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Reflections on the Future of NATO

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Liberal intellectuals in the West as a rule did not particularly appreciate Nato or other military alliances. At best, they grudgingly conceded it a limited usefulness in a bi-polar Cold War world. More recently, they happily hope to see it go away, along with the Warsaw Pact, as tensions receded, as the Cold War was finally and officially declared over on many occasions this past year and definitively at Paris in November, 1990, and as a happy new age of peace and cooperation appears to dawn on the horizon. To reflect on a future role for Nato is now being considered unworthy, a detraction of precious resources from nobler causes.

#### I. Nature of the Problem

Quite obviously - there are many serious reasons today for questioning Nato's legitimacy, its very *raison d'être*.<sup>1</sup> They have their basis in all those steps beginning with the 1985 summit meeting which at an accelerating pace led to mutual solemn pledges by East and West about ending old enmities, promises of non-aggression, cooperation and good will at the CSCE meeting in Paris in November, 1990, particularly the Joint Declaration of all Warsaw Pact and Nato States and the all-CSCE Paris Charter;<sup>2</sup> the beginning phase-out of Soviet troops from East and Central Europe which will end in Germany by 1994; and the impending dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a military organization.<sup>3</sup> The big military threat of all-out aggression by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) against the West through Central Europe has, for all practical purposes, disappeared. Even representatives of the most inveterate military viewpoint concede this much.<sup>4</sup> Whether Nato was responsible for the "Long Peace" in Europe since 1949<sup>5</sup> we do not know and may never know. Did the Soviet Union (with help of the WPO) ever want and intend to attack? But that is quite beside our point here. Nato was and is primarily a classical alliance designed to deter aggression by a defined external enemy.<sup>6</sup> With that threat gone - is Nato to follow? Even its Secretary General has seriously discussed the question - though of course he has denied it.<sup>7</sup>

On the most general level one might argue with Fukuyama<sup>8</sup> that if "the end of history" is upon us, i.e. if the stormy contests of the past have produced a tranquil sea of boundless liberalism, we could dispense with further precautions against traditional "accidents of history". But one can hardly take seriously this (inverted) Marxist (or Hegelian) model turned to obvious political purposes. In Stanley Hoffmann's words it is "a silly notion based on a series of mistaken assumptions"<sup>9</sup>

In summary, the answer to the question - dissolve Nato? - would have to be an unqualified yes were the situation as simple or one-dimensional as suggested by these propositions. And precisely because the situation has become complex, fluid, and hazy there are already those who begin to develop nostalgic memories of the Cold War as a stable because neatly divided world.<sup>9a</sup>

The real issue is first in terms of classical alliance thinking: has the threat been transformed, or are there other threats which justify its continued existence? Second, has Nato brought forth other achievements which are worth preserving and which might be jeopardized by its demise?

## II. Transformation of the Threat

The one big threat is gone or very remote - but transformed and new kinds of threat persist.

### 1. East - West Context: The Soviet Union

Any amount of legitimate criticism can be raised against the arguments that follow: that they reveal timidity, pessimism, short-sightedness, a regressive mind-set molded by cold-war experience,<sup>10</sup> etc. etc. Granted all that and more - we still persist in presenting the argument. There may be no immediate classic military threat from the Soviet Union which is beset by economic, political, ethnic-nationalist problems which threaten its very existence as a unified state. Much as we wish the political and economic reform efforts of *Perestroika* every success - primarily for the sake of the Soviet peoples, for the sake of

domestic Soviet and international peace - the outcome is open in a twofold sense.

a) The reform movement may succeed. It has been argued that it was economic necessity and other structural problems which forced President Gorbachev to emphasize disarmament, to abandon the Breschnjew Doctrine and dismantle the Soviet Empire, to open the Soviet Union to western values (plus capital, aid, know-how). But then, upon the logic of this argument: the Soviet Union might revert to antagonistic policies after domestic restabilization - unless, of course, she will have been transformed in that process. The latter negative condition is the big unknown. And both conditions begin to appear more and more unlikely. Is it an irresponsible cold-war mind-set which provides for this possibility?

b) If Perestroika fails or takes too long for people or the military to wait it is not difficult to design scenarios of economic or administrative chaos or the outbreak of nationalist antagonisms leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. History is certainly not devoid of examples where the explosive energies building up in this kind of situation have been diverted towards external targets by skilfull political manipulators, be they central or local leaders. And their powers of persuasion or wreckage may be wonder-fully enhanced by the availability of far-reaching weapons systems - not a very comforting idea in a situation of chaos. And even without much conscious manipulation the mere (and likely) outbreak of violence may draw third states in and thus escalate into major hostilities. This is a threat which cannot be taken lightly, even without a WPO, because

c) the Soviet Union remains, after the United States, and certainly in relation to all other including East European states, the only world super power, in terms of conventional land, sea, air forces - not to speak of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. This fact may be an argument per se. But it assumes even greater force in combination with points a) and b). The danger of this potential being used for a major invasion of or threat towards Western Europe may be highly unlikely. But it is not entirely unconceivable that future Soviet leaders might think of employing

it in order to rebuild their now-lost East European empire. Such an attempt could easily lead to a major conflict involving all Europe and North America.

2. Central and Eastern Europe

All nations of this area are facing huge structural problems resulting from political and economic reforms and high expectations which cannot be fulfilled quickly enough. They are compounded in some cases - results of repeated political reshufflings in the course of history - by nationalist or ethnic minority conflicts which lead to irredentist claims for varying degrees of autonomy, for the redrawing of borders, transfer of territories (even if in this context the German case has ceased to an immediate issue). Suppressed forcefully over decades - i.e. not subjected or made amenable to rational and openly discussed attempts to solve them - they are now coming into the open abruptly and disruptively. Local ethnic minorities may not per se be able to throw Europe into chaos. But the danger of local conflict producing a chain reaction which might draw in major actors is not entirely far-fetched. Greetings from Sarajevo.

3. South-North Threats

A far greater danger to Nato countries may result from third-area conflicts and may lead to a shift in Nato's major conflict orientation from East-West towards North-South. Whether technically an adaptation of the wording of the North Atlantic Treaty is necessary for Nato to deal directly with these issues is not our concern here. That is the nature of the transformed threat. Northern Africa, the Near and Middle East might be a case in point. A number of factors combine to create potentially dangerous situations which will affect the immediate Nato area directly or indirectly. We only mention a few without elaborating further: The population explosion (e.g. Egypt now has 53 million people and by the year 2025 will have one hundred million; the Maghreb area had 20 million in 1950 and will grow to 140 million by 2025); inability of regimes there to employ and feed these masses and to satisfy quickly rising expectations; the role and political impact of

fundamentalist Islam of the Irani type (which is active in many countries e.g. Egypt); erratic leaders (Libya); at the same time control over important raw materials (oil and others); local conflicts of which there is abundant supply: e.g. Iran-Iraq, Iraq-Kuweit, Israel-Arab neighbors, etc.; and finally the proliferation of highly sophisticated modern weapons, conventional but also including A-B-C weapons of mass destruction and ever wider ranges which are becoming cheaper and easier to produce or to buy. Several countries either already have them or have capabilities to produce them or have even used them (as Iraq has employed poison gas).<sup>11</sup> - Interestingly, a Soviet general offered cooperation with Nato in such an eventuality.<sup>12</sup>

To the extent then that Nato was not designed for one kind of threat only - i.e. the massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe - these are good arguments for maintaining some kind of Nato, even if not necessarily the Nato as it has developed to this day over the last forty years. - But there are more arguments.

### III. Achievements Worth Preserving

Further support for the argument in favor of a future role for Nato derives from certain achievements which Nato has brought forth beyond the immediate security concerns vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Whatever the objective deterrent effect of Nato (which is open to debate) - it was perceived subjectively in Western Europe as a shield behind which the extraordinary peaceful creativity, innovation, growth, expansion, conciliation (Germany and France and other erstwhile enemies), and integration (economic and legal more than political) could develop. In a sense Eastern Europe had to bear the cost in terms of stagnation and non-development. Not that Nato *caused* one or the other. But the objective collusion between both blocs - even if unintentional - set the parameters for developments on both sides.

1. It is not suggested here that the West European "house" would collapse with the removal of Nato. The link is a more indirect one. The American commitment to and ultimate guarantee of European security through the North Atlantic Treaty and the resulting Nato,

in a subtle and imperceptible way, transformed the West European state system. The pre-Nato or pre-1945 system was a game for lonely players. Ultimately and at the last moment of truth, every state alone was responsible for its own survival as against all others. Occasional and shifting alliances did help in an unstable way. Nato and the American security guarantee relieved West European states of that responsibility. This arrangement set free enormous energy and resources traditionally absorbed by that responsibility (a performance repeated by each and every state). They could now be devoted to the productive activities alluded to above, and they did produce those remarkable results. This state of affairs probably also prevented minor conflicts across the East-West divide.

What will happen if Nato and the American guarantee were withdrawn? Will Europe - and that would inevitably mean all Europe - relapse into the instable pre-1945 system of cut-throat competition?<sup>13</sup> Stanley Hoffmann recently called such a suggestion an insult to European intelligence.<sup>14</sup> Even if one cannot be quite so sure everyone will, of course, share his hope (if not conviction) that the forty-year process and practice of the new cooperative and integrative politics have so transformed the system itself that it can stand on its own feet and survive.

But even if the new West European system does prove vital enough - it is not, by simple political and military arithmetic, a military and even less a nuclear (super) power. In terms of (military) security it is not even "Western Europe" but a loosely organized collection of individual medium-size and small states. Should any major threat recur or evolve as in any of the scenarios sketched above, American security support, at least as a last resort, would be indispensable for Europe to survive. The best, probably the only way to organize this is through (a - not necessarily the) Nato, certainly in the short- and medium-term perspective.

2. In this context another achievement of Nato, not altogether of minor importance, has to be mentioned: The pressure for conflict resolution through compromise which Nato as an institution has brought to bear on all members including the (inevitably) hege-



monic power (USA) in this strongly asymmetrical security relationship with its smaller European partners. This approach to conflict resolution has become a matter of habit and routine.

3. The last and centrally important aspect is, of course, Nato's "double containment" - i.e. of Germany.<sup>15</sup> Without Germany Nato would not have been possible as a practical concern. At the same time, binding Germany into Nato reassured her neighbors, provided the basis for Franco-German reconciliation, and made the German potential (economic and otherwise) usable for dynamic and integrative West European developments. If there is one constant in United States foreign policy thinking since World War II it is the fear of a neutral Germany vacillating unanchored between East and West. German membership in Nato was the most convenient solution for this dilemma, in 1954/55 just as in 1990. And it even looked for a while this past year as if Washington saw no other reason for continuing Nato at all.<sup>16</sup> With regard to a unified Germany this position was early supported by Warsaw and Prague and finally though grudgingly accepted by Moscow, doubtless at some considerable psychological cost to the latter. - This alone would be one of the strongest arguments for continuing Nato into the future. Such arguments have indeed been advanced, without much concern for present political change in Europe or corresponding adaptation within NATO, though less emphatically in Europe than in the United States.<sup>17</sup>

The paper might end here: a need for Nato's future can at least be argued. But that leaves open what it should look like, particularly in view of changed East-West perspectives and their relations to changes in and between Central and East European states not covered by Nato. The latter may and probably will continue. But in order to survive it will have to accommodate these changes.

#### IV. The United States, Europe, and Nato in a Changing Security World

If the foregoing remarks support the continued existence of Nato they do not require its exact present structure. We may recall that the latter - integrated forces under American command -

developed only in response to the Korean War and is not identical with the original North Atlantic Treaty which contains only rather broad unspecific promises of support for western values, peaceful resolution of conflicts and mutual help in case of aggression.

Any ever so tentative answers to the question regarding the future role and shape of Nato in view of the changed and continually changing international context will have to reflect three basic issues: the relation between Europe and the United States - do they still need each other, why should they be concerned about each other's security; and how should their future security relationship (possibly within Nato) be structured. Finally, how do the newly independent Central and East European states fit into this picture; they increasingly demand security through a new role either within or related to Nato or within an all-European security system.

The United States began thinking "beyond containment" in the late 1980s. Secretary of State Baker reacted with his December 1989 speech in Berlin<sup>18</sup> to events in Central and Eastern Europe and the GDR that preceding fall. He proposed that Nato shift its emphasis from military to political functions (an aspect which has recently been exaggerated beyond Nato's constitutional capacity for action in non-military political and other matters by its Secretary General<sup>19</sup>); further, Nato should take advantage of the present hopes for arms control, disarmament, verification, and confidence-building by negotiating the necessary agreements with its counterpart (WFO or Soviet Union) and then implementing them. His aim clearly was to adjust Nato to new security conditions in Europe. It was not in any sense to basically restructure Nato nor to envision some entirely new security system for Europe and the North Atlantic area.

However, even if Nato continues to be needed these minor adaptations may not suffice to accommodate the depth of recent changes in East-West relationships which culminated in the Joint Declaration of the twenty-two alliance states East and West, the Paris Charter and the CFE treaty, all signed at the CSCE Paris meeting in November 1990. The calls for new (all-)European security struc-

tures are becoming louder. They would appear to demand new non-confrontational models - if only because democratic societies, and foremost among them the American, will not want any longer to pay for the old ones.

The problem is circular: Effective European defense needs the United States; a firm U.S. commitment is to Nato only; Europe is more than Nato; only the CSCE comprises all of Europe plus the United States and Canada; the United States has always refused CSCE its full trust.<sup>20</sup>

That Europe (except the Soviet Union) needs the United States for its defense (if defense is needed) is obvious. But why has the United States committed itself to Europe's defense? President Bush claimed that the United States is "a European power". That may be exaggerating America's case but it is true in a vague cultural and historical sense. In economic terms, since the early post-World War II period there has developed a genuine interdependence (trade, investment) which today is stronger than ever before, i.e. it makes the United States and Western Europe (EC) fully equal. In political and strategic terms, the American post-1945 commitment is basically the same which led to United States interventions in two world wars: its interest to prevent the domination of Europe by one hostile power. In the final analysis, American long-term interest in Nato is in preserving the only structural and institutional link which allows the United States to bring its power (which is still hegemonic in this sphere) to bear upon security and hence political issues in Europe because the latter is and remains (for the reasons just outlined) critically important to the United States; and in order to prevent a situation from arising which would, for the third time in this century, require U.S. intervention for the protection of those interests. Domestically, this commitment may still be sustained in principle - but most certainly only at considerably lower cost. In view of the huge budget deficits and many urgent social problems the pressures for reallocation of resources in the United States will therefore continue to rise and may become irresistible. In the coming decade the U.S. will reduce its role to that of guarantor of last resort for European security, particularly with its nuclear capabilities

and perhaps symbolic troop dislocation in Europe.<sup>21</sup> That posture is compatible with its own interest in Europe.

But how do the Central and East European States and their security concerns, and finally also the Soviet Union, fit into this picture? It is this question that gives the issue its proper dimension. Simple accession of the WPO or rather its member states (some - or all of them ?) to Nato even under presently favorable conditions is not exactly likely. This is no realistic option, though also that has been discussed (possibly by the Soviet Union more than by Nato).

Various proposals have been advanced for adapting Nato, on the basis of the interest configurations sketched above, to the new and continually changing international context. Any quick basic structural change is technically impossible. So it will in any case and for some time continue in its familiar shape.

#### V. Nato and the CSCE

The most radical solution would be soon to dissolve Nato and the WPO and let CSCE take over their functions. Nato would only continue to exist in CSCE in a hegelian sense as *aufgehoben*. This, however, is not a practical proposition, at least not for the time being.<sup>22</sup> Promising as the CSCE process is - its weaknesses so far in regard to hard policy issues are only too well-known.

If the CSCE process per se cannot easily or soon take over the functions of Nato it is, as a little-structured *process*, compatible with continued co-existence of Nato and WPO under its own slowly evolving roof.<sup>23</sup> Few changes would be required. All practical matters could be negotiated with a long view between both organizations. The CSCE process is distinguished by its comprehensive membership, its openness, flexibility, utopian-process character which does not attempt to preempt the future<sup>24</sup> - and has barely been outlined by the Paris Charter. Nato offered to change its strategy and deterrence doctrine at the London meeting in July 1990:<sup>25</sup> to use nuclear weapons as last resort only (no liberal first use); not to modernize the Lance missile and to

negotiate short-range nuclear forces including nuclear artillery shells; to back away from 'forward defense' and to restructure its forces generally in favor of small mobile units - with the overall objective of establishing a posture of structural incapacity for aggression (or: non-provocative defense).<sup>26</sup> This arrangement might well work in relation to the Soviet Union and Eastern/Central Europe even if the WPO does not survive at least as a negotiating partner for the kinds of agreements sketched out above.

By contrast, at present the weak link in this general arrangement would rather appear to be Nato itself. Its inner cohesion has been called into question by its legitimacy crisis under the impact of the end of the Cold War. Some distance and erosion of consensus between the United States and Western Europe and of domestic support on both sides are unmistakable. And the conviction that renewable or transformed threats persist, that interdependence is real, and that Europe and the United States need each other for the defense of common interests and values does not immediately help. Needed are new structures which reconcile not only these diverging positions among each other but also with the changing East-West relationship in Europe. In this sense Nato may serve as a transitory element, as a bridge to that new structure to be discarded once the latter has been reached.<sup>27</sup>

#### VI. Nato as Bridge to a future European Security System: Alliance Model Centered on Western Europe

Here the interpretation of the past becomes relevant for the future. Nato's "success" vis-à-vis the WPO has alternatively been viewed in the power or "realist" tradition as "victory" of Nato's over Soviet power or - the idealist line of thought - as "triumph" of western ideas over those of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist model. These different views of the past also inform thinking about a future Nato and security system for Europe.<sup>28</sup>

The first, the "realist" view is the frame for a model based on a restructured Nato.<sup>29</sup> In this view any stable peace presupposes that the remaining Soviet military potential - which in conventional and nuclear terms is that of a formidable super power - be

counterbalanced by a similar Western force even if at the lowest possible level. This balancing force can be provided only with U.S. help. Nato is the appropriate framework. But it has to adapt to the changing nature of the United States - European relationship. That relationship is characterized, on the American side, by a decline in leadership and commitment, partly due to waning domestic support; though America will remain, for reasons of its own interest as outlined above, the ultimate or "last resort" guarantor of European security. The inevitable American hegemony in this asymmetric security relationship derives from America's overpowering nuclear position (as compared with Europe's) and from the fact that in this sphere "Europe" does not exist: within the Nato frame the United States deals more or less bilaterally with a loose collection of individual small or medium-size European states; only their military forces are integrated under U.S. command. Hence, America's strategic concepts usually prevail. In the economic sphere, on the other hand, the Europeans are integrating and growing stronger to a position of equality with the United States; and at the same time they develop increasing sensibilities about the continuing American military hegemony on which they depend.

As solution for this dilemma the "realist" model proposes to use the integrative dynamics generated in the economic sphere and create a unified West European political structure which would enable Europe to speak to the United States with one voice. One instrument available among others is the long-dormant West European Union. If reactivated it could become the vehicle for a fully equal and cooperative European political and security relationship with the United States. Another could be the European Community if it really decided to push and expand its integrative dynamism to include the political and security functions.<sup>30</sup> Nato would then - on the basis of a new treaty concluded by two equal partners - consist of these two "pillars", i.e. the United States and an integrated and unified Western Europe. It might even be renamed as has been suggested: ENATO, for European-North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or EATO: European American Alliance.

The United States would remain responsible for providing the nuclear shield of "last resort", a role which flows logically from the strategy decisions of the London Nato summit in 1990. It would keep a symbolic troop presence in Europe and a rapid-buildup highly mobile reserve force at home. The European Nato pillar would be responsible for regular security management within the (then) agreed-upon (East-West, or CSCE) framework for troops, conventional weapons and French and British nuclear forces.

This model has many advantages. The perennial debate about strategy and burden-sharing<sup>31</sup> would become easier: more equal-based, presumably more open and rational. The institutional pressure for compromise solutions would be maintained, probably expanded because it operates among equals.- The unified Germany would be tied in by this restructured Nato even more strongly than by the old one - because the new Nato is based on a genuine and closely knit texture of political unity. The irony or beauty of the thing is that Germany's very drive for greater (relative) autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S.<sup>32</sup> would be the motor for creating European unity with its binding effect on Germany because that is the only way to obtain the desired autonomy - collectively. Hence the model would, at the same time, avoid "singularizing" Germany.- Finally, the danger for at least Western Europe to relapse into the pre-1945 kind of international system is fairly remote under this model.

But what about Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? On the present assumption Nato remains a traditional alliance directed at potential external threats, i.e. primarily the Soviet Union. President Bush's suggestion that Nato's "enemy today is uncertainty and instability" per se<sup>33</sup> would appear to be a somewhat abstract substitute. A reinvigorated Nato could probably give the Central and Eastern European states some associate or beneficiary status under treaties creating a kind of security umbrella without granting full membership: i.e. protection against the Soviet threat, the German threat, and a combination of both i.e. of the Hitler-Stalin-pact type.<sup>34</sup> The device might satisfy the security needs of those states but not their collective ego - because it does not accept them as full equals.

The Soviet Union has historically been a great European power, it is a modern super power still that has lost the Cold War. It should by all means be drawn into the European processes and be treated as a legitimate member - not as a virus to be isolated or marginalized. Even the (wrong) impression in Moscow of such intentions could dangerously backfire.<sup>35</sup> To this end, (the new) Nato should negotiate general mutual non-aggression pledges (as in Paris), further specific bilateral agreements on arms reduction and control and their implementation, confidence-building - e.g. more common open strategy discussions, perhaps common planning, etc. A stronger new Nato would be a stronger partner for such agreements; that alone might be considered an improvement over the present situation. Soviet economic ties to the EC is another wide and promising field. And all this can easily be fitted into the newly expanding CSCE framework. Hence, one can hope to avoid marginalization.

The weakness of this model, of course, is its somewhat utopian character. West European political union is not just around the corner. So that the implications of what is specifically transitory about this model need hardly be discussed here.

## VII. European Collective Security

Technically, collective security provides security for all members of a system against a security threat arising inside the system through collective action by all against the violator. It can, of course, be combined with alliance-type collective action against external threats.

Is the inclusion of Central and East European states and of the Soviet Union in such a system a realistic option today? Perhaps not, though that also has been proposed.<sup>36</sup> It might be conceived, however, as the result of a long process of incremental steps enlarging the security relationship between West and East Europe. Each one step would make the following one somewhat easier. One might better start with the old Nato because the high degree of political cohesion of the new Nato sketched under VI. would practically obviate this present model. Art. 10 of the original North



Atlantic Treaty allows for accession of any European state willing to assume the treaty obligations. In such a process Nato would probably undergo important changes: the political, conflict preventing and resolving i.e. collective security function would take precedence over the traditional alliance function. That would mean reversing the old order of priorities.

This model follows the "idealist" interpretation of the present situation. It assumes that the basis for Nato and its "victory" (less over the other side than over the Cold War itself) is the homogeneity of the normative traditions and value system ("common heritage and civilization") shared by all its members: democracy, personal freedom, and the rule of law which the North Atlantic Treaty pledges to develop and protect.

Along these lines it has been argued that once these values will have been accepted in principle and in practice in Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union, then - and only then - can all these states be admitted into a then all-European collective security system.<sup>37</sup>

However, to wait for - and expect soon - such complete homogeneity in a Europe composed of states with so diverse histories and experiences would be to put off the realization of this model indefinitely.

But a collective security system may not necessarily presuppose such homogeneity of political and social values. That may be desirable but not necessary. If it comes to that, there are important differences also among West European states and North America. What would be required as a minimum would be what H.Kissinger once called the establishment of a "legitimate international system": i.e. consensus among participating states not about substantive political and social values but, minimally, about the kinds of objectives a state should be able to pursue internationally. Such a system leaves room for quite some value variations. Consensus is needed that foreign policy goals - whether in strictly security-military or in broader political, economic matters etc. - have to be limited, that they should not

be destructive, i.e. should not jeopardize the very existence of another state or of the system as a whole.<sup>38</sup>

All the important advances made over the past few years:

unilaterally by the Soviet Union or the United States,  
the WPO (soon to dissolve),  
Nato at the Brussels and London meetings 1989, 1990  
bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union:  
TNF Treaty, START negotiations etc.

multilaterally: CNF and CFE treaties, CSCE Paris meeting

if taken together, hopefully would appear to point in one direction: the slow but continuing growth of a consensus that indeed military action of any kind - certainly in the European theater - is a mode of social behavior with diminishing returns, is becoming not only atavistic but collectively self-destructive.<sup>39</sup> This trend would, of course, lessen the need for war prevention through alliances and hence strengthen the prospects of a collective security system. And to the extent that this insight begins to determine policy a "legitimate order" is or may be on its way to becoming reality. That would then be the foundation for a European - North Atlantic Collective Security System which transcends Nato's traditional basis in Western Europe only. There is no reason why Central and East European states should then not become members, with the United States and the Soviet Union serving as members and ultimate guarantors of Europe's security from the fringes. Such a role for both superpowers could be explained and made possible by a) the - relative - decline of their global roles generally or b) at least their - relatively - diminishing relevance for European affairs<sup>40</sup>, or c) by the fact that they both have similar, parallel or complementary interests in a stable, prosperous, conflict-free Europe. From the Soviet (and East or Central European) perspective this interest is Europe's capacity to contain Germany and to provide reconstruction aid to the East; from the American, to bind Germany, to act as a stable partner, and to prevent the Soviet Union from disintegrating. To the extent that it works such arrangement would then also free Europe from hegemonic control of the superpowers.<sup>41</sup>

At the same time, the new collective security system does not exclude closer cooperation - political, economic, security, cultural - among certain nations or subregional groups of nations. On

the contrary, a multiplicity of regional and/or functional sub-groups of nations, alliances, organizations, or institutions will help to stabilize and to balance such future collective security system which will finally merge into or just be the CSCE. Nato and EC are the most obvious cases. But new combinations could be construed and could be helpful: among the states of Central and Eastern Europe located between Nato or EC (unless they join them) and the Soviet Union, i.e. Poland, CSFR, Hungary; among those in South East Europe; or around the Mediterranean in regional terms; others for economic, ecological, cultural objectives, etc.<sup>42</sup>

All that may appear utopian. But hope for this model is precisely in the fact that it demands less in terms of immediate obligations, or transfer of sovereign rights, etc. And movement in that direction will be further reinforced by growing awareness that the goals of survival, security, or welfare cannot be pursued by strictly compartmentalized and unilateral activities such as piling up resources for any one of them, e.g. weapons for security. East and West have come to realize that these goals are embedded in a complex web of multi-sector and multi-actor level interdependence<sup>43</sup> (The first concept refers to functional policy areas, the other to types and levels of actors: private, transnational corporations, nation-states, international organizations or institutions, etc). Both sets of interdependencies are interdependent. Given the complexity of the situation, any attempt to attain the major objectives: survival, security, welfare, can hope to succeed only by cooperative modes of operation - or else all will stand to loose. As a result, even the "unreformed" Nato is reported to be considering a redefinition of the very concept of security as referring to political as well as economic stability of all states in Europe including the Soviet Union.<sup>44</sup>

Which of these models to choose (if this were a matter of rational choice)? Conventional prudence might call for the "realist" alliance model. Long-term trends, however, would appear to point towards the all-European collective security model. It would - and that is important - include those who by their own efforts have moved European history full circle since 1945 - who have finally given the *Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe*<sup>45</sup> its true mean-

ing. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States nor anybody else would be "singularized". And Nato (old type) will have become a useful instrument of the past.... \*)

\*) Überarbeitete, erweiterte und ergänzte Fassung eines Vortrages, den der Verf. im Dezember 1990 auf einer von der Universität Lublin/Polen veranstalteten Konferenz "The Transnational Future of Europe" gehalten hat.

## Notes

- 1 Ronald Steel, "NATO's Last Mission", *Foreign Policy* 76 (Fall 1989), 83, 86-7, 90; Ernst-Otto Czempel, "Die Modernisierung der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft", *Europa-Archiv* 8/1990, 276; Linda B. Miller: "American Foreign Policy: Beyond Containment?", *International Affairs / London* 66/2 (1990), 313-324; Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO's Future in a New Europe: An American Perspective", *International Affairs / London* 63/3 (1990), 495-511; Otto Pick, "New Roles for Old Alliances?", *The World Today* (Oct. 1990), 193-195; Alan Riding: "Redoing Europe", *New York Times*, Apr. 15, 1990, op-ed p.12; Fareed Zakaria, "Germany, in NATO only", *New York Times*, May 2, 1990, A 27 (henceforth NYT); *Abschied von der alten Ordnung: Europas neue Sicherheit*. Strategien und Optionen für die Zukunft Europas, Arbeitspapiere 5 (Gütersloh, 1990): Werner Weidenfeld and Walther Stützel authors of the working papers. - For more systematic recent discussions of a wide range of Nato problems cf. Gregory F. Treverton, ed., *Europe and America beyond 2000* (New York, London, 1990); Lawrence S. Kaplan et al., *Nato after Forty Years* (Wilmington, DE, 1990).
- 2 For texts see *Der Tagesspiegel*, Nov. 20 and 23, 1990.
- 3 See *Süddeutsche Zeitung* Nov. 16, 1990, p.10; *Der Tagesspiegel* Nov. 6, 1990, about the WPO meeting in Budapest; Soviet Minister of Defense D. Jasow after talks in Rome, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* Nov. 20/21, 1990.
- 4 Secretary of Defense Cheney, foreword to a Pentagon study "Soviet Military Power", repr. *Amerika Dienst* Oct. 3, 1990, 1. Nato Secretary General M. Wörner, "NATO's New Decade", *European Affairs* 1/1990, 9; Senator Sam Nunn, "A New Strategy for NATO", *European Affairs* 2/1990, 17.
- 5 John L. Gaddis' formula: *The Long Peace* (New York, Oxford, 1987), esp. chap. 8; id., "One Germany - in both Alliances", *NYT* March 21, 1990.
- 6 See e.g. Secretary General M. Wörner, "NATO's New Decade", *European Affairs* 1/1990, 13; id., "Eine Zeit des unaufhaltsamen Wandels", *NATO-Brief* 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1989), 3-4.
- 7 Secretary General M. Wörner, public address in Budapest, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* Nov. 26, 1990; id., "NATO's New Decade", *European Affairs* 1/1990, 8-15; see also from the former GDR perspective Manfred Müller, "Deutschlands Rolle in einem neugestalteten europäischen Sicherheitssystem", *Europa-Archiv* 6/1990, 221. - Strangely enough former chancellor K.G. Kiesinger as early as June 29, 1956 (before the *Bundestag*) talked about dissolving Nato with removal of the Soviet threat, s. his *Stationen 1949/1969* (Tübingen, 1969), 20.
- 8 Francis Fukuyama generated this debate with his original article "The End of History?", *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), 3-18; cf. "Responses to Fukuyama" by various authors ib. 19-35, "A Reply to my Critics" by Fukuyama ib. (Winter 1989/90), 21-28; Otis L. Graham, "Premature Reports: The 'End of History'", *OAH Newsletter* (May 1990), 3,23.
- 9 Stanley Hoffmann, "A New World and its Troubles", *Foreign Affairs* 69/4 (Fall 1990), 115.
- 9a See e.g. Michael Cox, "Whatever happened to the 'Second' Cold War? Soviet-American Relations: 1980-1988", *Review of International Studies* 16 (1990), 155-172; Fred Charles Iklé, "The Ghost in the Pentagon: Rethinking America's Defense", *The National Interest* (Spring 1990), 16.
- 10 Ken Booth, "Steps toward Stable Peace in Europe: A Theory and Practice of Coexistence", *International Affairs / London* 66/1 (1990), 17, 20-22; Fred Charles Iklé, "The Ghost in the Pentagon" (note 9a), 13-20, from a Reaganite-conservative perspective: he argues against letting concern for European stability ("enduring mindset") stand in the way of even forcibly preventing a possible Soviet attempt to reestablish its East European empire.
- 11 See for discussions of various threat scenarios: East-East, East-West, North-South, e.g. Thomas Enders, "Militärische Herausforderungen Europas in den neunziger Jahren", *Europa Archiv* 10/1990, 321-9; Stanley Hoffmann, "Abschied von der Vergangenheit: Politik und Sicherheit im Europa der neunziger Jahre", *Europa Archiv* 20/1990, 599-601; Fred Ch. Iklé (note 9a), 18-19; William G. Hyland, "America's New Course", *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Spring 1990), 11-12; Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, "Limited Collective Security", *Foreign*

*Policy* 80 (Fall 1990), 89s.; Frank Barnaby, *The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East* (London, 1989).

- 12 Interview with General Geli Viktorowitsch Batenin, *Die Welt*, July 25, 1990.
- 13 See John L.Gaddis, "One Germany in both Alliances", *NYT* March 23, 1990; Michael Cox, "What happened to the 'Second' Cold War?" (note 9a), 171-2.
- 14 Stanley Hoffmann, "Today's NATO - and Tomorrow's", *NYT* May 27, 1990, IV:13.
- 15 It is not necessary to mention any specific sources in this context because practically all the texts adduced here as evidence discuss this problem in one form or other.
- 16 See e.g. White House spokesman M.Fitzwater, *NYT* April 12, 1990, 10.
- 17 See e.g. Czech President V.Havel, quoted in *Der Tagesspiegel*, Nov. 20, 1990, 8; Alexander M.Haig, former Nato Supreme Commander and Secretary of State, "An Alliance for all Europe", *NYT* Jan. 18, 1990. - With little sensibility for the complexity of the issues, former West German Minister of Defense, Rupert Scholz, "Deutsche Frage und europäische Sicherheit", *Europa Archiv* 7/1990, 239-246.
- 18 Text in *Europa Archiv* 4/1990, D 77-84.
- 19 "NATO's New Decade", *European Affairs* 1/1990, 8-15.
- 20 This is clear from the history of American attitudes towards CSCE and official American statements; cf. Stanley R.Sloan (note 1), 499-500.
- 21 See Stanley Hoffmann, "A New World and its Troubles", *Foreign Affairs* 69/4 (Fall 1990), 117 ss.; Stanley R.Sloan (note 1), 499, 508; Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Com., "A New Strategy for NATO", *European Affairs* 2/1990, 13 ss.; Linda B.Miller (note 1), 318; Ronald Steel (note 1), 86-7.
- 22 It has, however, been made by Prague's Foreign Minister J.Dienstbier, see Flynn and Scheffer (note 11), 88.
- 23 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Beyond Chaos: A Policy for the West", *The National Interest* (Spring 1990), 11-12.
- 24 This is the basic approach of the important contribution by Ken Booth (note 10), 32-34 et passim.
- 25 Text of the London Declaration of July 6, 1990 in *NYT* July 7, 1990, p.5; see also articles by Bill Keller, Craig A.Whitney, and R.W.Apple Jr., ib. pp. 1 and 4; see also p.5: for positive Soviet reaction.
- 26 See, e.g., again Ken Booth (note 10), 35-39.
- 27 See Gerhard Heimann: "Die Auflösung der Blöcke und die Europäisierung Deutschlands", *Europa Archiv* 5/1990, 167-172; also Ronald Steel, "Nato's Last Mission", (note 1), 83 ss., 91-95.
- 28 See e.g. William G.Hyland (note 11), 4 ss.; Nato Secretary General M.Wörner, "Eine Zeit des unaufhaltsamen Wandels", *Nato-Brief* 6 (Nov.-Dez. 1989), 4.
- 29 The following section is based on: Ernst-Otto Czempel "Überwindung des Containment", *Europa Archiv* 12/1989, 373-382; id., "Die Modernisierung der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft", *Europa Archiv* 8/1990, 275-286; see also Alan Riding: "Redoing Europe", *NYT* Apr. 15, 1990, op-ed.p.12; Fareed Zakaria, "Germany, in NATO only", *NYT* May 2, 1990, A 27, suggesting "ENATO"; Christopher Layne, "Superpower Disengagement", *Foreign Policy* 77 (Winter 1989/90), 17-19; Stanley Hoffmann, "Abschied von der Vergangenheit" (note 11), 601-606; id., "A Plan for a New Europe", *New York Review of Books* Jan. 18, 1990, 21. See also Werner Weidenfeld, "Europa im Umbruch: Perspektiven einer neuen Ordnung des Kontinents" (note 1), 14-17; Walther Stützel, "Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen europäisch-amerikanischen Sicherheitsstruktur" (note 1), 23-24, 31-37, and suggesting EATO, ibid. 25; Ernest Wistrich, *The United States of Europe* (Lublin/Poland, 1990), 24 et ss.
- 30 The EC Commission in Oct. 1990 proposed inclusion of a mutual assistance clause along the lines of Art. 5 of the 1948 Brussels WEU Treaty into the Rome Treaty, see *EG-Nachrichten: Berichte und Informationen-Dokumentation*, Nr. 10, Oct. 29, 1990, 4-5. The EC Summit Meeting in Rome in Dec. 1990 did commission amendments to the EC Treaty to be completed

by 1993 which would to some extent institutionalize a common EC foreign policy; however, this applies much less to security policy and, contrary to the Commission proposal, even less to defense policy, see *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Dec. 17, 1990, 1 and 6. – See also Giovanni De Michelis, Italian Foreign Minister, "Die EG als Gravitationszentrum: Für ein Europa der vier Kreise", *Integration* 13 (Oct. 1990), 143–149. For detailed discussions of the various ways and possibilities in the densely-grown European treaty network see Hans-Gert Pöttering, "Perspektiven für eine gemeinschaftliche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EG", *Europa Archiv* 11/1990, 341–350; Heinrich Schneider, "Vom KSZE-Prozeß zum Gesamteuropäischen Kooperationsystem: Die europäische Sicherheit und ihr Architekturdilemma", *Integration* 13 (Oct. 1990), 150–164.

- 31 See John R. O Neal, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change", *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (1989), 435–456.
- 32 Evident e.g. in Rupert Scholz (note 17), *passim* (conservative CDU); Gerhard Heimann, "Die Europäisierung Europas – Sprengsatz oder Chance", *Vierteljahresberichte* (Bonn, März 1989), 59–65 (liberal SPD). – That is a structural, not an intentional dynamic: if there is no Soviet threat, why should Germany be a subordinate member of a U.S.-dominated alliance?, see Stanley Hoffmann: "Today's NATO- and Tomorrow's", *NYT* May 27, 1990, IV:13.
- 33 Commencement speech, Oklahoma State University, May 4, 1990, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (May 14, 1990), 723, 725.
- 34 See Stanley Hoffmann, "Abschied von der Vergangenheit" (note 11), 600; *id.*, "Today's Nato..." (note 32).
- 35 See e.g. Ken Booth, "Steps toward Stable Peace" (note 10), 42.
- 36 Walther Stützle, "West und Ost in einem Bündnis", *DIE ZEIT* 22 (May 25, 1990), 4; *id.* (notes 1 and 29), 19, 25–30; Comment (anon.), *NYT* June 18, 1990, A 20, "How to make Europe Secure".
- 37 This proposition is emphasized by Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, "Limited Collective Security" (note 11), 81 et ss.
- 38 See Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston, 1964); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics* 30/2 (Jan. 1978), 167–214; more recently Ken Booth (note 10), 27–29.
- 39 These points are emphasized by Stanley Hoffmann, "Abschied von der Vergangenheit" (note 11), 605; Clifford E. and Charles A. Kupchon, "A Tune for Europe from a Concert of Old", *The International Herald Tribune*, July 7/8, 1990.
- 40 See Linda B. Miller, "American Foreign Policy" (note 1), 320.
- 41 See Ronald Steel, "Nato's Last Mission" (note 1), 94; Christopher Layne, "Superpower Disengagement" (note 29), 30 et ss., 38; Stanley Hoffmann, "A Plan for a New Europe" (note 29), 21; Stanley R. Sloan, "Nato's Future..." (note 1), 511: "... the Soviet Union could share the responsibility with all other European nations, with the United States and with Canada for discouraging the threat or use of military force in relations between participants of the system." – Michael Staack, "Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik auf dem Weg in ein neues Europa", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 4/5 (Jan. 19, 1990), 28.
- 42 See Stanley Hoffmann, "Today's NATO..." (note 32); Pöttering, "Perspektiven..." (note 30), 348; Z. Brzezinski, "Beyond Chaos" (note 23), 8, 10–12; Jürgen Nötzold and Reinhardt Rummel, "Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Europäischen Ordnung", *Außenpolitik* (1990), 219–220.
- 43 Jürgen Nötzold and Reinhardt Rummel, "Auf dem Wege..." (note 42), 217–8, 223–4; Neville Brown, "New Paradigms for Strategy", *The World Today* (June 1990), 115–118.
- 44 Report on the Nato Foreign Ministers' fall 1990 meeting in Brussels, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 18, 1990.
- 45 Ronald Steel, "Nato's Last Mission" (note 1), 93–95, talks about "undoing Yalta". But his concern appears to be similar.