' implied that America's allies would have to do far more to protect themselves and pay far more towards the costs of alliance, both in Europe and elsewhere. For European integration, this policy stance held important implications. It meant that they could no longer rely on the USA as a benign hegemonic force in the global economy, and that they could no longer count on the unqualified support

of the USA for European defence. US policy makers came to see European integration as much more of a problem than a solution; the EEC's development of foreign policy cooperation, with its insistence that the Community was a 'civilian power', implied to US policy makers that the Community was a means of hiding from international obligations and developing a form of the non-alignment that they feared and despised. The entry of the British into the EEC in 1973 thus could be defined not as a triumph for US policy but as a worrying move that could lead to the loss of their most trusted ally. The Nixon-Kissinger response was characteristic: Kissinger proclaimed 1973 'the year of Europe' and called for the conclusion of a new Atlantic treaty in line with the administration's idea of the global 'structure of peace' (Cromwell 1978). But this initiative, which had not been discussed with any European governments, fell on stony ground in a year when the combination of EEC enlargement, conflict in the Middle East, and an accompanying oil price crisis preoccupied European policy makers.

US policies towards European integration during the early 1970s might thus be summarized as a form of wary containment, but this misses the point that the EEC had become a genuine economic rival to the USA in a number of major areas. Although the Community's plans for economic and monetary union and political union by 1980 came to little or nothing, the 1970s as a whole gave evidence of the fact that the Americans needed the Community as much as the Community needed them. Thus the process of adjustment in US policy positions and policy rhetoric could be observed especially during the Carter administration between 1976 and 1980: Europeans were seen as partners in interdependence and as a focus for cooperation within international institutions, although this was not without its own difficulties in a period of economic stagnation (Hoffmann 1978). European foreign policy cooperation was a source of worry, for example over the Middle East where the Community members were much more pro-Palestinian than was Washington, but as it became clear that European declarations would lead to little substantive policy change, this suspicion moderated (Allen and Smith 1983).

Much of this apparent reconciliation was dissipated by the events of the 'second cold war' and by the arrival of the Reagan administration in 1980. Reaganism attacked the Europeans on two fronts. First, it politicized and 'domesticized' American foreign economic policies, leading to a concentration on the needs of the US economy but also to a strong emphasis on the sin of 'trading with the enemy', in this case the Soviet bloc in particular. For some Europeans, this rhetoric and the subsequent application of 'extra-territorial' measures to restrict trade with the Soviet bloc was evident of US unilateralism and a form of imperialism; for others, such as the British, it was defined much more positively as a reassertion of US leadership. That is certainly the way the US administration saw it: the USA was the leader of the free world, and was assuming its responsibilities (Allen and Smith 1989).

The second area in which US foreign policy challenged European integration was in the development of the fledgling 'European' foreign and security policies. Here, we can see again the 'containment' aspect of the US stance vis-à-vis European integration. US policy makers felt strongly that they did not want the Community to develop in such a way as to erode NATO, or to reduce their capacity to form 'special relationships' with individual EEC member states. In pursuit of this stance, Washington was prepared to use its connections with the British and others to ensure that any new developments in the Community were moderated and always made subject to the primary role of NATO in ensuring European security (Treverton 1985; Joffe 1987). Thus during the late 1980s when the revival of the Western European Union created a platform for a distinct European defence identity, the White House was quick to emphasize the dire consequences of any attempt to duplicate or to undermine NATO.

By the end of the 1980s, then, US policies towards the European integration project continued to manifest a series of tensions and contradictions. Washington supported European integration in general, but was never short of reasons for opposing it or criticizing it in particular contexts. US policy makers wanted a strong European partner both within Europe and the Atlantic area and in the broader global arena, but

KEY QUOTES 12.1: US policy makers and European integration in the Cold War

The Marshall Plan speech, 1947

It is evident . . . that, before the United States Government can proceed much further with its efforts to alleviate the situation and help the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by the Government. It would neither be fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drawing up of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, of Europe's nations.

(Marshall 1947; George C. Marshall was
US Secretary of State)

The 'Declaration of Interdependence'—John F. Kennedy, 4 July 1962

The nations of Western Europe, long divided by feuds more bitter than any which existed among the Thirteen Colonies, are joining together, seeking, as our forefathers sought, to find freedom in diversity and unity in strength. The United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic objective of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, and developing coordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic, and political areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.

... I will say here and now on this day of independence that the United States will be ready for a 'Declaration of Interdependence', that we will be prepared to discuss

with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago.

(Kennedy 1962)

The 'Year of Europe' speech: Henry Kissinger, April 1973

The problems in transatlantic relationships are real. They have arisen in part because during the fifties and sixties the Atlantic community organised itself in different ways in the many different dimensions of its common enterprise. In economic relations, the European community has increasingly stressed its regional personality; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for, a wider trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two perspectives. In our collective defense, we are still organised on the principle of unity and integration, but in radically different strategic conditions. The full implications of this change have yet to be faced. Diplomacy is the subject of frequent consultation, but is essentially being conducted by traditional nation states. The United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical. In short, we deal with each other regionally and even competitively in economic matters, on an integrated basis in defense, and as national states in diplomacy. When the various collective institutions were rudimentary, the potential inconsistency in their modes of operation was not a problem. But after a generation of evolution and with the new weight and strength of our allies, the various parts of the construction are not always in harmony and sometimes obstruct each other.

(Kissinger 1973; Henry Kissinger was
US Secretary of State)

'The transatlantic relationship: a long-term perspective'

I have often discussed with European friends the different requirements for a nation with global responsibilities to those with more regional concerns. The use of the word global is not meant in any arrogant fashion. Nor is it to deny the interests that several European nations retain in

(continued)



KEY QUOTES 12.1: (continued)

areas of the world beyond their continent. But the sheer scope of American interests engages us in a different set of perspectives and imperatives. I am persuaded that despite periodic inconsistencies (mainly on our part) and even more frequent crises of policy disagreement (emanating frequently from the European side) members of the alliance can still forge a strong consensus on most issues of importance . . . [but] . . . now may well be the appropriate moment for all of us—Europeans and Americans—to

take a new look at where we should be going together and how we should get there . . . The two pillars of a 'smarter' relationship, in my opinion, are: increasing respect for the differences in our alliance; and a more coordinated approach—across the board—to all political, economic and security issues with our European allies.

(Eagleburger 1984; Eagleburger was US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs)

they did not want it to be so strong that it developed a mind of its own. They valued the prosperity and stability of the EEC, not simply as a contribution to broader global stability but also as a source of economic gains for Americans, but they found difficult in accepting the Community as a 'partner in leadership' within the global economy. US hegemony over the Community, if it had ever fully existed, was fragmented and fraying at the edges in the late 1980s, and subject to question not only in the core economic domain but also in political and security terms.

Ken Weisbrode

"The Atlantic Century"

Cambridge, Da Capo, 2009

pp. 169-173 , 183-199

antic fervor of the early 1960s had a good deal to do with
ed counterpredilections of the New Frontiersmen and
ct that so many foreign policy figures from the Truman

and Eisenhower years remained active in public or semipublic life. And yet there was a sense that the demand for their ideas had ebbed as the ways of making policy had changed. "U.S. leadership no longer is possible on the basis of our ability to aid others in material ways," wrote Jack Tuthill to Ball in early 1961.⁸¹ Thus, in spite of Rusk's best efforts to consolidate the Atlantic chorus into a single, nonpartisan whole, the Atlantic Council found itself cast in the role of the loyal opposition. As was often the case, it was part political, part personal. Soon after the council was formed, its new chair, General Norstad, along with Ted Achilles, who, as resident vice chair until the mid-1980s, ran it as "his personal plaything," proposed to launch a special commission on European policy, a sort of Action Committee for the West and a quiet back channel to de Gaulle.⁸² The administration demurred, with a dismissive Rusk telling Achilles, "I don't think we need to be too worried about losing our virginity on this one."⁸³ For his part, Schaetzel took the challenge more seriously, noting that "it cannot be ignored that the initiative being proposed by the Council amounts to an implicit attack on the President's European policy."⁸⁴ Achilles and the more doctrinaire Atlanticists on the council's board came to depict the administration's rhetoric of partnership as a betrayal of the community spirit upon which the postwar transatlantic relationship was founded. "The twin pillar approach," wrote Achilles in 1967, "seemed to many of us in the ACUS a completely dead duck." The unifying goal of the Europeanists, in other words, was laudable, "provided that it was outward-looking and contributed toward Atlantic, or even wider, unity."⁸⁵ By this point the two sides had coalesced into warring camps, as suggested by the following exchange of letters between Monnet and Wally Moore:

MONNET: I think our objective is common: the unity of the West. I think that our ways to reach it are very different. I, for one, believe that the reality of the Atlantic unity can only be reached by the way of creating the unity of Europe and an effective partnership between Europe and the United States. . . .

MOORE: I certainly agree that we have a common objective but I am not sure whether or not "our ways to reach it are very different."

MONNET: On one point I should like to comment straight away. In your letters to Sponsors, you say that "The US Sponsors agreed with the unanimous advice of the above (and of Jean Monnet) that we should continue this year our all-out offensive to bring about a 'true Atlantic Community' . . ." A "true Atlantic Community" is generally understood by most people as a system of relations between the United States, UK, and the various *separate* nations of Europe. I do not believe this will work—as I told you and many of our friends—I believe that the transformation of relations must be between the USA on one hand and a European federation—including the U.K.—on the other hand, a relations of equal partners. . . .

MOORE: You may recall that during our talk in your office last November we did not discuss *how* Atlantic relations should be arranged although your own views on that question were, of course, well known to me.

Actually the text of the Second *Declaration* . . . does not deal with the form of Atlantic organization but only with the substance. [Monnet's red exclamation point appears here in the margin] Some of our signers prefer the system of Atlantic relations which you ascribe to us. But others, on both sides of the Atlantic, prefer the arrangement of "equal partners" which you yourself advocate. . . .

While the *Declaration* . . . has never addressed itself formally to the precise form of "the true Atlantic Community" . . . we have, over the past years, conducted a dialogue with some of our signers. . . .

Meanwhile, it seems to us unwise to adopt too rigid a position with regard to the ultimate organization of the Atlantic Community. . . .

MONNET: . . . let me say just this. The term "Atlantic Community" well describes the Community of interest and civilization that binds the West. But it seems to me and to many other Europeans potentially misleading in so far as it suggests that Atlantic problems are likely to be settled by the same procedures as those at work in the European Communities. And I particularly do not believe that "political integration" is possible "on an Atlantic basis" unless there is not only equality of status but also something closer to equality of size between

the participants. This can only be achieved by the unification of Europe. . . .

MOORE: While, for understandable reasons, you declined our invitation to sign the "Statement" we think that you will be interested in the attached list of those who did sign it.⁸⁶

It was no wonder then that people on each side termed one another "theologians."

IN THE MEANTIME THERE WAS Europe to deal with. The first crisis happened, not surprisingly, in Berlin—that "navel in the human body, cut off with contact with the mother, ugly in itself, but without it one would lose face."⁸⁷ Following Nikita Khrushchev's emergence as the Soviet leader after 1956, tensions began to worsen. Nearly two years later, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum for the end of the city's military occupation. In 1959, the Western powers proposed a new peace plan based in large part on work that had been done by the U.S. State Department.⁸⁸ If the German hands then had moderated Dulles's propensity to negotiate over Berlin—for despite his tough rhetoric, Dulles, who considered himself as knowledgeable about Germany as anyone, was more likely to make concessions over Berlin than his Democratic predecessors—they would do the same thing for Kennedy, only in reverse, in order to ensure that the door of diplomacy remained open. When the new president met Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, the latter would make a notoriously aggressive first impression as soon as the conversation moved to Berlin. Then came construction of the "monstrosity" of the Berlin Wall in August, followed by the missile crisis in October 1962, ostensibly about Cuba but really, according to the official consensus at the time, about Berlin. As Kurt Birrenbach later put it, "the Berlin Crisis practically ended with the Cuba Crisis, where your country showed that you were ready to use force, if necessary."⁸⁹ Next there was Kennedy's 1963 trip to Germany that "immensely moved" him. Bill Tyler recalled their visit to the Cologne cathedral, hearing,

that rhythmic, almost hysterical scanning of his name: "Ken-ne-dy, Ken-ne-dy". They all shouted and stamped their feet and pronounced those syllables with enormous enthusiasm, and you felt that the popularity of the President was some-

thing which went far beyond anything that could be accounted for by an act, or policy, or by the fact that he was President. . . . We were nearly crushed to death.

Later when Kennedy gave his famous speech at the Berlin Wall, his sister, Eunice Shriver, said, "Oh, John, you're the champion," and the president turned to Tyler: "It's quite something, it's really something, isn't it?"⁹⁰

Matters had not seemed so glorious two years earlier. Paul Nitze asked, "Shall we venture war rather than yield? If not, shall we acquiesce through a negotiation?" This was the critical question facing the Kennedy administration when it came into office.⁹¹ It could not have been more focused on Berlin, even though many of its leading lights chose, especially in retrospect, to interpret Khrushchev's Viennese *démarche* as a bluff.⁹² Those with experience on the ground did not do so, and continued to fear the worst. Typical was the warning from Bill Tyler:

[R]esponsible circles in the Dept. [assume] that Khrushchev [*sic*] doesn't set great store by Berlin really, and that he would be prepared to live and let live, were it not for the perpetual goading to which the GDR subjects him, and the ensuing necessity of making a show of positive effort to hold [Walter] Ulbricht in line. . . . This trend, of course, is playing K's game to the hilt.⁹³

La Période Texane

De Gaulle's NATO withdrawal—who's who revisited—Lyndon Johnson's approach to Europe—the Kennedy Round—bridge building and the acceleration of détente

TOMMY THOMPSON, who first appeared several chapters ago in interwar Geneva, had just begun his second tour as ambassador to the Soviet Union. By the early 1960s, he had risen to occupy the heralded place of Loy Henderson as the senior Soviet hand in the department and, if the White House transcripts of the Cuban Missile Crisis present an accurate picture, the one to whom nearly everyone deferred on all such matters. He characteristically saw through the fog to the essence of the problem in 1963. Europe, he wrote, would remain unstable so long as Berlin was unresolved, and that was not in the cards anytime soon. The only way de Gaulle could prevail in his aim to reinvent France as a great power would be to decouple the United States and European nuclear deterrents. That would mean tying "Germany to France through a French nuclear capability not possessed by Germany," something the Germans were unlikely to endorse if push came to shove. Nearly everyone else in

Europe appeared to accept the American military umbrella, just as they were "unwilling to provide conventional forces adequate to United States strategy [and were] highly suspicious of [American] efforts to force them to do so." Thus the Multilateral Nuclear Force, if it ever had a chance of succeeding politically, would not have made much of a difference on the ground. Thompson may have supported it for political reasons, but only while also urging that France be given nuclear technological assistance, the price for that being the admission of the United Kingdom to the Common Market.¹ Apart from the MLF, all of this would happen by the middle of the 1970s. It may not have been a grand design, but, eventually, it seemed like a good bargain.

De Gaulle, however, was in no mood to wait. He announced in March 1966 that France would leave NATO's unified military command. Few people in EUR were shocked. "It would be amazing," wrote one longtime observer of France, "if the withdrawal of France from NATO had not been taken in the United States, and especially in governing circles in this country, very badly indeed. Indignation, anger, regret, variously mingled and intense, are natural responses; surprise is not."² De Gaulle had waxed unfavorably about NATO (the organization, but not the treaty or the alliance—an important distinction) for several years.³ During the summer and fall of 1965, French foreign minister Couve de Murville had warned that de Gaulle planned to take a step of this nature, although most people expected it to come in 1969 with the treaty's twenty-year renewal.⁴ It came earlier for various reasons, namely, that de Gaulle was worried about the upcoming 1967 parliamentary elections and the likelihood of an end to his tenure in office.⁵

Just as significant from the point of view of EUR as the "Gaullist disruption" was the American reaction to it. For most in the bureau, de Gaulle and his methods were a fact of life, whether one liked him or not. But for Ball, Acheson, and, by extension, the higher levels of the State Department, the de Gaulle affair proved to be something of a crucible in their strained relationship with Lyndon Johnson. Although the Vietnam War continued to affect that relationship—to Acheson's favor and to Ball's disfavor—it was the determination of both men to "take de Gaulle to Coventry" that threatened whatever momentary standing they had with the president on European affairs.⁶ Johnson would hear none of it. At an infamous meeting on

May 19, 1966, the two sides came to verbal blows. "It is never difficult to ignite the Acheson powder magazine," Bruce noted in his diary, "and the President's spark set off an explosion." While Rusk and McNamara tried to calm things down, "Acheson visibly seethed in silence; LBJ looked like a human thundercloud."⁷ Acheson, finding himself "in the middle of a whole series of intra-USG vendettas—Defense vs. State, White House vs. State, JCS vs. McNamara, Semitic-Gaullists vs. European Integrationists, and LBJ-turn-the-other-cheekism vs. DA-let-the-chips-fall-where-they-mayism," let loose: "I lost my temper. . . . Rusk and McNamara dove for cover while Ball and I slugged it out with Mr. Big. Dave Bruce was a charmed witness. It was exhilarating."⁸

Soon after, Acheson upbraided Francis Bator at a dinner party (hosted by the British, no less): "[Y]ou know what you did? You made the greatest imperial power the world has ever known kiss de Gaulle's arse!"⁹ But Johnson held firm to the line set down earlier by Kennedy: as much as de Gaulle's attitudes and actions could infuriate, the United States still needed to do business with him. Where flattery did not work, patience just might. "Hostility to General de Gaulle is not a policy," Bundy once wrote. "He is a most difficult man, but these problems existed before him and will continue after him."¹⁰

For most people on the sidelines, however, being anti-Gaullist was synonymous with being anti-French. There were very few well-known American devotees of de Gaulle apart from Walter Lippmann and Senators Frank Church and William Fulbright.¹¹ Many of their contemporaries regarded the general as a romantic figure out of the ruin of France, an almost exotic brand of nationalist and, perhaps less charitably, "a twentieth-century Don Quixote," "an aging mon-goose" surrounded by "sickly cobras." At root he was aloof, insecure, prickly, and ambivalent; an older, more bitter version of the child who had been shunned as "the asparagus."¹² Accordingly, reaction to de Gaulle's latest rebuff ranged from the annoyed to the hysterical, with most people in EUR landing cynically closer to the former. Many took de Gaulle at his word, recognizing that there did in fact exist alternative conceptions of transatlantic order but that, as John Foster Dulles phrased it long ago, "we shall not always agree with France any more than France will always agree with us, but I trust that throughout it will be recognized that the differences are of economic rather than moral origin."¹³

Well, not quite. De Gaulle's vision was political and differed from dumbbellism on philosophical as well as practical grounds, and in substance though not in form: As Christopher Emmet noted, "The theory is O.K. as an ideal to strive for, but its effect in giving the Gaullists their *only* respectable argument was unfortunate."¹⁴ De Gaulle promoted a strong, united Europe, not in the Monnet sense of mixed sovereignties but rather as a traditional alliance of nation-states, ideally under French hegemony. "Like Hitler," de Gaulle "thought we should leave Europe to him," only his Europe would not be a "Third Force" but "a Second Force in the West."¹⁵ Or, as the *Economist* put it succinctly in December 1962, this was a clash between "unity" and "parity," and "the two may in the end prove irreconcilable."¹⁶

De Gaulle's American opponents rightly saw his challenge as providing an affront to their vision of transatlantic cooperation and an opening for neutralism. But his defenders had something of a point: de Gaulle had been snubbed at Nassau; his quest for a national deterrent was a legitimate expression of *realpolitik*, particularly given suspicions that the United States and the Soviet Union would negotiate arms reductions over his head or, alternatively, might go to war, dragging his nation and the rest of Europe in with them. Thus, he made it clear that his decision did not apply to the Alliance itself but merely to the hierarchical sharing of military resources and control within NATO; he preferred that only French officers command French troops, and this extended naturally to France's new nuclear weapons. Otherwise de Gaulle, as his behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated, could be a loyal ally when it really counted. That he had defeated the Communists at home, extricated his country from Algeria, and continued to inspire the French people with national pride should have reassured his American allies. But then there was the man himself. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic who were able to see past his personality and rhetoric wasted little time in making sure that the NATO baby was not thrown out with the bathwater. By the early 1970s the various NATO ambassadors treated their French colleague like any other representative. The Gaullists back home to whom he reported did not express the slightest degree of annoyance.¹⁷

THE TUSSLE OVER DE GAULLE capped a period of estrangement between the White House and the more ideological Ball group in the

State Department.¹⁸ At each point the White House asserted a more cautious plan of action. The interesting thing about this was that EUR, apart from Schaetzel, who served as deputy assistant secretary during most of this period, did not subscribe to the Europeanist ideology or the policies they were meant to defend; indeed, the views of most people in the bureau were closer to those of the NSC than to those of Ball and his small group of allies. Supporting EUR and the White House was Acheson's own tribe of acolytes in the office of the undersecretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson, especially Jeff Kitchen and Sey Weiss. In league with Paul Nitze's office in the Pentagon, they helped to mount the rearguard action against the MLF.¹⁹ Aligned with them was David Klein, Bundy's shrewd assistant on the NSC who also happened to be a foreign service officer and veteran of EUR. Bundy had decided he needed "a stuffy foreign service officer with some Soviet/German experience" following the construction of the Berlin Wall. Bill Tyler recommended Klein.²⁰ Bundy hired him after a single meeting.

The bureaucratic map was therefore more complicated than nameless flowcharts might otherwise suggest. Individual policy positions adhered less to office stereotypes than to networks of patronage and "like-mindedness," including those that extended back and forth outside government, and to coalitions on the inside. Labeling which official stood where, therefore, is less relevant historically than knowing that EUR lost considerable influence over foreign policy for the first time since World War II. This was because the political leadership of the department, namely, Ball, presumed itself to be both more knowledgeable and imaginative than the diplomatic professionals. That had happened before, particularly with Dean Acheson in the Truman years, but the effects on the institution this time were the opposite, mainly because Acheson, unlike Rusk, had enhanced the department's standing through a close relationship with his president. Kennedy and Johnson, by contrast, reposed little faith in State. Where they did not neglect it outright, they infiltrated it with critics. One such person was the former attorney general Nicholas Katzenbach, who became undersecretary in 1966. Miriam Camps's old colleague, Jeff Parsons, noted that Katzenbach "couldn't care less about the senior officers. . . . [H]e implied that good men could as well or better be found outside so why have a stuffy old and unnecessary prof Service anyway[?] . . . K has a congenital dislike for anyone who dresses neatly, washes, combs hair and brushes teeth."²¹

Katzenbach's problems were not entirely of his own making. Rusk, for instance, forgot to tell him that he had hired Walt Rostow's brother Gene, a Yale Law School professor and onetime Acheson protégé "who had been waiting for the call since 1948."²² Unfortunately, Rostow had fired Katzenbach from the law school's faculty; the two spent a good deal of time avoiding one another on the seventh floor. This story was typical. For all his virtue, diligence, and decency, Rusk was not a very good manager. Unwilling to stick his neck out, overworked by Vietnam and other crises, and overly submissive to the White House and Pentagon, Rusk left EUR and most other bureaus of the department little choice but to wither.

Bureaucracies, as we know, abhor a vacuum. Enter Francis Bator. Intense, quick on his feet, resourceful, and occasionally audacious, Bator was a Hungarian immigrant who served in the army and worked for Max Millikan at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, having received a Ph.D. there in economics with a minor in Central European diplomatic history done under the direction of Karl Deutsch. In 1961, he was working at the RAND Corporation; this led to a job with the Agency for International Development and then to one on Bundy's staff.²³ He was well liked. His boss said of him, "He has the sophistication of the Central European, the good manners of the Grotonian, the intellectual acuteness of the Institute [MIT], and the splendid combination of human qualities for which all residents of Cambridge are noted."²⁴ He also had an important ally in Walter Lippmann, for whom he did occasional research and writing. When Bundy left the NSC, Bator established a parallel relationship with Bundy's replacement, Walt Rostow, similar to the one Rusk had with Ball: Though nominally his deputy, Bator oversaw all matters pertaining to Europe and international economics, and reported directly to the president.²⁵

Bator's counterpart at EUR was Leddy, regarded by one former subordinate as "the most knowledgeable economist ever to serve as Assistant Secretary of EUR." After some skirmishing over who was in charge of European policy, he served Bator quietly as a back channel and deferred to him, not only because frequent back problems kept him away from work but also because the star of his patron, Ball, had fallen so low.²⁶ It was Bator then, who, by his account, single-handedly brought focus to the "inescapably decentralized way of handling relations with Europe" shaping the president's decisions.²⁷

Another disadvantage for Leddy was that he succeeded a man known as "perhaps the most cultivated person in the department": Bill Tyler. He was not a favored choice but got the job because he was Kohler's deputy and there had been no consensus on a successor. Still, Tyler earned points with the White House after serving especially well as interpreter with de Gaulle.²⁸ "Amiable, a bon vivant, highly intelligent, an expert linguist [fluent in French, German, Spanish, and Italian, with] a pleasing personality and sound judgment, a thoroughly exceptional man," Tyler had been born in France to an American expatriate, Royall Tyler, and his Italian wife. Tyler père was also a displaced American: he had grown up in Biarritz, where his mother moved after the death of her husband. He was an old friend of Allen Dulles's and had helped him set up the OSS station in Bern, then went on to direct Red Cross efforts in Europe and had many close friends in the foreign service.²⁹ His wife, Elisina, had emigrated to England with her sister, who went on to become the first woman to hold a chair in Italian at the University of Birmingham. There Elisina married the publisher Grant Richards, whom she later left for Tyler. The two moved in an elegant circle of friends, including Robert and Mildred Bliss, Bill Tyler's godparents, who donated Dumbarton Oaks to Harvard and made him its first director, as well as Edith Wharton, which is how Tyler became Wharton's literary executor. Wharton's chauffeur lived at the Tylers' château at Antigny until he died.³⁰ Like his father, Tyler was educated at Harrow and Oxford, and was, also like his father, an amateur historian, authoring a book about the dukes of Burgundy. He was in his twenties before he visited the United States, where he went in 1932 to work in a bank, even though he had really wanted to pursue a career in the fine arts. His godparents meanwhile tried to get him a job in the State Department. When war broke out, Tyler found himself in Boston, making short-wave propaganda broadcasts for the station WRUL under the name *l'Américain-Bourguignon*. From there he was seconded to the Office of War Information in North Africa, where he got to know many leaders of the Free French. After the war he joined the foreign service, serving under Jefferson Caffery, David Bruce, and Jimmy Dunn in Paris. To Bruce, Tyler was "serene, humorous, witty, scholarly . . . the most superior man in the Foreign Service. He is modest, unselfish, unassertive, but through character, ability and personality captivates one's interest and affection."³¹

With Ball over him and Schaetzel under him, Tyler had a tough hand to play. Like Bruce, he was not wont to assert himself, preferring to be asked for advice and almost always giving it, cautiously. Above all, he was keen to preserve the appearance of influence and the prerogatives of office. He later recalled, in referring to the orientation of Ball and company:

One thing I did not do and could not have done would have been . . . in anything I said or wrote, to appear to be deviating from our position and our policy goals. If I had felt that a matter of principle was involved, I would have resigned. But I didn't feel my integrity was at stake, because I was entirely in sympathy with the objective, but not with the means pursued. But I kept this to myself. It was just not a realistic position for us to take, and I feared the effect it might have on our relations with certain other European countries, in addition to France, if we pressed so hard that it seemed as though we were completely and unremittingly beholden to the prospect of somehow using our power and our political clout to try to impose European political integration when Europe itself was not ready for it.³²

Thus, Tyler worked in league with Bundy and against the spirit of both his boss and deputy. Tyler was certainly not a Europeanist in the Monnet mold, but neither was he a Gaullist, the occasional suspicion notwithstanding. If asked, he probably would have said he was just doing his job and had no such allegiances one way or the other. Like Bruce, he preferred the cultivation of trust behind the scenes in the usual formula: "[W]e ought to take our foot off the European accelerator pedal and . . . leave it to the Europeans to work out when and how they propose to organize themselves into an entity which would constitute a basis for partnership."³³ It was this judgment that drew them together, along with Bohlen and Klein, into a subtle but effective source of influence upon Bundy and Kennedy. As a result, the latter two were predisposed to reject Ball's and Owen's insistence that Europeans were "inexperienced teenagers" who would "never do anything by themselves."³⁴ On each issue—the MLF, de Gaulle, Skybolt—they tended to keep their thoughts to themselves, as Tyler put it, trying to follow the policy line while casting doubt and plotting alternatives.³⁵

His career would appear to have suffered little from his isolation at the top of his bureau. When Bohlen began to hint that he was ready to give up the Paris embassy, Tyler would have been an obvious candidate to replace him. But Tyler insisted on being named ambassador to the Netherlands. His reason was a mystery to most people, apart from the few who knew that his mother was rumored to be the illegitimate great-great-granddaughter of Napoleon Bonaparte's brother, Louis, the king of Holland. It seemed therefore a fitting place to end one's diplomatic service.³⁶

THERE WERE TWO IMPORTANT achievements in transatlantic relations that would ultimately overshadow the crises and setbacks in the 1960s. These were the completion of the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the so-called bridge building initiative that laid the basis for a political and economic opening to Eastern Europe. Their success was a repudiation of dumbbellism and marked a return to the traditional goal of an expansive Atlantic Community. Bator, whose fingerprints were on both, depicted the alternatives a bit differently: There were actually "three visions" at play: Monnet's, the Atlanticists', and a third, not de Gaulle's but some other formula involving a "scheme of U.S.-Soviet disengagement in Europe which would allow the unification of Germany," which in reality meant a kind of growing out of the Cold War. If the focus on the first two was primarily on the West, the third placed the burden of change upon Central and Eastern Europe.³⁷ But first the Western half of Europe needed to get its house in order.

This began with a reconfiguration of the trading relationship with the Common Market. The Kennedy Round began in 1964 under the leadership of Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, a Republican and Eisenhower's ambassador to France, who appeared here in Chapter 5.³⁸ Because it involved core economic relationships between the United States and Europe, EUR, or specifically, the new office within EUR—a spin-off of RA called Regional Political and Economic Affairs, or RPE—was heavily involved alongside the Bureau of Economic Affairs (E) and the undersecretary for political affairs, who was then the aforementioned Gene Rostow. Rostow was a talented but abstract-minded lawyer, about whom Bator's assistant Ed Hamilton once reportedly said, "[T]alking to him was like watching a great big wool ball float above four feet off the floor, passing slowly

by."³⁹ He was supportive, but the nominal protagonist of the Kennedy Round was none other than Eisenhower's former secretary of state, Christian Herter, who would barely live beyond the end of the negotiations. Herter agreed to lead them, and hired two deputies: Mike Blumenthal and William Roth, who later replaced Herter as the first U.S. trade representative. Things got off to a slow start, but ultimately came to a head in 1965 with Roth and Blumenthal shuttling back and forth to Geneva and the "Bator command group" overseeing the coordination back in Washington.⁴⁰ They were supported by RPE's Deane Hinton and E's Thomas Enders—who became known as the Kennedy Round's dueling duo, a loosely rendered doppelgänger of Blumenthal and Roth. Hinton and Blumenthal were salty, street-smart operators; Enders and Roth were more urbane, although just as tough, especially Enders, whom Roy Jenkins rated as "an impressive, self-confident, over-tall Yale man, who I think is probably very good."⁴¹ In the 1970s, both men would end up as ambassadors to the European Community and as assistant secretaries for economic and business affairs. Enders, in particular, was known for "plugging everything in the right sockets" and had his own political ambitions. With their help, Blumenthal and Roth reached a deal in Geneva after more than two years of tortuous negotiations and following a critical intervention on the part of President Johnson, who ordered that agriculture was not equivalent to industry and so sealed the deal.⁴² Dean Rusk wrote to the negotiators, "Warmest congratulations on a superb job beautifully done." To Bob Schaezel, Acheson noted that the result was "better than I dreamed possible."⁴³ It was a comparably unsung example of successful bureaucratic cooperation, although it might not have seemed so harmonious at the time.

In order to grasp the political import of the Kennedy Round and why EUR veterans like Hinton regarded it as having so long-lasting a success, one must take a step back and note that the trade negotiations culminated a decade of difficult external and internal readjustments toward and within Europe.⁴⁴ Largely, this had to do with the effort—strongly endorsed by Monnet—to bring Britain into the Common Market and with the related need to ensure that the market itself would evolve in a way that would not prove injurious to American national and global interests. Here they were joined by Acheson, who asked Adenauer to urge de Gaulle to approve the British application, as did Ball.⁴⁵ It was Ball, "amazed" at his own "direct-

ness," who told the British entirely on his own that the United States would support their application unwaveringly. Soon after, a previously skeptical Macmillan took him aside and said, "[W]e are going to do this thing." Ball proceeded, again largely on his own initiative, to lobby Walter Hallstein and other concerned Europeans in favor of British admission.⁴⁶ But the economic team in EUR was not fully on board. Joe Greenwald, one of its top officers, warned back in 1961 against moving too fast, urging instead that American rhetoric "seriously and scrupulously follow our announced policy of leaving the decision up to the UK." An interagency committee on the "tangled affair" of British entry was chaired by Bill Tyler and reached similar conclusions, as did Bundy, who sounded perplexed by Ball's activism. Walt Butterworth, then the American representative to the European Communities, even insisted that the United States raise the stakes with the British: "Given the entire record of recent years, we must take a hardheaded, objective view of new overtures from London. . . . If they want in, they will have to pay a political price in the form of a genuine commitment to the Continent. They full well know what the alternatives are, and nothing is to be gained by our acting as agents to communicate to the Europeans their feelings of puzzled or outraged innocence."⁴⁷

Macmillan and de Gaulle met at Rambouillet just days before Kennedy met with Macmillan at Nassau to sort the Skybolt mess. We now know that de Gaulle told Macmillan that the British application would be rejected, as indeed it was that January. "What hit us?" many a Briton asked. Monnet might have wondered something similar; it was the only time he was ever seen drinking a martini before dinner, recalled Jack Tuthill. But the question was not whether it would be done, but how. "At Rambouillet," de Gaulle was reported to have recalled, "Mr. Macmillan came to me to say that we ought to unite our two forces. Several days later he went to the Bahamas. Naturally, that changed the tone of my press conference."⁴⁸

To add further insult to injury, this was followed by the Élysée Treaty, a Franco-German pact that solidified an alliance of the two countries outside the nascent European Community, causing, as one European observer recalled, "profound distress" in the State Department.⁴⁹ But Ball pushed ahead, even though he might have suspected that Macmillan was being less than forthcoming about his own conversations with de Gaulle when he told him that "our noises are not

the same as your noises," regarding de Gaulle's reported resistance to the British move.⁵⁰ Now the question became one of how to avoid an overreaction from the British and other European nonmembers of the Common Market. There was the possibility that the British and others would establish a competing trading bloc and force the United States to play favorites; or that protectionism would spread throughout the Atlantic region. Jean Monnet seemed especially desperate to keep the various issues from interconnecting, and so reportedly brokered, by way of Ball and possibly others, the inclusion of critical revision language in a preamble to the Franco-German treaty that reaffirmed the central place of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Atlantic Alliance for Europe.⁵¹

Miriam Camps at this juncture reentered government service. Her attention was focused almost entirely on the British effort to join the Common Market, and the related harmonization of relations between the so-called Sixes (the EEC) and Sevens (the British-led European Free Trade Association, or EFTA), a subject about which she contributed what remains one of the most authoritative books.⁵² Camps and her close network of fellow trade specialists—among them Leddy, Tuthill, Greenwald, and Reinstein, a group described by EUR's Abe Katz as "the clan"—continued to work quietly in favor of an active American role in European integration by using traditional methods. Here is Camps writing earlier in October 1959:

I am just back from a few days in Brussels where I talked to all our old friends and some new ones: [Robert] Marjolin, [Jean] Rey, [Max] Kohnstamm, [Jean-François] Deniau. . . . I am accredited to no one and yet pretty well steeped in everyone's views . . . having listened for x years on both sides of the Channel convince me of the purity of their intentions and the justness of their views. . . . I think the U.S. should now say something like this to the U.K.: if the U.K. is prepared now really to take a decision to give its European relation primacy and to work out its relationship with the U.S. primarily although not exclusively in that context, we will use our influence with the Six to see that a sensible negotiation on association is conducted on their side.⁵³

The only problem with this plan was that it lacked the consensus of the other European governments, and Ball's freelancing did not help.

There had been the hope that the problem of harmonization could be solved by pushing for closer European integration within the OECD, which, as noted, was founded in part to replace the obsolescent OEEC; to coordinate European and American trade and other economic approaches toward the developing world; and, according to a few cynics, to "kill the Free Trade Area," an anti-Common Market group established by the British in 1958.⁵⁴ The era of infighting acronyms was well under way. The story of such maneuverings is long and complex, even for many trade specialists to follow. Nora Beloff summarized it:

The Americans, Mr. Dillon said, could not lie down and let the Europeans get together and discriminate against them just at the moment when they were making their first acquaintance with Britain's old friend, the balance of payments problem. Like all good Americans, Mr. Dillon did not question the right of the Europeans to merge their sovereignties and establish a United States of Europe on the American model. For political reasons, Mr. Dillon was personally all in favour of the Community experiment even if it was commercially disadvantageous to his own country. But he certainly could not support a purely commercial arrangement with no political component, which would bring Britain in and America out.⁵⁵

Moreover, the OECD might have had the additional advantage of raising the European Commission's diplomatic profile, which could have allowed for a "marriage of interests," in this one instance, between some Europeanists and the Atlanticists.⁵⁶

For her part, Camps was skeptical about the successor organization she helped to set up: "I do not believe that the OECD offers the neutrals enough to satisfy them for two reasons," she wrote to Bob Schaetzel in October 1961. "They are prepared for free trade with the Community; we are not. . . . Second, I think past examinations have shown that it is not possible to attack the problem by isolating items that are of particular interest[;] . . . it is not a problem that can be dealt with on the basis of woodpulp, watches and a handful of other stuff."⁵⁷ Yet such things mattered, politically as much as commercially. "Americans tend to oversimplify matters and to take extreme positions," noted one liaison officer for the European Communities in Washington. "They are enthusiastic at the beginning but

expect spectacular or concrete results from the 'Grand Designs.' . . . [W]hen progress is not obvious . . . they become extremely negative."⁵⁸ Although in the case of the Sixes and Sevens, the Americans had a point: The United States would find it difficult to defend trade discrimination against NATO allies in favor of members of the Common Market who were not in the Alliance.⁵⁹

Camps and her colleagues would eventually come around to the determination that the Common Market was the only way forward, and that the United States had to help it both grow and liberalize. "It is our judgment," conceded Douglas Dillon back in 1959, "that the best way of dealing with European and world trade problems would be for all of us—the U.K., the continental European countries outside the Six, the United States, Canada and others—to accept the Common Market as an accomplished fact."⁶⁰

The intensive, retail diplomacy by members of the "clan" as well as the Kennedy Round team did away with the perception among the British and neutrals like the Austrians and the Swedes of a conspiracy by the United States to overlook their interests in its role as the "keeper of the faith" on integration, and thereby established a decade-long relationship of trust between Americans and Europeans on trade and related economic matters.⁶¹ The British would join the Common Market in 1973 and would prove wrong the prediction that "a little England going into Europe is likely to favor a policy of little Europe once she is in."⁶² Meanwhile, the OECD would evolve in ways that transformed it into today's global organization, but one not too different from what Ball once described as another "umbrella in which Europe could get together."⁶³ The various pieces of the puzzle still, amazingly, continued to coalesce in fits and starts. To the extent an American contribution to European integration succeeded at all, then, it was because of the behind-the-scenes work of people like Camps in remaking institutions, chief among which was her old invention, the OEEC.

IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT, ironically, that the term "bridge building" became known in Europe. Initially it referred to the various efforts by the British to establish "halfway houses" like the Free Trade Area. The State Department, especially EUR, regarded them as dubious attempts to "undercut" the Common Market and opposed them at nearly every turn.⁶⁴ As much as American policy favored trade-liberalizing schemes

on principle, its priority remained strengthening the European movement and the Common Market, specifically. In the neat formulation of the economic expert and later ambassador to Italy and Spain, Richard Gardner, "the idea was to get the external tariff of the six EC members low enough to facilitate British entry in a way that would minimally impact our relations with them."⁶⁵ But EUR was "so concerned" about the Common Market negotiations, wrote one of its most thoughtful officers, Richard Vine, "they wouldn't let themselves think about it." Vine argued that the British were mainly to blame for failing to integrate their Common Market, nuclear and East-West policies, as some British Europeanists, for example the Tory prime minister Edward Heath, later admitted.⁶⁶ It seemed up to the Americans to recast the balance between them and the other Europeans, much as the MLF crowd vainly sought to do in its sphere. However, it appeared that they, or EUR at least, did little besides provide a sympathetic ear for Europe within the U.S. government, and to make sure the Europeans knew it, which may have mitigated what otherwise might have been a far more contentious period in transatlantic economic relations, as indeed the early 1970s would become. EUR restricted its role, in other words, to early warning identification and process management. Any more ambitious agenda carried several risks, not least of which was the mutual dependence of the trade talks upon progress with European integration, which is why, again, those in charge said the Kennedy Round just had to succeed.⁶⁷

The larger point to all this was that, like dumbbellism, the above set of priorities had an almost exclusive focus on *Western* Europe. It followed Monnet's program for consolidation, first of Western Europe, and then of transatlantic partnership. But bridge building presently acquired a much different meaning, which takes us to Bartor's third model. Détente was well under way by the mid-1960s. There had been Kennedy's 1963 American University speech, but it was really more about an overture to the Soviet Union than an opening to the East per se, and spoke against the recurring fear of the Western Europeans, particularly Adenauer, that the superpowers would reach agreements over their heads. Indeed, the German question lay not too far from the surface; it would be Germany, or rather policy toward Berlin and not a separate Franco-German alliance, that would eventually supply the second pillar of partnership, if such

a thing existed.⁶⁸ Again, it should be recalled that Germany required some of the hardest economic and political choices for the United States; German ambivalence fed American fears about de Gaulle's true aims for Europe, and the suspicions that he and a senile Adenauer, or a more left-of-center German successor, would pursue an alternative path to reunification; or that he would sign some kind of pact independently with Moscow. Also, Germany and presumed German sensibilities remained the most vexing obstacles to an integrated, European defense. Kennedy put it succinctly: "If the pressure comes back in Berlin, then you will find unity in the Alliance. If it is off Berlin, then we are going to have to recognize that we are going to deal with a lot of problems . . . particularly . . . with the General."⁶⁹

An interim answer to these various questions—and the closest thing to a grand design the 1960s would produce—came with a speech Lyndon Johnson gave in October 1966. In it he put forth the logical synthesis of both détente and what would come to be called *Ostpolitik*, stating that German reunification could only occur hand in hand with a relaxation of the Cold War standoff and an opening of the Soviet bloc to the West.⁷⁰ That simple idea was to "shift from the narrow concept of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement" in order to build "a surer foundation of mutual trust."⁷¹ The speech foreshadowed a good deal of the "linkage" diplomacy of the 1970s, which, as the next chapter illustrates, laid the basis for the "Europe, whole and free" that would be proclaimed another decade later by President George H. W. Bush. Yet Johnson's 1966 proposal was self-consciously modest, with "goals,"

defined not in terms of a concrete, architectural outcome, but rather in terms of maximizing piecemeal movement in broadly indicated directions, as opportunity presents itself. It is a vision exceedingly flexible in both structural outcome and tempo. It allows for political integration in Europe but does not require it, and emphasizes the practical arrangements and the increasing closeness needed for efficient problem solving. It allows, but only at the end of a very long process, for some sort of growing together of the two parts of Germany, but in the meanwhile calls only for a further opening of relations between Western and Eastern Europe. . . . It calls for increasing

East European independence of the Soviet Union, but only at a pace which keeps down the risk of backlash. It allows for increasing autonomy in Western Europe's relations with the United States, even in defense, but only in step with the European capacity to manage a credible deterrent of its own. . . . It allows for some institutionalization of Atlantic politics, but looks mainly to increasingly close ad hoc cooperation on specific problems.⁷²

The bureaucratic tale behind the speech is significant. Mainly the work of Bator, the speech made the rounds of the various bureaus. Henry Owen's Policy Planning Staff took a special interest, contributing several early drafts written by Owen's assistant, the Columbia University political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski, who would go on to achieve fame as Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, later claimed credit for having written the entire speech.⁷³ Bator pointed out that this was not only incorrect but also detrimental to its goals, since Brzezinski had the reputation of a hawk and, as some would allege, a Russophobe. At any rate, he was not known for his open mind toward détente, particularly in the Soviet Union. A Polish refugee, he was not seen as being very pro-German, either. Bator and his coauthors, Leddy and Bowie, took pains to cast the speech in the most positive possible terms; but as soon as Brzezinski claimed credit for it, the Soviet press jumped on the speech as a resurrection of the "rollback" policy of the 1950s. Even though the State Department had stopped using terms like "Communist bloc" and "satellites" in favor of geographic ones like "Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," the speech would have less of an immediate impact than its backers might have liked.⁷⁴ But it nevertheless marked the official end of the crisis era and the beginning of what Richard Nixon would come to label the era of negotiations.