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Daniel Dieckelmann

dieckelmann

Doktorand

Adresse
Lansstraße 5-9
14195 Berlin

Daniel Dieckelmann is a PhD candidate of Economics at the John F. Kennedy Institute of Freie Universität Berlin.

His research fields are Macro-Finance, Economic History, Financial Stability, and Systemic Risk.

With a double background in Information Systems and Economics, Daniel is further interested in machine learning and the history of economic thought. His current research explores the quantitative history of banking crises and the possibility of their prediction.

Daniel has worked for the European Central Bank, in the financial sector, and for tech start-ups.

During his PhD studies, Daniel has been hosted by Cornell University, the Bank of Israel, and the Institute for New Economic Thinking for research stays.

Download Daniel’s CV here.

2020-2021:

Booms, Busts, and Business Cycles: Economic Growth and Financial Development in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

Intermediate undergraduate economics, Freie Universität Berlin

Download Syllabus (2020)


2018-2019 & 2020:
Money, Banking, and Financial Crises: A historical North American perspective.

Intermediate undergraduate economics, Freie Universität Berlin

Download Syllabus (2020)


2013-2014:
Introductory Statistics.

Undergraduate economics, Heidelberg University

Mentoring Team:

Prof. Dr. Max Steinhardt, Freie Universität Berlin (First advisor)

Prof. Matthew Baron, PhD, Cornell University (Second advisor)

Prof. Dr. Moritz Schularick, University of Bonn

Priv.-Doz. Dr. Till Strohsal, Freie Universität Berlin

 

Working Papers

 

Cross-Border Lending and the International Transmission of Banking Crises

Collaboration with the Bank of Israel

Abstract: This paper introduces a new transmission channel of banking crises where sizable cross-border bank claims on foreign countries with high domestic crisis risk enable contagion to the home economy. This asset-side channel opposes traditional views that see banking crises originating from either domestic credit booms or from cross-border borrowing. I propose a combined model that predicts banking crises using both domestic and foreign factors. For developed economies, the channel is predictive of crises irrespective of other types of capital flows, while it is entirely inactive for emerging economies. I show that policy makers can significantly enhance current early warning models by incorporating exposure-based risk from cross-border lending.

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Beyond Boom and Bust: Causes of Banking Crises, 1870–2016

with Matthew Baron, Cornell University

Abstract: We systematically reassess the economic historiography of banking crises for 46 countries over the past 150 years to document how their main causes have developed over time. Banking systems have become more resilient against shocks to the real economy with economic development, making financial shocks the prevalent cause of crises today. However, only about 40% of all banking crises with widespread bank failures are credit booms gone bust, making an increasing share of banking crises the result of international contagion. Prior to the 1970s, bank equity returns proxying for banking stability are sensitive to trade, commodity, and domestic GDP shocks, but less so to past real estate returns and credit booms—whereas the reverse is true afterwards.


Historical Banking Crises: New Evidence on their Causes and Severity

In After 2008: The New Economics of Debt and Crisis. University of Chicago Press.

Book chapter, work in progress.


Market Sentiment, Financial Fragility, and Economic Activity: The Role of Corporate Securities Issuance

Abstract: Using new quarterly U.S. data for the past 120 years, I show that sudden reversals in equity and credit market sentiment approximated by several measures of corporate securities issuance are highly predictive of banking crises and recessions. Deviations in equity issuance from historical averages also help to explain economic activity over the business cycle. Crises and recessions often occur independently of domestic leverage, making the credit-to-GDP gap a deficient early-warning indicator historically. The fact that equity issuance reversals predict banking crises without elevated private credit levels, suggests that changes in investor sentiment can trigger financial crises even in the absence of underlying banking fragility.

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Dahlem Research School
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
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